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JURISDICTION 
 This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j). 
INTRODUCTION 
 This appeal arises from an administrative land use decision originally made by the 
San Juan County Planning and Zoning Commission (“Planning Commission”) as the 
“land use authority” pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-103(29), upheld by the San Juan 
County Commission (“County Commission”) as the “land use appeal authority” under 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-701(1), and upheld on further appeal by the Seventh Judicial 
District Court in and for San Juan County, State of Utah (the “District Court”).  
The land use decision at issue is the September 14, 2015 decision of the Planning 
Commission (the “P&Z Decision”) not to revoke an amended conditional use permit (the 
“Amended CUP”) held by Sustainable Power Group, LLC (“sPower”) to construct and 
operate a large wind turbine electric generating facility (the “Wind Facility”), comprising 
27 wind turbines (“Turbines”) that are approximately 453 tall – taller than any other 
building in the entire state of Utah – near Monticello, Utah. (R1772-73.) 
Northern Monticello Alliance, LLC (“NMA”) is comprised of and represents land 
owners (“NMA Members”) who own individual parcels of 5-20 acres which total 70 acres 
land (the “NMA Property”) that is essentially surrounded by the Wind Facility. NMA asks 
this Court to remand the P&Z Decision not to revoke the Amended CUP to the Planning 
Commission. Such remand to the Planning Commission is essential and required for three 





First, the Planning Commission failed to “make findings of fact or conclusions of 
law that are adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review,” as required 
by McElhaney v. City of Moab, 2017 UT 65, ¶ 41, __ P.3d __.  The Planning Commission 
is the only body that can make findings of fact that are relevant to the legal standards 
governing its decision before any appeal authority or court can undertake meaningful 
appellate review.  See id.  
Second, at the hearing on revocation, NMA was denied any meaningful opportunity 
to participate and present evidence in support of revocation of the Amended CUP to the 
Planning Commission to protect the NMA Members’ property interests. Third, the process 
by which the Commission upheld the P&Z Decision was illegal under the San Juan County 
Zoning Ordinance and the County Land Use, Development, and Management Act 
(“CLUDMA”), Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-101 et seq., and must be overturned. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
 Issue 1: Whether the District Court erred by declining to review whether the 
Planning Commission’s verbal land use decision was supported by substantial evidence 
under the standard articulated in McElhaney v. City of Moab, 2017 UT 65, __ P.3d __. 
Standard of Review:  The application of the wrong standard is a question of law. 
See, e.g., Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); T.B. v. M.M.J. (State 
ex rel. R.N.J.), 908 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Appellate review of a district 
court’s determination of a question of law is reviewed for “correctness,” which means that 
“the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the 





Issue Preserved:  NMA preserved Issue 1 by timely asserting before both the 
County Commission and the District Court that the Planning Commission’s decision was 
not supported by substantial evidence. (R1972; R1975; R2394-400.) NMA specifically 
argued to the District Court that the McElhaney standard for determining substantial 
evidence should be applied as soon as that standard was articulated by the Utah Supreme 
Court. (R2394-400.) 
Issue 2:  Whether the District Court erred by failing to direct the County 
Commission to remand consideration of revocation of the Amended CUP to the Planning 
Commission to conduct a plenary evidentiary hearing with instructions to allow NMA to 
participate and submit evidence on why the Amended CUP should be revoked, as required 
by the Due Process Clause of the United States and Utah Constitutions and Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-27a-706(2)  
Standard of Review: “Due process challenges are questions of law.” Augustus v. 
Vernal City, 2017 UT App 195, ¶ 14, 407 P.3d 1007. Appellate review of a district court’s 
determination of a question of law is reviewed for “correctness” and no deference is given 
to the determination of the district court. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Issue Preserved:  NMA preserved Issue 2 by timely raising its arguments both 
before the Commission (R1972; R1975) and before the District Court, in NMA’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment on appeal from the Commission’s decision to uphold the P&Z 
Decision. (R2400-03.)  
Issue 3:  Whether the District Court erroneously ruled that reconsideration by the 





Amended CUP to the Planning Commission with instructions to allow NMA and its 
Members to fully participate in a hearing where revocation would be considered under a 
non-deferential standard of review) was legal, where no state statute or county ordinance 
provides for or establishes a mechanism for the County Commission, as the appeal 
authority, to reconsider its final and issued decisions. 
Standard of Review:  Whether a land use decision is illegal is a question of law. 
Outfront Media, LLC v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2017 UT 74, ¶ 12, 416 P.3d 389. Appellate 
review of a district court’s determination of a question of law is reviewed for “correctness” 
and no deference is given to the determination of the district court. See State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).  
Issue Preserved:  NMA preserved Issue 3 by timely raising its arguments both 
before the County Commission during NMA’s appeal of the original land use decision 
(R1972; R1975) and before the District Court in NMA’s Motion for Summary Judgment 







STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Issuance of the Amended CUP 
On June 29, 2012, Wasatch Wind Intermountain, through its subsidiary Latigo Wind 
Park, LLC (“Wasatch Wind/Latigo”), filed an application for a conditional use permit to 
construct the Wind Facility in an A-zone of San Juan County (the “County”) near 
Monticello, Utah. (R0875).  The Wind Facility surrounds the NMA Property, which is 
sometimes referred to as “inholding parcels.” (R0492, R0922.)  Prior to the proposal to 
build the Wind Facility, the NMA Members purchased the NMA Property to build cabins 
with views of the mountains on large (5-20 acre) lots. (R0888.)   
On July 5, 2012, the Planning Commission held a hearing and approved a 
conditional use permit (the “July CUP”) to operate the Wind Facility. (R1336.) NMA 
Members never received notice of the hearing and subsequently learned that the Planning 
Commission had approved the July CUP.  (R0951, R0959-60.) NMA timely filed a written 
complaint, objecting to approval of the July CUP.  (R1921.)  In response to the written 
objection, the Planning Commission held another hearing on the July CUP on October 4, 
2012. (R0919–1005; R1336.) 
At the October 4, 2012 Public Hearing, the Planning Commission issued the oral 
Amended CUP, which superseded the July CUP. (R1952.)  The Amended CUP included 
mitigation conditions, which must be found in the minutes and transcript of the October 4, 
2012 Public Hearing (the “October 4, 2012 Transcript”). (R0998, R1952.) The October 





However, there is no document setting forth the terms of the Amended CUP or the 
mitigation conditions proposed and agreed to by the applicant, Wasatch Wind/Latigo, or 
imposed by the Planning Commission.  
Among the conditions proposed by Wasatch Wind/Latigo and accepted by the 
Planning Commission at the Public Hearing was the condition that, if a purchase agreement 
could be reached, Wasatch Wind/Latigo would purchase the inholding NMA Property. 
(R0963-64.) If no agreement could be reached, then specific mitigation steps for Sound, 
Light and Flicker would be taken as to the NMA Property. (Id.)  
In accordance with the purchase condition of the Amended CUP, on or about 
February 12, 2013, NMA Members and Wasatch Wind/Latigo entered into a written 
Option to Purchase Real Property (“Purchase Option”), which required Wasatch 
Wind/Latigo to purchase the NMA Property “prior to commencing any significant 
construction activities of any wind farm project on parcels adjacent to the [NMA] 
Property.” The Purchase Option is attached for convenience as Addendum H. 
(R0619-0643.) San Juan County Zoning Ordinance 6-9 provides that conditional use 
permits expire within a year after issuance “[u]nless there is substantial action” on the 
permit. The County may allow one extension of up to six months when in the public 
interest. Id. The term of the Purchase Option was for two years in order to allow Wasatch 
Wind/Latigo to move forward in developing the Wind Facility within the 18-month 
window provided by ordinance. Had Wasatch Wind/Latigo been unable timely to comply 
with the Amended CUP, it could decline to exercise the Option and would not be “stuck” 





A specific condition and requirement of the Purchase Option was that NMA would 
withdraw its then pending appeal of the approval of the Amended CUP to the County 
Commission, acting as the Land Use Appeal Authority.  (R0621-22.) 
In reliance upon the Purchase Option, NMA withdrew its appeal of the Amended 
CUP to the County Commission and the Amended CUP became final and not subject to 
any further appeal or review.  (R0621, R2087-88.) The Purchase Option did not require 
Wasatch Wind/Latigo to purchase the NMA Property if the construction of the Wind 
Facility did not go forward.  (R0620, R2088-89.)  However, Wasatch Wind/Latigo 
subsequently did commence significant construction activities to avoid expiration of the 
Amended CUP prior to obtaining a building permit on February 3, 2014.  (R2071.)  
Nevertheless, Wasatch Wind/Latigo failed to exercise the Purchase Option and never 
purchased the NMA Property. (R2088.) 
In or about January of 2015, Wasatch Wind/Latigo assigned their interest in the 
Wind Project to Sustainable Power Group, LLC (“sPower”). (R1993-94.)  sPower, as 
successor in interest to Wasatch Wind/Latigo, assumed all benefits and liabilities of 
Wasatch Wind/Latigo, including the obligation to comply with all mitigation requirements 
of the Amended CUP and to purchase the NMA Property pursuant to the Purchase Option. 
sPower also failed and refused to exercise the Purchase Option prior to its expiration on 
February 13, 2015. 
B. Proceedings to Revoke Amended CUP 
After the County received complaints that sPower had failed to comply with the 





Planning Commission held a public hearing on September 9, 2015, to determine whether 
the Amended CUP should be revoked pursuant to San Juan County Zoning Ordinance 6-
10 for failure to comply with the conditions upon which the Amended CUP was issued. 
(R0174-75.) Surprisingly, at the hearing the Planning Commission muzzled NMA by 
precluding NMA and NMA Members from presenting any evidence or argument regarding 
sPower’s violations of the conditions of the Amended CUP in support of revocation. 
(R1971-72.)  Among the evidence that NMA was barred from presenting to the Planning 
Commission in support of revocation of the Amended CUP was the failure of sPower to 
fulfill either the purchase requirement or alternative mitigation requirements of the 
Amended CUP. (R1772-1967.) 
After hearing sPower’s presentation, and after prohibiting NMA Members from 
participating in the hearing, the Planning Commission decided to postpone its 
determination on revocation pending review of “other pertinent information.” (R0721-22.) 
At a public meeting on September 14, 2015, the Planning Commission issued an oral ruling 
that sPower had complied with the conditions of the Amended CUP. (R0724.) Once again, 
NMA was prohibited from speaking or submitting any evidence to the Planning 
Commission. In fact, the Chair of the Planning Commission seized materials NMA tried to 
present to the Planning Commission. (R0190.)  
The Planning Commission failed to issue any written findings of fact or conclusions 
of law and voted not to withdraw the Amended CUP on a roll call vote. (R0724). The 
Planning Commission failed to identify what “other” information, if any, it reviewed 





Commission failed to make any a record of the evidence it considered in reaching the P&Z 
Decision.  (R0724.) 
C. Appeal of Decision Not to Revoke Amended CUP 
NMA timely appealed the decision of the Planning Commission to the County 
Commission, sitting as the land use appeal authority, on October 13, 2015, and the parties 
filed written submissions on November 5, 2015. (R1772–1968.) Pursuant to San Juan 
County’s ordinances, the County Commission reviewed the Planning Commission’s 
decision only on a deferential arbitrary and capricious standard, to determine if the 
Planning Commission’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. (R0177.) 
sPower’s November 5, 2015 submission failed to indicate what evidence it had actually 
presented to the Planning Commission prior to the Planning Commission’s September 14, 
2015 decision. (R1319-34.)  
In fact, sPower improperly submitted new evidence that it later admitted was not 
presented to the Planning Commission prior to, or at, the hearing on September 14, 2015.  
The County Commission accepted the new evidence that was never before the Planning 
Commission. (Compare documents sPower contends were submitted to the Planning 
Commission prior to its September 14, 2015, revocation hearing with evidence sPower 
presented to the County Commission on appeal, set forth in Addendum I.)   
The submission of new evidence to the County Commission violated Utah Code 
Ann § 17-27a-707, which only allows a deferential review by a land use appeal authority 





land use appeal authority is allowed, the standard of review is de novo, without deference 
to the land use authority.  Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-707(2). 
D. Reconsideration of Remand to the Planning Commission 
After hearing presentations from both NMA and sPower on November 10, 2015, 
the County Commission issued its Written Decision on December 2, 2015 (“Final Written 
Decision”), reversing the P&Z Decision and remanding to the Planning Commission the 
issue of whether sPower had met all of the mitigation conditions of the Amended CUP, 
including the requirement to purchase NMA Property. (R0173–85.) The County 
Commission also directed the Planning Commission to receive evidence from NMA. 
(R0180.) 
Although nothing in either Utah state law or San Juan County ordinances provides 
for reconsideration by the County Commission, on December 3, 2015, sPower’s counsel 
sent an ex parte communication to the County Commission (the “Request for 
Reconsideration”), demanding that the County Commission immediately reconsider and 
amend its Final Written Decision and implicitly threatening a $100 million damages 
lawsuit if the County Commission did not immediately reverse its Final Written Decision 
and acquiesce to sPower’s demands.  (R0168–72.)1  
sPower’s Request for Reconsideration did not specifically identify any actual 
evidence considered by the Planning Commission to determine that sPower complied with 
                                                 
1 In essence sPower, through its legal counsel, threatened to sue the County for $100 
million simply for remanding the issue of revocation to the Planning Commission for a full 





the Amended CUP. (R0168–72.) Instead, sPower referenced specific materials provided to 
the Planning Commission on September 23, 2015, after the September 14, 2015 P&Z 
Decision. (R0170-71.)  NMA Members were never afforded the opportunity to refute these 
materials, which were never properly before either the Planning Commission or the County 
Commission, or to provide rebuttal evidence before either the Planning Commission or the 
County Commission. (R1977.)   
Neither CLUDMA nor San Juan County Ordinances provide for rehearing or 
reconsideration or provide any sort of mechanism for rehearing or reconsideration. 
Nevertheless, in a closed executive session on December 7, 2015, the County Commission 
reconsidered its Final Written Decision in light of sPower’s $100 million threat. (R0145.)  
On December 8, 2015, the County Commission issued an Amendment to Written Decision 
(“Amended Decision”), whereby it abruptly reversed itself and, rather than remanding the 
issue to the Planning Commission for a fair hearing, upheld the Planning Commission’s 
decision in its entirety. (R0144–49.)  
Commissioner Phil Lyman issued a stinging Dissent (R0157-66), noting, among 
other things, that the County Commission did not know what evidence had been presented 
to the Planning Commission prior to September 14, 2015 P&Z Decision. (See R0161-62.)2 
He also observed that sPower had failed to fulfill the financial mitigation requirements of 
the Amended CUP prior to issuance of a building permit, that sPower’s counsel, Sean 
                                                 
2 Commissioner Lyman’s uncertainty is understandable. Sean McBride said the Planning 
Commission had six documents in front of it.  However, sPower presented 32 documents 





McBride, “falsely” claimed that payment to NMA Members under the Purchase Option 
represented the actual full value of the properties, that sPower’s assertion that “The NMA 
property owners have been paid full value for their properties under the mitigation 
agreement” is “absurd,” and that sPower’s assertion “that it provided mitigation through 
compensation to NMA land owners, is completely false.” (R0162-64.)  Commissioner 
Lyman concluded that the decision of the County Commission to reconvene and to reverse 
the Final Written Order was “misguided and capricious” and that the matter should have 
been remanded to the Planning Commission. (R0163, R0165.) The Dissent (“Lyman 
Dissent”), (R0157-67), is attached for convenience as Addendum J.  
E. First Appeal to District Court. 
NMA timely appealed the Amended Decision to the District Court, arguing that the 
County Commission’s unauthorized reconsideration was arbitrary, capricious, and illegal. 
(R2743-46.) The District Court heard arguments on NMA’s motion for Summary 
Judgment and issued its Memorandum of Decision on the August 30, 2016 Hearing on 
September 9, 2016 (“Initial District Court Decision”). (R2738-46.)  
The District Court stated that it could not find that the County Commission’s 
decision was unsupported by substantial evidence (R2743); however, the District Court did 
find that the County Commission’s decision to reconsider the Final Written Decision in a 
closed meeting without notice to NMA Members was illegal because it denied NMA 
Members the opportunity to present evidence and be heard on the Request for 





NMA’s counsel prepared a proposed order vacating the Amended Decision and 
remanding the matter to the Planning Commission - the only body that had the power to 
determine if the Amended CUP should be revoked utilizing a non-deferential standard of 
review - for renewed proceedings on revocation of the Amended CUP in which NMA 
could, for the first time, actually participate.  (R0091-92.)  However, the District Court 
declined to enter the order remanding the matter to the Planning Commission and instead 
entered an order vacating the Amended Decision and remanding the matter to the County 
Commission solely for the purpose of allowing NMA to belatedly argue against 
reconsideration that has already been granted under threat of a $100 million damage claim. 
(R0096, R2744-45.) 
Understanding that the Initial District Court Decision in actuality did not, and likely 
would not, provide NMA with any real relief, i.e., an evidentiary hearing before the 
Planning Commission, NMA appealed to this Court. (R2748-49) However, the Court, on 
its own motion, summarily dismissed NMA’s appeal, determining that, despite the fact that 
NMA had only prevailed on a single limited issue that would not likely lead to the actual 
relief sought by NMA – the ability to introduce evidence and participate fully in a 
revocation hearing on the Amended CUP before the Planning Commission –  NMA had 
“received what [it] asked for” because the Amended Decision had been vacated. (R2748.)  
F. Remand to County Commission 
NMA’s concern that the limited grounds for the District Court’s remand to the 
County Commission would not result in an evidentiary hearing before the Planning 





parties that it would not hear any additional evidence. (R1977.) Nevertheless, sPower 
submitted an affidavit that – for the first time – purported to testify regarding what evidence 
was presented to the Planning Commission in reaching its September 14, 2015 decision to 
not revoke sPower’s Amended CUP. (R2103-04.)3 
After hearing the arguments otherwise based on the record previously before the 
District Court, and despite the fact that NMA and its Members never had the opportunity 
to present evidence and argument to the Planning Commission regarding revocation, on 
February 21, 2017, the County Commission issued its Amended Written Decision on 
Remand (“Remand Decision”), in which it again upheld the P&Z Decision not to revoke 
the Amended CUP. (R1970-79.) 
In issuing the Remand Decision, the County Commission itself failed to provide any 
findings of fact or reasoning for determining that the P&Z Decision was supported by 
substantial evidence. Instead, it reaffirmed its ex parte and vacated Amended Decision and 
made only the conclusory ruling that “We cannot say that the Planning Commission’s 
decision not to revoke the [Amended] CUP lacked substantial evidence.” (R1978.)   
G. Second Appeal to District Court 
NMA again timely appealed to the District Court. Shortly after NMA filed its 
Complaint and Petition for Judicial Review (the “Second Appeal”) in the District Court, 
the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in McElhaney v. City of Moab, 2017 UT 65, __ 
                                                 
3 This was a transparent effort to attempt to legitimize belated and improper evidence that 
was not before the Planning Commission when it decided not to revoke the Amended CUP 





P.3d__, which clarified the requirements a decision issued by a land use authority such as 
the Planning Commission must satisfy to be supported by substantial evidence. McElhaney 
also prescribed that the proper relief for the failure to make required findings was a remand 
to the land use authority so that it could rectify its errors. 2017 UT 65, ¶ 42.4 
At a hearing on the parties’ competing motions for summary judgment in the Second 
Appeal, the District Court declined to consider whether the County Commission’s Remand 
Decision was supported by substantial evidence, even though the issue of whether 
McElhaney applied was fully briefed by the parties. (R2877) The District Court declared 
that it had already considered the substantial evidence issue in NMA’s previous appeal of 
the since-vacated Amended Decision, and it did not need to do so for the Remand Decision. 
(Id.)  
The District Court then upheld the County Commission’s Remand Decision because 
the County Commission had allowed NMA to argue its case on the rehearing, even though 
NMA was not permitted to present any evidence not already in the record during the 
County Commission rehearing. (R2878.)  Most importantly, NMA was never able to 
present any evidence or argument to the Planning Commission – the only body that can 
consider and act on revocation without any deference.   
Notwithstanding its prior ruling in its Initial District Court Decision that the 
Amended Decision was illegal because it originated from an ex parte communication that 
denied NMA the opportunity “to argue its side of the case with regard to that evidence or 
                                                 
4 Ironically, the original Final Written Decision by the County Commission had come to 





to present its own evidence” (R2741), the District Court stated in its Order Denying 
Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting Respondents’ Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment (“Final Order”) that it “did not mean for the county commission to 
take evidence if it hadn’t taken evidence in the first place,” a legally and factually erroneous 
standard. (R2878.) NMA timely appealed the Final Order.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
First, during NMA’s appeal, the Utah Supreme Court issued McElhaney v. City of 
Moab, which clarified that a land use authority must “produce findings of fact capable of 
review on appeal,” or its decision is arbitrary and capricious.  2017 UT 65, ¶¶ 35-37, 39-
41, __ P.3d __. The Planning Commission, the land use authority in this case, failed to 
produce any findings of fact – written or otherwise – when it determined not to revoke 
sPower’s Amended CUP.  
Under the McElhaney standard, the County Commission, as the land use appeal 
authority, was required to remand the matter back to the Planning Commission to produce 
such findings. The County Commission’s failure to do so was arbitrary and capricious, and 
any subsequent decision holding to the contrary was erroneous. See McElhaney, 2017 UT 
65, ¶ 42.  NMA argued this point before the District Court, however, that court wholly 
failed to consider or apply the McElhaney standard. The District Court’s failure to apply 
binding Utah Supreme Court precedent is erroneous, as it allowed the court to uphold an 
arbitrary and capricious land use decision. 
 Second, the District Court’s decision to uphold the County Commission’s decision 





conditioned on mitigation of the negative effects on neighboring property owners, such as 
NMA Members. If sPower fails to comply with those conditions, those property owners 
will necessarily be injured. Accordingly, NMA Members, as neighboring property owners 
surrounded by the Wind Facility, have a property interest in sPower’s compliance with its 
Amended CUP.  
Consequently, as originally recognized by the District Court in the Initial District 
Court Decision, NMA Members are entitled to due process, which requires “at a minimum, 
adequate notice and ‘an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner.’” Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, ¶ 111, 299 P.3d 990. Such due 
process has been denied to the NMA Members as at no time have they been permitted to 
present any evidence as to sPower’s failure to comply with the mitigation conditions of the 
Amended CUP or to rebut or contradict the evidence and argument presented by sPower. 
In fact, NMA Members were not permitted to participate at all in the Planning 
Commission’s original determination - a denial made significantly more problematic by 
the fact that no additional evidence could be presented or properly considered in the 
subsequent proceedings.  
 Third, the District Court erroneously upheld the County Commission’s illegal 
decision to reconsider its Final Written Decision. When first asked to review the P&Z 
Decision not to revoke the Amended CUP, the County Commission determined that the 
Planning Commission’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Rather than 
appealing that decision to the District Court, as provided by law and ordinance, sPower 





and reversed its Final Written Decision. The County Commission was not authorized by 
any law, ordinance or rule to reconsider its Final Written Decision after it was issued.  The 
District Court erred in allowing the County Commission to reconsider and reverse its Final 
Written Decision.  
ARGUMENT 
 
I. The District Court Erred in Declining to Review Whether the Planning 
Commission’s Decision was Supported by Substantial Evidence Under the 
McElhaney v. City of Moab Standard. 
  
A. The failure of the Planning Commission to produce written findings renders 
its decision not to revoke the Amended CUP arbitrary and capricious. 
 
The Utah Supreme Court has declared that a CLUDMA land use authority, such as 
the Planning Commission, must “produce findings of fact capable of review on appeal,” or 
its decision is necessarily arbitrary and capricious.  McElhaney v. City of Moab, 2017 UT 
65, ¶¶ 35-37, 39-41, ___ P.3d ___. The Court reasoned that without specific findings of 
fact, a land use decision cannot be supported by substantial evidence because “in the 
absence of explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law, the reasoning behind the [land 
use authority’s] decision is an amorphous target” that is unamenable to “meaningful 
appellate review.”  Id. at ¶¶ 31, 41.  
In this case, the Planning Commission, as the land use authority, failed to provide a 
written decision or any explicit findings of fact supporting its decision not to revoke the 
Amended CUP. Accordingly, the P&Z Decision cannot be affirmed under McElhaney. The 
Planning Commission is the only entity authorized to take evidence and make factual 





In fact, the County Commission and the District Court are expressly prohibited from 
divining the Planning Commission’s reasoning in the absence of explicit findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. See McElhaney, 2017 UT 65, ¶¶ 31, 40-41; San Juan County 
Zoning Ordinance 2-2(2)(e). Any attempt to do so is reversible error. Id. ¶ 41. 
Nevertheless, instead of remanding the matter to the Planning Commission for 
findings of fact and conclusions of law capable of appellate review, the County 
Commission upheld the P&Z Decision in its Remand Decision. This was clearly erroneous, 
as the County Commission did not know what documents the Planning Commission 
consulted or what testimony it considered persuasive when it made the P&Z Decision, 
much less the rationale for that decision.5 In upholding the unwritten and unsupported P&Z 
Decision, the Remand Decision was also arbitrary and capricious and is unsupportable 
under a substantial evidence standard. McElhaney, 2017 UT 64, ¶¶ 31, 41. Consequently, 
the District Court was required to overturn the County Commission’s Remand Decision. 
See id.; Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-801(3)(b). 
  
                                                 
5 At the January 3, 2017, hearing before the County Commission, sPower presented the 
Declaration of Sean McBride dated December 22, 2016, that described six mitigation 
documents sPower claims were before the Planning Commission when it determined not 
to revoke sPower’s Amended CUP. However, there is no evidence in the voluminous 
record generated prior to December 22, 2016, that substantiates Mr. McBride’s belated 
assertion that the Planning Commission considered these materials.  (See Lyman Dissent, 
R0161.) This new evidence was not properly before the County Commission and cannot 
be used to infer the Planning Commission’s reasoning in the P&Z Decision. See San Juan 






B. The only remedy is remand to the Planning Commission. 
The only way to cure the chain of arbitrary, capricious and illegal decisions is to 
remand this matter back to the Planning Commission to permit the Planning Commission 
to “craft findings of fact and conclusions of law capable of appellate review,” in accordance 
with McElhaney. 2017 UT 65, ¶ 42. After all, the District Court and the County 
Commission can only review the Planning Commission’s decision based exclusively on 
the evidence and arguments presented to the Planning Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 17-
27a-801(3)(b)(ii); San Juan County Zoning Ordinance 2-2(e).  
Moreover, McElhaney clearly identified the respective obligations of the land use 
authority, the land use appeal authority, and subsequent reviewing courts:  
[T]he district court valiantly attempted to fill the void by parsing the comments 
neighbors made at Council meetings. The district court also examined Google Maps 
and drew conclusions about the traffic that the bed and breakfast might bring. We 
commend the district court for its willingness to take on this project, but it was 
error because the analysis allowed the district court to base its conclusion on what 
it believed the Council's decision relied upon—increased traffic in the 
neighborhood. The district court framed the issue this way even though no 
councilmember explicitly cited traffic as the reason for the decision. The district 
court may have correctly read the tea leaves; traffic was a concern that many 
neighbors raised. But it was the Council's responsibility to define the basis for its 
decision, not the district court's. 
 
McElhaney, 2017 UT 65, ¶ 40 (emphasis added). 
This exact scenario exists in the present matter.  The County Commission and the 
District Court, in reviewing the Planning Commission’s decision for “substantial 
evidence,” have attempted to divine the basis for that decision. However, it was the 





it failed to do.  The County Commission and District Court are powerless to correct that 
error. Remand is the only remedy. 
Even if the District Court or the County Commission were entitled to correct the 
insufficiencies in the P&Z Decision, they failed to do so. The Remand Decision is devoid 
of any findings of fact or rationale for upholding the P&Z Decision. The County 
Commission conclusorily states that “We cannot say that the Planning Commission’s 
decision not to revoke the Latigo CUP lacked substantial evidence.” (R1978.)  
Similarly, the District Court made no findings of fact, but simply declared “the 
Court . . . may, as it has considered and decided these matters on effectively the same record 
in NMA I once before, determine that it need not reconsider them and instead rely on its 
prior determination that, but for the due process violation, the county commission’s 
decision was not illegal and was supported by substantial evidence.” (R2825, R2877.) The 
District Court did not point to any specific findings in the County Commission’s Remand 
Decision and instead relied on its prior analysis of the County Commission’s vacated 
Amended Decision.6 Such scant analysis, which fails to “disclose the steps by which” the 
                                                 
6 The District Court’s reliance on the vacated Amended Decision was faulty in its own 
right, as the District Court had previously nullified the Amended Decision. See VACATE, 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In any event, the District Court’s original 
substantial evidence ruling regarding the vacated Amended Decision was limited to the 
following two sentences: “[T]he County found sound, light, and flicker studies that it relied 
on to conclude that sPower's mitigation efforts met the requirements of the permit. 
Accordingly, the court cannot find that the County's decision was unsupported by 
substantial evidence.” (R2061.) Significantly, there was no evidence before the District 
Court at that time that any of the studies the County Commission relied on in its Remand 
Decision were before the Planning Commission when it made the original P&Z Decision. 






County Commission and District Court reached their conclusions, preclude this Court from 
“protecting the parties and the public from arbitrary and capricious administrative action.” 
McElhaney, 2017 UT 65, ¶ 36.  
C. Mitigation conditions in the Amended CUP have been violated. 
Additionally, the District Court made no effort to consider evidence that “fairly 
detracted” from sPower’s position, in contravention of Utah’s substantial evidence 
standard. See Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 776 P.2d 63, 
68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Had the District Court considered evidence fairly detracting from 
the P&Z Decision, it would realize – even in light of NMA being barred from presenting 
evidence – that there is substantial detracting evidence in the record that sPower failed to 
perform its mitigation obligations under the Amended CUP. Yet the District Court did not 
analyze or even mention that evidence in its Final Order. 
Further, the County Commission failed – or refused – to consider the evidence 
presented by NMA in its “Written arguments for the appeal of the San Juan County 
Planning Commission with Respect to the Latigo Wind Park” dated November 5, 2015 
(“2015 Appeal Brief”), and its nearly 200 pages of supporting documentation (R1629-
1826).  As neither Utah nor San Juan County have adopted any standards to mitigate the 
                                                 
McBride detailing mitigation work is useful to a limited extent, but there is no evidence 
that even this letter was considered by the Planning and Zoning Commission at their 
September 9, or 14, 2015 meetings. The date on the letter would indicate that they would 
not have had the letter, but may have had similar information.”) (emphasis added.) Sean 
McBride’s declaration of what evidence was before the Planning Commission was not 
signed until December 22, 2016, three months after the District Court’s order to vacate the 





negative impact of Sound, Flicker, Light and Ice Throw on properties adjacent to a Wind 
Facility, NMA submitted Oregon state standards for wind farms (R1774-75; R1796-1934) 
and Oregon state standards for wind turbine noise (R1774-75; R1847).  NMA also 
submitted evidence regarding relocation of the Turbines (one of which was moved over a 
mile) after the Amended CUP was approved (R1773, R1794), increased Flicker, Sound 
and Ice Throw impacts on the NMA Property from relocated turbines (R1774; R1948), 
increased Sound impacts based on turbine selection (R0174), and sPower’s failure to 
implement any meaningful light mitigation through “OCAS” or “Dark Sky” technology 
(R1776-78).  
Although, due to the lack of reviewable findings of fact, NMA is still not sure 
exactly what evidence it must combat to demonstrate the lack of substantial evidence, the 
County summarily claims that the evidence in the record demonstrates that sPower 
incorporated as much Flicker, Light, and Sound mitigation to the NMA Property as 
possible. However, the reports, studies, and other mitigation evidence presented by sPower 
fail to provide any meaningful data or analysis relative to mitigation of detrimental effects 
on the NMA Property, which is largely and purposely ignored due to the fact that it was 
under contract to be purchased and incorporated into the Wind Facility.  Entirely ignoring 
the effects of Flicker, Light and Sound on NMA Property is reckless, arbitrary, and 
capricious. 
1. sPower failed to fulfill financial mitigation conditions. 
First, it is indisputable that sPower has failed to provide the financial mitigation 





predecessor, Wasatch Wind/Latigo, proposed financial mitigation that would be 
accomplished in one of two ways: (1) Wasatch Wind/Latigo or its successor would 
purchase the NMA Property if the parties were able to enter into an agreement to do so; or 
(2) if no agreement could be reached, Wasatch Wind/Latigo or its successor would make 
“a value reduction mitigation payment, based on appraisal standard processes.” See 
October 4, 2012 Transcript, (R0963–64). These financial conditions were accepted by the 
Planning Commission. (R099-1003.) Other mitigation conditions were imposed in the 
event that an agreement to purchase the NMA Property could not be reached. (R0963-66.) 
An agreement to purchase was in fact reached.  In the Purchase Option, NMA 
Members were required to withdraw their pending appeal of the approval of the Amended 
CUP.  In reliance on the fulfilment of the approval of the Amended CUP that “all and any 
new land purchase lease deals be in writing for any contiguous and affected landowners … 
at the time of building permit issuance” (R0998), NMA Members withdrew their pending 
appeal, and filed no appeals for two years thereafter (R0158), thus allowing the Amended 
CUP to become final and not subject to any further appeals or review, as NMA was the 
only one to timely appeal following approval of the Amended CUP by the Planning 
Commission.   
However, despite the clear terms of the Purchase Option requiring Wasatch 
Wind/Latigo and its successor, sPower, to purchase the NMA Property prior to 





application for, and receipt of a building permit7 an entire year before the Purchase Option 
expired (R1321), sPower waited until just after the Purchase Option expired, and long after 
it commenced construction, before offering to purchase the NMA Property for a 
significantly lower price than that agreed to in the Purchase Option.  (See R0460.)   
Having purposely failed to exercise its Purchase Option, in violation of its 
commitment to purchase prior to commencement of significant construction activities on 
the Wind Facility, sPower determined that it could instead obtain the NMA Property for as 
little as $3,000.00 per acre (R0455-60) – less than a third of the Purchase Option price – or 
not at all, and leave the NMA Members surrounded by the towering Turbines as close as 
879 feet (268 meters) from the NMA Property. (R2795.) 
While the Wind Facility is now operational, sPower has not paid any financial 
mitigation required by the Amended CUP.  (R0152, R0157-59.) As recognized by 
Commissioner Lyman, “Latigo did not mitigate in relation to the NMA Land Owners” and 
                                                 
7 Because sPower was obligated to demonstrate compliance with the financial mitigation 
conditions of the Amended CUP at the time the building permit was issued, sPower should 
have presented the County with proof of purchase of the NMA Property to demonstrate its 
compliance. Indeed, Marcia Hadenfeld, the chair of the Planning Commission stated that: 
“When they come to Greg (Adams) and Bruce and say, we’re ready for Tower 1, oh, we 
didn’t finish that part, or oh, we didn’t make our payments, Bruce and Greg are going to 
say, then you’re not ready for Tower 1, get out.” (R0972.)  However, Greg Adams, the 
building inspector who was coincidentally the brother of Rob Adams, Director of 
Sustainable Property Holdings for sPower, frankly conceded he had made no effort to 
ensure that sPower had complied with any conditions of the Amended CUP when he issued 
the building permit.  (R2343, 2345-46, 0012, 2357 R0076.)  sPower and the County both 
violated the conditions of the Amended CUP by not assuring that financial mitigation had 






sPower’s false representation that “[t]he NMA property owners have been paid full value 
for their properties under the mitigation agreement is absurd.” Lyman Dissent (R0162-63.) 
2. Any failure by the Planning Commission to clearly enunciate 
the financial mitigation condition does not excuse its violation. 
 
One argument by the County below was that the financial mitigation condition was 
not explicitly made part of the Amended CUP.  This argument springs from the confusion 
arising from the failure of the Planning Commission to create or issue a written conditional 
use permit, requiring one to divine the conditions of the Amended CUP from the 100-plus 
page October 4, 2012 Transcript.  (R0919-1004.)  In reading the October 4, 2012 
Transcript, the only record available as to the specifics of the Amended CUP, a number of 
conditions, including financial mitigation, were proposed by Wasatch Wind/Latigo, 
discussed, and either accepted or rejected by the Planning Commission.  The sometimes-
rambling back and forth discussion is less than a model of clarity.  See R0919-1004. 
The financial mitigation condition was first mentioned by Michelle Stevens, 
representing Wasatch Wind/Latigo, who stated: “We’ve submitted offers for options to 
purchase the 80 acres that you’ve referred to – the in-holding properties.”  (R0924.)  She 
later confirmed that Wasatch Wind/Latigo was trying to buy the NMA Property and 
deferred to Thomas Ellison, counsel for Wasatch Wind/Latigo, to explain the financial 
mitigation condition. (R0943.) Later during the hearing, Mr. Ellison proposed the financial 
mitigation condition as one of a number of conditions to be satisfied at the time of building 
permit issuance to address concerns raised by NMA regarding the severe impact of the 





Ellison: Now, I think it’s quite clear, it’s come up enough tonight, that we 
are interested in buying this property. We do have a valuation difference, 
apparently. We do believe we’ve made a good faith offer and several times 
of what Mr. Cook has indicated, or a range of values for the land. But 
notwithstanding that, we think this Commission needs to understand that its 
decision can go forward, understanding that there will be processes put in 
place, to address, you know, basic concerns. So over and above the 
mitigation, we’ve talked to you about, already, of the specific pain that’s, 
which again, have been indicated to be applicable to these in-holding parcels. 
So even though there are no residences there, we want to preserve the ability 
to construct homes on these parcels with the appropriate mitigation. So those 
payments are there, but the additional thing is to try to address the proximity 
factor that’s associated with these in-holdings. 
 
(R0961.) 
Chairwoman: Just to clarify, you’re not saying that you have to buy the 
property, but you’re saying, if you’ve come into agreement to buy a 
property, it will be done by the time you go ________. 
 
Ellison: That’s correct. If we’re able to come into agreement, we will buy 
it, but otherwise, we’re offering a value reduction mitigation payment, 
based on appraisal standard processes. 
 
 (R0964.) (emphasis added.) 
 This proposed condition was accepted by the Planning Commission, which moved 
forward on the basis of this condition to issue the Amended CUP. (See generally R0988-
R1004.)  The specific language of the adopted motion to approve the Amended CUP was:  
Chairwoman: Okay. Does anyone have an action? I would move that the 
Planning and Zoning Commission amend, or supplement - put an addendum 
on the Conditional Use Permit for Wasatch Wind’s Latigo Wind Park, as 
issued in July 2012, to incorporate as much flicker, light, sound, mitigation as 
possible, and to meet all industry standards of those challenges, and that all - 
reiterating that all and any new land purchase lease deals be in writing for any 
contiguous and affected landowners. I further say that any mitigation and 
standards and conditions of this CUP must be met by any and all project 
development people, be they owners now or in the future, and all of these be 








While this is as clear a statement of a financial mitigation condition as one could 
expect under the circumstances, the County has claimed it is not clear enough.  Ignoring 
its culpability in failing to prepare and issue a written conditional use permit and instead 
relying solely upon verbal statements, the County argues that the financial mitigation 
condition regarding purchase of the NMA Property surrounded by the Wind Facility was 
in reality no condition at all.  First, sPower’s predecessor, through its legal counsel Thomas 
Ellison, clearly not only proposed, but clearly accepted and agreed to this condition.  The 
motion to approve the Amended CUP specifically adopts this condition.  The existence of 
this condition is further verified by the actions of sPower’s predecessor and NMA Members 
who negotiated and signed the Purchase Option following the meeting where the Amended 
CUP was approved. 
Second, any uncertainty or ambiguity in the terms of the Amended CUP is caused 
solely by the failure of the Planning Commission to adhere to the requirements enunciated 
in McElhaney to provide a written record of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The 
County, and not NMA, must bear the consequences of the County’s failure to create a 
written conditional use permit and the County should be estopped from arguing that the 
financial condition is not clearly part of the Amended CUP. 
3. Alternate mitigation conditions have been violated. 
There is no evidence in the record that demonstrates that sPower undertook any of 
the mitigation efforts required in the event an agreement to purchase the NMA Property 





not fulfilled, as none of the evidence of mitigation submitted by sPower provides any 
analysis of Flicker on the NMA Property. (R0759). Indeed, the Updated Shadow Flicker 
Impact Assessment dated January 28, 2014, did not even analyze the effect of Flicker on 
the NMA Property because it explicitly assumed the NMA Property was to be purchased 
by Wasatch Wind/Latigo or its successor pursuant to the requirement in the Amended CUP 
to do so, and the resulting Purchase Option, which was in place at that time. (R0756, 
R0762, R2142.)  
Looking at the Flicker map, it is abundantly clear that relocating Turbines 
substantially closer to the NMA Property subsequent to the issuance of the Amended CUP 
without any further approval increased the Flicker effects and that the NMA Property 
would be affected by Flicker far beyond the 30-hour, 30-day standard articulated by 
sPower’s experts.8 (R0871-72, R0886.) But sPower has not, and cannot provide, based on 
existent studies, any evidence that it has somehow mitigated that Flicker on NMA Property.  
                                                 
8 “Micrositing” is the process of choosing the type of wind turbine and its exact position. 
Each position must comply with several requirements regarding existing wind resource, 
distances from other wind turbines, and neighboring properties. Normally there have to be 
at least 500 m [1,640 ft] between the turbine and the next residence. See National Wind 
Watch  https://www.wind-watch.org/documents/micrositing/  The Amended CUP and its 
requirement of mitigating the detrimental effects of Flicker, Light, Sound, and Ice Throw 
were based on specifically approved Turbine sites subject only to “micrositing." (R0924-
25, 0929, 0963, 1052-53, 1058, 1065, 1071, 1074.)  However, the final Turbine locations 
fail to follow industry standards.  Turbine #9 was moved to within 879 feet of the NMA 
Property and Turbine #18 to the north of the NMA Property was moved from 1,207 feet 
away from the NMA Property to only 715 feet.  (R0203.) There is no evidence in the record 
that the final turbine sites were actually approved by San Juan County or that the County 
agreed to put turbines only 715 and 879 feet away from the NMA properties. While there 
may have been some leeway in the CUP for micrositing, moving Turbine #9 over 1.5 miles 






Further, Sound mitigation evidence submitted by sPower fails because none of the 
analyses account for the noisier GE turbines actually utilized for the Wind Farm. (R0730-
54.)9 Even the most recent Sound mitigation letter dated July 28, 2015, fails to mention the 
switch to the noisier GE turbines. (R0730.) While the letter indicates “the current project 
is proposed to be constructed with wind turbines having a sound power level of 107.5 dBA 
on 80-meter towers,” it does not specify what kind of wind turbines were analyzed or 
whether those unspecified turbines were subsequently utilized by sPower. (R0730.)  
Any conclusion that the July 28, 2015, letter was referring to the Sound levels and 
effects of the GE Turbines currently used on the Wind Farm is mere conjecture.  There is 
simply nothing in the record to indicate what the actual sound data is for sPower’s GE 
Turbines. Further, there is no breakdown of the specific noise impact on the NMA Property 
of the GE Turbines.  In other words, use of the noisier GE turbines disqualifies and 
invalidates the use of the study relying on the quieter Vestas turbines as evidence that 
sPower had employed “as much Sound mitigation as possible” with respect to the NMA 
Property, as required by the Amended CUP.  In fact, not only does it disqualify the study, 
it in fact proves the violation of the Amended CUP through the conscious and intentional 
decision to use noisier GE turbines.10 
                                                 
 
9 The 2013 analysis submitted by sPower assumed that the Vestas turbines would be used. 
(R0833.) 
 
10 Several Vestas turbine models with lower sound levels were available, but not used by 





Furthermore, as sPower readily admits, “the single largest component of flicker and 
sound impact is proximity to the turbine locations.” (R2037.) sPower moved the turbines 
significantly closer to the NMA Property after the Amended CUP was approved. (Compare 
R1207 (the 2012 sound analysis map) with R0743 (the 2013 sound analysis map).) Because 
proximity is the single largest component of Sound and Flicker impact, it is necessarily 
true that, by locating Turbines closer to NMA Property, sPower has increased, not 
mitigated, the Sound and Flicker on NMA Property – no matter what Turbines it used. 
Thus, there is no way the Planning Commission or the County Commission could 
reasonably conclude that sPower has provided as much Sound or Flicker mitigation as 
possible, as required by the Amended CUP. (R.1952.) It was erroneous for the District 
Court to uphold those fatally flawed determinations.  
sPower touts that it negotiated the number of red aircraft safety lights, which flash 
throughout the night, required by the FAA from 27 down to 14. While that claim may seem 
plausible on its face, sPower has not presented evidence regarding which Turbines have 
lights and which do not. Without evidence on that issue, it is impossible to say whether the 
NMA Property will be less impacted by the light from the current Turbine locations than it 
would have been by the light from the approved Turbine locations. If the 14 Turbines 
closest to the NMA Property all have red safety lights, then the negative impact of light on 
NMA Property may be worse now that the Turbines are closer to the Property than when 
all the Turbines had red lights, but were farther away.  
Wasatch Wind, the original developer of the Wind Facility, committed to install 





Facility.  (R 0206.)  Dark Sky Technology uses radar technology to activate flashing red 
aircraft safety lights on each 453-foot Turbine only when an aircraft is in the area, thereby 
dramatically reducing the time periods when the flashing red aviation warning lights are 
in operation. (R206-207.) Michelle Stevens of Wasatch Wind committed to the Planning 
Commission on October 4, 2012, when it was considering the issuance of the Amended 
CUP, to “select FAA approved lighting for towers that minimizes impact to the 
surrounding area” and to “work with the best technology that we can.” (R0930.) 
(emphasis added.) sPower uses Dark Sky Technology at sPower’s Pioneer Wind Park in 
Glenrock, Wyoming, (R0207-08), however, sPower’s plan for the Wind Facility failed to 
incorporate Dark Sky technology. Consequently, the red flashing aircraft warning lights 
on 453-foot-tall Turbines flash continually throughout the night, every night, and can be 
seen for a distance of at least 3.1 miles. (R1062.) This is another clear example of 
sPower’s failure to abide by the conditions of the Amended CUP.11 
Further, sPower’s self-serving representation that it had mitigated detrimental 
Light as much as possible by negotiating with the FAA to reduce the number of Turbines 
required to be lit from 27 to 14 is belied by Wasatch Wind’s Supplemental Statement in 
Support of the Conditional Use Permit Application for the Latigo Wind Park dated 
September 28, 2012, which acknowledges that the FAA does not typically require that 
all turbines be lit – it typically requires only that turbines on the perimeter be lit. (R1062.)  
                                                 
11 In light of sPower’s repeated failure to meet any of the mitigation standards in the 
Amended CUP, it is not surprising that it “hit the panic button” and threatened a $100 
million damage claim when the County Commission simply remanded the issue of 





Additionally, there nothing in the record, excepting bald assertions in self-serving 
letters from sPower, that indicates that sPower actually negotiated with the FAA to install 
fewer red lights than required by FAA regulations. sPower has not provided the federal 
regulations or any documentation of their negotiations with the FAA. There is, accordingly, 
no evidence that sPower has provided any Light mitigation relative to the NMA Property. 
In fact, the opposite is true.  The County’s treatment of NMA Property is the epitome 
of arbitrariness. Turbine #9 was relocated over a mile closer to the NMA Property from the 
original location approved by the Amended CUP. That Turbine, which is 453 feet tall, is 
now within 879 feet of the NMA Property. (R1773, R1794.) sPower has admitted that this 
relocation increases, not mitigates, the Flicker, Light, and Sound affecting the NMA 
Property. (R2037.) Yet, the County and the District Court have ignored the violation of the 
Amended CUP and San Juan County Zoning Ordinance 6-1, which require sPower, as the 
holder of a conditional use permit, to “mitigate or eliminate the detrimental impacts” of its 
conditional use on the NMA Property.  
If Turbine #9 had been relocated the same distance to the south-east, it would now 
be in the middle of Monticello. Undoubtedly, the County would require abundant up-to-
date mitigation studies and reports regarding every piece of property that could conceivably 
be negatively affected by that relocation. The County is not entitled to indiscriminately 
ignore the negative effects of the relocation simply because the Turbines were moved 
closer to NMA Property, rather than closer to town. The requirement to undertake “as much 
flicker, light, sound, mitigation as possible” is meant to protect all property owners, not 





Despite NMA’s arguments regarding these issues to the District Court, that court 
chose not to analyze the arguments at all. (R2875-78.) That decision was clearly erroneous, 
and this Court should reverse the District Court’s Final Order.  
II. The District Court’s Final Order deprived NMA Members of their due process 
rights under the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution. 
While the District Court’s Order properly found that NMA Members are entitled to 
due process, the District Court’s Order is illegal.  It violates the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution, which provides that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. It further violates the Utah Constitution, which provides 
that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.”  
UTAH CONST. Art. I, § 7.12   
If a party’s property interest is at stake, “[d]ue process requires, at a minimum, 
adequate notice and ‘an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner.’” Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, ¶ 111, 299 P.3d 990 (quoting Salt 
Lake Legal Defender Ass'n v. Atherton, 2011 UT 58, ¶ 2, 267 P.3d 227). “Typically, a 
hearing must provide parties the opportunity to present ‘evidence, objections, and 
arguments, to the end that the ... court may be enabled to fairly and intelligently pass upon 
and determine the questions presented for decision.’” Id. (quoting McGrew v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608, 616 (1938) (emphasis added)). 
                                                 
12  Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-706(2) also requires the appeal authority to “respect the due 





A. NMA Members are entitled to due process protections. 
  NMA Members have a property interest in the unrestricted use and enjoyment of 
the NMA Property, which is now surrounded by the Wind Facility and its towering 
Turbines. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 54 (1993) 
(acknowledging a property owner’s interest in “the right to unrestricted use and enjoyment” 
of its property); cf. View Condominium Owners Ass’n v. MSICO, L.L.C., 2004 UT App 
104, ¶ 17, 90 P.3d 1042 (restrictive covenants are “strictly construed in favor of the free 
and unrestricted use of property”).  
The Planning Commission’s decision, erroneously upheld by both the County 
Commission and the District Court, not to revoke the Amended CUP in the face of 
sPower’s continuing failure to comply with multiple conditions of the Amended CUP to 
mitigate the impact of the Wind Facility on the NMA Property, either through purchase or 
other mitigation, is depriving NMA Members of any economically viable use or peaceful 
enjoyment of the NMA Property.   
In fact, the property that NMA Members purchased for primary and vacation homes 
to be built now sits in the middle of a beehive of Turbines, the closest of which is only 268 
meters away, with noise levels of between 107.5 and 108 decibels, lights which flash all 
night, blades 80 meters long that create a flicker of reflected sunlight and glare and which, 
in the winter time, can throw chunks of ice large enough to kill a person up to 312 meters, 
or over 1,000 feet – a sufficient distance to reach a portion of the NMA Property.  (R0204, 





Accordingly, the County must provide NMA a meaningful opportunity to be heard, 
including an opportunity to present evidence, objections, and arguments to the Planning 
Commission as to why the Amended CUP should be revoked for sPower’s multiple failures 
to abide by the conditions upon which it was given approval to construct and operate the 
Wind Facility. The County has denied NMA this opportunity, and the District Court erred 
by upholding this denial. 
B. NMA Members have never been given a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard. 
 
It is insufficient that NMA be given a belated opportunity to argue before the County 
Commission or the District Court because those entities can only review the Planning 
Commission’s decision exclusively on the evidence and arguments presented to the 
Planning Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-801(3)(b)(ii); San Juan County Zoning 
Ordinance 2-2(e). These reviews have a much more deferential “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard favoring the holder of a conditional use permit.  The Planning Commission is the 
only body where the standard of review is whether or not a conditional use permit should 
be revoked based on a preponderance of the evidence.  See San Juan County Zoning 
Ordinance 6-10. 
Simply put, the Planning Commission is the only body that can provide NMA any 
“meaningful” opportunity to present its case, especially where the Commission must 
“presume that the [Planning Commission’s] decision applying the land use ordinance is 





Commission, the County Commission, nor the District Court has ever afforded NMA a 
“meaningful opportunity to be heard.” 
Before the Planning Commission, NMA will be able to provide evidence concerning 
sPower’s failure to abide by not only the purchase condition of the Amended CUP by not 
purchasing the NMA Property, but also the alternate financial mitigation conditions, as 
well as the detrimental effects sPower’s actions have had on NMA’s Property. As discussed 
above, there is no meaningful data in the record regarding mitigation of the adverse impacts 
of the Wind Facility to the NMA Property. This is a direct result of NMA’s being barred 
from presenting evidence or argument before the Planning Commission and the assumption 
in sPower’s studies that the NMA Property would be purchased and integrated into the 
Wind Facility.  
C. The Planning Commission lacked the evidence it needed to make a fair 
decision on revocation. 
 
If NMA had been permitted to participate in the hearing before the Planning 
Commission, the record would contain all of NMA’s evidence, and sPower would have to 
rebut that evidence with current studies and reports specific to the NMA Property, rather 
than the extant reports that excluded the NMA Property. Otherwise, sPower would fail to 
demonstrate compliance with the requirements of the Amended CUP. sPower would also 
have to explain why, after committing to the Planning Commission to purchase the NMA 
Property, sPower failed and refused to exercise the Purchase Option.  
NMA’s arguments before the County Commission and the District Court were 





Planning Commission for two reasons.  First, the County Commission and District Court, 
as appellate bodies, were limited to the deficient record created by the Planning 
Commission.  Second, ambiguities and uncertainties in the substance of the Amended CUP 
due to the failure of the Planning Commission to prepare and adopt a written Amended 
CUP13 made it impossible for the County Commission or the District Court to discern the 
basis for the Planning Commission’s decision not to revoke the Amended CUP. This 
limited consideration is a direct and unacceptable result of the Planning Commission’s 
decision to permit only sPower to participate in the revocation hearing. 
Unsurprisingly, sPower limited the discussion before the Planning Commission to 
the specific mitigation requirements mentioned in the October 4, 2012 Transcript of the 
meeting approving the Amended CUP. sPower did not address the general requirements 
placed on every CUP by Chapter 6 of the San Juan County Zoning Ordinance to “mitigate 
or eliminate … detrimental impacts,” to “impose such requirements and conditions as are 
necessary for the protection of adjacent properties and the public welfare,” to ensure that a 
conditional use, such as the Wind Facility, “will not, under the circumstances of the 
particular case, be detrimental to the health, safety or general welfare of persons residing 
or working in the vicinity, or injurious to property or improvements in the vicinity,”  and 
to ensure “[t]hat the proposed use will comply with intent, spirit, regulations and conditions 
specified in this Ordinance for such use and the zoning district where the use is to be 
                                                 
13 A review of the October 4, 2012 Transcript amply demonstrates that not even the 
Planning Commission knew exactly what conditions it actually imposed on the Amended 





located, as well as make the use harmonious with the neighboring uses in the zoning 
district.”  San Juan County Zoning Ordinance 6-1, 6-4 (R0559-60.) (See also R0776-0862.)  
The Planning Commission refused to receive evidence from NMA regarding 
increased Ice Throw risk based on relocation of the Turbines, sPower’s failure to provide 
any financial mitigation to NMA Members, sPower’s failure to implement Dark Sky 
Technology, and the County’s issuance of the building permit without requiring evidence 
of compliance with the conditions of the Amended CUP.  Accordingly, neither the County 
Commission nor the District Court could consider such evidence. 
D. NMA Members were deprived of due process. 
Where NMA Member’s property interests are at stake, the Planning Commission’s 
failure to receive evidence of adverse impacts by affected parties violated NMA’s due 
process rights. NMA is entitled to meaningfully raise its arguments regarding, inter alia, 
the safety hazards and other pitfalls resulting from the relocation of the Turbines. And it 
will only have the opportunity to do so by presenting its evidence and making its arguments 
to the Planning Commission. 
In its decision, the District Court reinforced the County’s decision to deny NMA 
any meaningful participation. Rather than allow NMA present its own evidence to the 
Planning Commission, the District Court declared that its earlier direction to the 
Commission to permit NMA to present evidence “did not mean for the county commission 
to take evidence if it hadn’t taken evidence in the first place.” (R2878.) The District Court, 
consequently, upheld the Commission’s Remand Decision—again based solely on the one-





By upholding the Planning Commission’s decision to preclude NMA from 
participating in the revocation hearing, the District Court has wrongfully limited NMA’s 
ability to meaningfully present its full panoply of evidence, objections, and arguments. See 
Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84. The District Court has, therefore, violated 
NMA’s right to Due Process.  
III. The District Court erroneously ruled that reconsideration by the County 
Commission of its issued Final Written Decision was legal, where no state 
statute or county ordinance authorizes the County Commission to 
reconsider its final and announced decisions. 
The District Court further erred by not reinstating the County Commission’s Final 
Written Decision remanding the matter to the Planning Commission with instructions to 
allow NMA to participate. Under CLUDMA and San Juan County Zoning Ordinances 2-3 
and 6-7, the County Commission had authority to hear and act on NMA’s appeal of the 
P&Z Decision.  Pursuant to that authority, and in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 17-
27a-708, which provides that “[a] decision of an appeal authority takes effect on the date 
when the appeal authority issues a written decision,” and that “[a] written decision … 
constitutes a final decision under Subsection 17-27a-801(2)(a),” the County Commission 
rendered its Final Written Decision on December 3, 2015.  
However, rather than petitioning for review with the District Court, which was the 
only avenue available to sPower following the Final Written Decision (R0184), sPower 
sent its Request for Reconsideration to the Commission, demanding reconsideration and 





the County Commission did not acquiesce to sPower’s demands by “4:00 p.m. MST 
Monday, December 7, 2015” – only four days hence. (R0168-72.) 
A. The County has no authority or mechanism for rehearing or 
reconsideration. 
 
Neither CLUDMA nor San Juan County ordinances provide for or allow a final 
written decision to be reconsidered or amended after issuance by the County Commission.  
Indeed, pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 17-27a-801, the only further relief that may be sought 
by an adversely affected person is not to demand that the County Commission reconsider 
and amend its decision, but to “file a petition for review of the decision with the district 
court within 30 days after the local land use decision is final.”  
While the County has previously noted that the Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
“[i]nherent in the power to make an administrative decision is the authority to reconsider a 
decision,” Clark v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 914, 915 (Utah 1981), it was determining only 
whether the State Engineer was empowered “to adopt rules which provide for rehearings.” 
Id. The State Engineer had rules in place that implemented and governed its authority to 
reconsider its decisions, and the Court determined that “the Engineer did not err in 
construing the rules to permit the granting of the petition for rehearing.” Id.  
The County, on the other hand, has not established any mechanism to permit and 
control reconsideration of final and issued decisions of the County Commission in its role 
as the land use appeal authority. The County could, if it so desired, easily establish such 
rules by ordinance under Utah Code §17-27a-701, but for whatever reason, it has mandated 





it to the district court. (R0298.) Thus, any inherent authority the County Commission may 
have to reconsider its decisions has not been implemented by a duly adopted ordinance.  
Furthermore, CLUDMA does not create a global automatic initiation of a county’s 
inherent authority to reconsider its decisions. Unlike Section 63G-4-302 of the 
Administrative Procedures Act, which constrains administrative agencies to reconsider 
their decisions by granting interested parties the automatic right to reconsideration, 
CLUDMA does not recognize or grant any reconsideration. Instead, CLUDMA requires 
that an adversely affected party “specifically challenge a land use authority's decision . . . 
in accordance with local ordinance.” Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-701(2) (emphasis added). 
It further mandates that each appeal authority “shall conduct each appeal and variance 
request as described by local ordinance.” Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-706(1) (emphasis 
added). Where, as here, the local ordinance does not empower the appeal authority to 
reconsider its decision, CLUDMA accordingly prohibits any reconsideration—as a 
reconsideration is outside the description given by the San Juan County Zoning Ordinance. 
Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't of Corr., 942 P.2d 933, 945 (Utah 1997) (stating 
that the inherent power to reconsider does not exist where no statutory provisions state to 
the contrary.)14  
                                                 
14 The lack of a reconsideration mechanism in the San Juan County Zoning Ordinance is 
especially compelling in light of the Utah Supreme Court’s 2006 directive—long after the 
Clark and Career Serv. cases were decided—that “[h]ereafter, when a party seeks relief 
from a judgment, it must turn to the rules to determine whether relief exists, and if so, direct 
the court to the specific relief available. Parties can no longer leave this task to the court 
by filing so-called motions to reconsider and relying upon district courts to construe the 





B. Reconsideration was ultra vires, illegal and void. 
Notwithstanding its lack of authority to do so, the County Commission quickly 
capitulated to the threat of a multimillion dollar lawsuit by sPower and on December 7, 
2015, in a closed meeting, reconsidered the Final Written Decision. (R0144-49.) The next 
day, the County Commission illegally reversed course, amended the Final Written 
Decision, upheld the P&Z Decision, and deleted the requirement that the Planning 
Commission, with appropriate technical assistance, determine if sPower was actually 
complying with the requirement in the Amended CUP to implement “as much flicker, light, 
sound, mitigation as possible.” (Id.) 
Because neither the reconsideration of the original Final Written Decision nor the 
issuance of the Amended Decision was authorized by law, ordinance, or rule, the County 
Commission’s actions were ultra vires and void.  Indeed, by taking such action, the County 
Commission illegally arrogated to itself the District Court’s exclusive authority to review 
the final decisions of CLUDMA appeal authorities.   
On NMA’s subsequent appeal, the District Court remanded the case back to the 
County Commission and directed the County Commission to hold new proceedings on 
sPower’s Request for Reconsideration because “NMA should have been heard in 
opposition” to that request. (R2745.) On January 3, 2017, the County Commission held a 
non-evidentiary hearing on sPower’s request, precluding introduction of any evidence not 
already in the record.  
In its Remand Decision on February 21, 2017, the County Commission noted that 





based upon its complaint that, contrary to our finding, it had indeed provided evidence of 
mitigation beyond its bare representations.” (R1977.) In other words, the County 
Commission was once again reconsidering its own Amended Decision. Accordingly, its 
Remand Decision was based exclusively on that reconsideration.  As discussed above, any 
reconsideration was impermissible, yet the District Court upheld the Remand Decision. 
Consequently, the District Court’s decision was erroneous. 
The Final Written Decision should be reinstated and is now final.  The 30-day period 
for sPower to properly appeal has long since passed. Moreover, the 30-day period should 
not be tolled because sPower was explicitly advised in the Final Written Decision that the 
only further recourse was to appeal the Final Written Decision to the District Court. 
Nevertheless, sPower decided to take different, unauthorized action instead. sPower should 
not benefit from its clear disregard of the proper legal and administrative procedure, let 
alone the naked bullying threat of crushing financial liability. Therefore, the Final Written 
Decision should be reinstated and the case remanded to the Planning Commission pursuant 
to the County Commission’s original Final Written Decision.  
CONCLUSION 
 The District Court erred by failing to apply, or even address, the correct rule of law 
for determining whether the Planning Commission’s land use decision was supported by 
substantial evidence. The District Court further erred by depriving NMA Members of their 
due process rights by denying them any opportunity to provide evidence in support of their 
rights. Finally, the District Court erred in upholding the County Commission’s decision to 





on these errors, this case should be remanded to the Planning Commission to receive 
NMA’s evidence and to produce written findings suitable for appellate review. 
DATED this 28th day of June, 2018. 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
/s/ J. Craig Smith    
Craig Smith 
Jennie B. Garner 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND..., USCA CONST Amend....
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United States Code Annotated
Constitution of the United States
Annotated
Amendment XIV. Citizenship; Privileges and Immunities; Due Process; Equal Protection;
Apportionment of Representation; Disqualification of Officers; Public Debt; Enforcement
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV-Full Text
AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES; DUE
PROCESS; EQUAL PROTECTION; APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATION;
DISQUALIFICATION OF OFFICERS; PUBLIC DEBT; ENFORCEMENT
Currentness
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting
the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or
hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as
a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive
or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds
of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment
of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against
the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall
be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
<Section 1 of this amendment is further displayed in separate documents according to subject matter,>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 1-Citizens>
AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND..., USCA CONST Amend....
 © 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 1-Privileges>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 1-Due Proc>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 1-Equal Protect>
<sections 2 to 5 of this amendment are displayed as separate documents,>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 2,>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 3,>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 4,>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 5,>
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV-Full Text, USCA CONST Amend. XIV-Full Text
Current through P.L. 115-188. Also includes P.L. 115-190, 115-191, and 115-193. Title 26 current through P.L. 115-193.
End of Document © 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Utah Constitution
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Article I, Section 7 [Due process of law.]




17-27a-701 Appeal authority required -- Condition precedent to judicial review -- Appeal
authority duties.
(1) Each county adopting a land use ordinance shall, by ordinance, establish one or more appeal
authorities to hear and decide:
(a) requests for variances from the terms of the land use ordinances;
(b) appeals from decisions applying the land use ordinances; and
(c) appeals from a fee charged in accordance with Section 17-27a-509.
(2) As a condition precedent to judicial review, each adversely affected person shall timely and
specifically challenge a land use authority's decision, in accordance with local ordinance.
(3) An appeal authority:
(a) shall:
(i) act in a quasi-judicial manner; and
(ii) serve as the final arbiter of issues involving the interpretation or application of land use
ordinances; and
(b) may not entertain an appeal of a matter in which the appeal authority, or any participating
member, had first acted as the land use authority.
(4) By ordinance, a county may:
(a) designate a separate appeal authority to hear requests for variances than the appeal authority
it designates to hear appeals;
(b) designate one or more separate appeal authorities to hear distinct types of appeals of land
use authority decisions;
(c) require an adversely affected party to present to an appeal authority every theory of relief that
it can raise in district court;
(d) not require an adversely affected party to pursue duplicate or successive appeals before the
same or separate appeal authorities as a condition of the adversely affected party's duty to
exhaust administrative remedies; and
(e) provide that specified types of land use decisions may be appealed directly to the district
court.
(5) If the county establishes or, prior to the effective date of this chapter, has established a
multiperson board, body, or panel to act as an appeal authority, at a minimum the board, body,
or panel shall:
(a) notify each of its members of any meeting or hearing of the board, body, or panel;
(b) provide each of its members with the same information and access to municipal resources as
any other member;
(c) convene only if a quorum of its members is present; and
(d) act only upon the vote of a majority of its convened members.




(1) Each appeal authority shall conduct each appeal and variance request as described by local
ordinance.
(2) Each appeal authority shall respect the due process rights of each of the participants.




17-27a-707 Scope of review of factual matters on appeal -- Appeal authority requirements.
(1) A county may, by ordinance, designate the scope of review of factual matters for appeals of
land use authority decisions.
(2) If the county fails to designate a scope of review of factual matters, the appeal authority shall
review the matter de novo, without deference to the land use authority's determination of factual
matters.
(3) If the scope of review of factual matters is on the record, the appeal authority shall determine
whether the record on appeal includes substantial evidence for each essential finding of fact.
(4) The appeal authority shall:
(a) determine the correctness of the land use authority's interpretation and application of the plain
meaning of the land use regulations; and
(b) interpret and apply a land use regulation to favor a land use application unless the land use
regulation plainly restricts the land use application.
(5) An appeal authority's land use decision is a quasi-judicial act, even if the appeal authority is the
legislative body.
(6) Only a decision in which a land use authority has applied a land use regulation to a particular
land use application, person, or parcel may be appealed to an appeal authority.




(1) A decision of an appeal authority takes effect on the date when the appeal authority issues a
written decision, or as otherwise provided by local ordinance.
(2) A written decision, or other event as provided by ordinance, constitutes a final decision under
Subsection 17-27a-801(2)(a) or a final action under Subsection 17-27a-801(4).




17-27a-801 No district court review until administrative remedies exhausted -- Time for
filing -- Tolling of time -- Standards governing court review -- Record on review -- Staying of
decision.
(1) No person may challenge in district court a land use decision until that person has exhausted
the person's administrative remedies as provided in Part 7, Appeal Authority and Variances, if
applicable.
(2)
(a) Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or in violation of the
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the district court
within 30 days after the decision is final.
(b)
(i) The time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition is tolled from the date a property owner
files a request for arbitration of a constitutional taking issue with the property rights
ombudsman under Section 13-43-204 until 30 days after:
(A) the arbitrator issues a final award; or
(B) the property rights ombudsman issues a written statement under Subsection 13-43-204(3)
(b) declining to arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator.
(ii) A tolling under Subsection (2)(b)(i) operates only as to the specific constitutional taking issue
that is the subject of the request for arbitration filed with the property rights ombudsman by a
property owner.
(iii) A request for arbitration filed with the property rights ombudsman after the time under
Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition has expired does not affect the time to file a petition.
(3)
(a) A court shall:
(i) presume that a land use regulation properly enacted under the authority of this chapter is
valid; and
(ii) determine only whether:
(A) the land use regulation is expressly preempted by, or was enacted contrary to, state or
federal law; and
(B) it is reasonably debatable that the land use regulation is consistent with this chapter.
(b) A court shall:
(i) presume that a final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid; and
(ii) uphold the decision unless the decision is:
(A) arbitrary and capricious; or
(B) illegal.
(c)
(i) A decision is arbitrary and capricious if the decision is not supported by substantial evidence
in the record.
(ii) A decision is illegal if the decision is:
(A) based on an incorrect interpretation of a land use regulation; or
(B) contrary to law.
(4) The provisions of Subsection (2)(a) apply from the date on which the county takes final action
on a land use application for any adversely affected third party, if the county conformed with




(5) If the county has complied with Section 17-27a-205, a challenge to the enactment of a land use
regulation or general plan may not be filed with the district court more than 30 days after the
enactment.
(6) A challenge to a land use decision is barred unless the challenge is filed within 30 days after
the land use decision is final.
(7)
(a) The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall transmit to the reviewing
court the record of its proceedings, including its minutes, findings, orders and, if available, a
true and correct transcript of its proceedings.
(b) If the proceeding was recorded, a transcript of that recording is a true and correct transcript
for purposes of this Subsection (7).
(8)
(a)
(i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the record provided by the land use
authority or appeal authority, as the case may be.
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record of the land use
authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, unless that evidence was offered to the
land use authority or appeal authority, respectively, and the court determines that it was
improperly excluded.
(b) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence.
(9)
(a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of the land use authority or appeal authority,
as the case may be.
(b)
(i) Before filing a petition under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of a
constitutional taking issue under Section 13-43-204, the aggrieved party may petition the
appeal authority to stay its decision.
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the appeal authority may order its decision stayed pending
district court review if the appeal authority finds it to be in the best interest of the county.
(iii) After a petition is filed under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of a
constitutional taking issue is filed under Section 13-43-204, the petitioner may seek an
injunction staying the appeal authority's decision.
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1-1  Short Title 
This Ordinance shall be known and may be so cited and pleaded as the "ZONING ORDINANCE 
OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, UTAH” 
1-2  Purpose
This Ordinance is designed and enacted for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, 
convenience, order, prosperity and welfare of the present and future inhabitants of SAN JUAN 
COUNTY, including, among other things, the lessening of congestion in the streets or roads, 
securing safety from fire and other dangers, providing access to adequate light and air, 
classification of land uses and distribution of land development and utilization, protection of the 
tax base, securing economy in governmental expenditures, fostering agricultural and other 
industries, and the protection of both urban and non-urban development. 
1-3 Interpretation 
In interpreting and applying the provisions of this Ordinance, the requirements contained herein are 
declared to be the minimum requirements for the purposes set forth. 
1-4 Conflict 
This Ordinance shall not nullify the more restrictive provisions of covenants, agreements, other 
ordinances or laws, but shall prevail notwithstanding such provisions which are less restrictive. 
1-5 Definitions 
For the purpose of this Ordinance certain words and terms are defined as follows: (Words used in the 
present tense include the future; words in the singular number include the plural and the plural the 
singular; words not included herein but defined in the Uniform Building Code shall be construed as 
defined therein). 
(1) Accessory Building.  Building not used for human occupancy which is secondary to the 
main structure on the same piece of property such as a shed or garage.   
(2)        Affected Entity.  A county, municipality, local district, special service district     
created under state law, school district, interlocal cooperation entity established under state law, 
specified property owner, property owners association, public utility, or the Department of 
Transportation. 
               (3) Agriculture. The tilling of the soil, the raising of crops, horticulture and          
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gardening, including the grazing and pasturing of domestic animals, but not including any 
agricultural business or industry, such as fruit-packing plants, fur farms, animal hospitals or similar 
uses. 
 (4) Agricultural Industry or Business. An industry or business involving agricultural
products in packaging, treatment, sales, intensive feeding, or storage, including but not limited to
animal feed yards, fur farms, commercial milk production, food packaging or processing plants,
commercial poultry or egg production and similar uses as determined by the planning commission.
(5) Airport.  A landing area used regularly by aircraft for receiving or discharging passengers
or cargo. (FAA definition)
(6) Airstrip.  An airfield without normal airport facilities.
(7) Alley:  A public thoroughfare less than twenty-five (25) feet wide.
(8) Anemometer.  An instrument for measuring wind force and velocity.
(9) Animal Unit. One (1) cow, one (1) horse, five (5) sheep or goats, or an equivalent number
of smaller animals or fowl as determined by the Planning Commission.
(10) Appeal Authority.  The person, board, commission, agency, or other body designated by
this ordinance to decide an appeal of a decision of a land use application or variance.
(11) Basement. A story partly underground. A basement shall be counted as a story for the
purposes of height measurement if its height is one-half (1/2) or more above grade.
(12) Bed & Breakfast/Boarding House. A building with not more than five (5) guest
rooms, where, for compensation, meals are provided for at least five (5) but
not more than fifteen (15) persons.
(13) Building. Any structure having a roof supported by columns or walls for the
housing - or enclosure of persons, animals or chattels.
(14) Building, Accessory. A detached subordinate building clearly incidental to and located
upon the same lot occupied by the main building.
(15) Building, Height of. The vertical distance from the average finished grade surface to the
highest point of the building roof or coping.
(16) Building Line. A line parallel to the front, side or rear lot line and established at the point
where that lot line is closest to any part of the building or structure exclusive of the ordinary
projections of skylight, sills, belt courses, cornices, chimneys, flues and ornamental features which
do not project into a yard more than two and one-half (2-1/2) feet, and open or lattice enclosed fire
escapes, fireproof outside stairways and balconies open upon fire towers which do not project into
a yard more than five (5) feet.
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(17) Building, Main. The, principal building or one of the principal buildings upon a lot, or the 
building or one of the principal buildings housing a principal use upon a lot. 
(18) Car Port. A private garage not completely enclosed by walls or doors. For the purposes of 
this Ordinance, a car port shall be subject to all of the regulations prescribed for a private garage  
(19) Conditional Use.  A land use that, because of its unique characteristics or potential impact 
on the county, surrounding neighbors, or adjacent land uses, may not be compatible in some areas 
or may be compatible only if certain conditions are required that mitigate or eliminate the 
detrimental impacts.  
(20)  Condominium.  The ownership of a single unit in a multi-unit project, together with an 
undivided interest in the common areas and facilities of the property. 
(21)  Corral.  A space, other than a building, less than one (1) acre in area, or less than one 
hundred (100) feet in width, used for the confinement of animals. 
(22)  Dwelling. Any building, or portion thereof, which is designed for use for residential 
purposes, except hotels, apartment hotels, bed & breakfast/boarding houses, lodging houses, tourist 
courts and apartment courts. 
(23)  Dwelling, Farm or Ranch. A building to provide housing for migratory or temporary farm 
workers, persons permanently working on a farm or ranch, or for family members of the main 
household who are engaged full-time in operating the farm or ranch. 
(24)  Dwelling, Multiple-family. A building arranged or designed to be occupied by three (3) or 
more families, 
(25)  Dwelling, Single-family. A building arranged or designed to be occupied by one 
(1) family, the structure having only one (1) dwelling unit. 
(26)  Dwelling, Two-family. A building arranged or designed to be occupied by two (2) families, 
the structure having only two (2) dwelling units. 
(27)  Dwelling Unit. One or more rooms in a dwelling, apartment hotel or apartment motel, 
designed for or occupied by one (1) family for living or sleeping purposes and having one (1) but 
not more than one (1) kitchen or set of fixed cooking facilities, other than hot plates or other 
portable cooking units. 
(28) Evaporation Pond.  Artificial ponds with very large surface areas that are designed to 
efficiently evaporate water by sunlight and exposure to the ambient temperatures. 
 (29)  Family. One or more persons occupying a dwelling unit and living as a single 
housekeeping unit, as distinguished from a group occupying a boarding house, lodging house or 
hotel, as herein defined. 
R03960539
7 
(30) Fire Hazard.  Any situation, process, material or condition that may cause a fire or 
explosion or provide a ready fuel supply to augment the spread or intensity of the fire or 
explosion and that poses a threat to life or property. 
(31)  Frontage. All the property fronting one (1) side of the street between intersecting or 
intercepting streets, or between a street and a right-of-way, waterway, end of dead-end street, or 
political subdivision boundary, measured along the street line. An intercepting street shall 
determine only the boundary of the frontage on the side of the street which it intercepts. 
(32)  Garage, Private. An accessory building designed or used for the storage of not more than 
four (4) automobiles owned and used by the occupants of the building to which it is accessory, 
provided that on a lot occupied by a multiple dwelling, the private garage may be designed and 
used for the storage of one and one-half (1 1/2) times as many automobiles as there are dwelling 
units in the multiple dwelling, if the garage and dwelling have a roof or wall in common.   
(33) Garage, Public. A building or portion thereof, other than a private garage designed or used 
for servicing, repairing, equipping, hiring, selling or storing motor-driven vehicles. 
(34) General Plan.  The document adopted by the county that sets forth general guidelines for 
proposed future development of the unincorporated land within the county. 
(35) Geologic Hazard.  One of several types of adverse geologic conditions capable of causing 
damage or loss of property and life. 
(36) Gravel Pit.  A pit from which gravel is obtained. 
(37) Home Occupation. Any use conducted entirely within a dwelling and carried on by persons 
residing in the dwelling unit, which use is clearly incidental and secondary to the use of the 
dwelling for dwelling purposes and does not change the character thereof and in connection with 
which there is not display, nor stock in trade. The home occupation shall not include the sale of 
commodities except those which are produced on the premises, and shall not involve the use of any 
accessory building or yard space or activity, outside of the main building, not normally associated 
with residential use. Home occupation shall include the use of the home by a physician, surgeon 
dentist, lawyer, clergyman, engineer, or other professional persons for consultation or emergency 
treatment but not for the general practice of his profession. In all cases where a home occupation is 
engaged in, there shall be no advertising of said occupation, no window displays, or signs except as 
hereinafter permitted, and no employees employed. 
(38) Hotel. A building designed for or occupied as the temporary abiding place of sixteen (16) 
or more individuals who are, for compensation, lodged. 
(39) Household Pet.  Animals or fowl ordinarily permitted in the house, and kept for company 
or pleasure such as dogs, cats, and small caged birds, but not including a sufficient number of dogs 
to constitute a kennel, as defined in this Ordinance. 
(40) Industry.   The organized action of making of goods and services for sale. 
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(41) Junk Yard. The use of any lot, portion of a lot, or tract of land for the storage, abandonment 
of junk, including scrap metals or other, or for the dismantling, demolition or abandonment of 
automobiles, or other vehicles, or machinery or parts thereof; provided that this definition shall be 
deemed not to include such uses which are clearly accessory and incidental to any agricultural use 
permitted in the zone. 
(42) Kennel. The keeping of three (3) or more dogs, at least four (4) months old. 
(43) Land Use Application.  An application required by the county’s land use ordinance. 
(44) Land Use Authority.  The person, board, commission, agency, or other body designated by 
the local legislative body in this ordinance to act upon a land use application.   
(45) Land Use Ordinance.  A planning, zoning, development, or subdivision ordinance of the 
county, but does not include the general plan. 
(46) Land Use Permit.  A permit issued by the land use authority. 
(47) Legislative Body.  The county legislative body. 
(48) Local District.  Any entity created under state law – Local Districts, and any other 
governmental or quasi-governmental entity that is not a county, municipality, school district, or the 
state. 
(49) Lodging House.   A building where lodging only is provided for compensation to five (5) 
or more, but not to exceed fifteen (15) persons. 
(50) Lot.  A parcel of land occupied by a building or group of buildings, together with such 
yards, open spaces, lot width and lot area as are required by this Ordinance, having frontage upon a 
street or upon a right-of-way or upon a right-of-way not less than sixteen (16) feet wide. Except for 
group dwellings and guest houses, not more than one (1) dwelling structure shall occupy any one 
(1) lot. 
(51) Lot Area. The total gross land area of a parcel of land, not including street right-of-ways 
dedicated to the public. 
(52) Lot, Corner. A lot abutting on two intersecting or intercepting streets, where the interior 
angle of Intersection or interception does not exceed one hundred thirty-five (135) degrees. 
(53) Lot Depth. The horizontal distance between the front yard and the rear lot lines measured in 
the main direction of the side lot lines. 
(54) Lot Line Adjustment.  The relocation of the property boundary line in a subdivision 
between two adjoining lots with the consent of the owners of record.
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(55) Lot Line, Front. For an interior lot, the lot line adjoining the street; for a comer lot or 
through lot, the lot line adjoining either street, as elected by the lot owner. 
(56) Lot Interior.  A lot other than a corner lot. 
(57) Lot Line, Rear. Ordinarily, that line of a lot which is opposite and most distant from the 
front line of the lot In the case of a triangular or gore-shaped lot, a line ten (10) feet in length 
within the parcel, parallel to and at a maximum distance from the front lot line. In cases where 
these definitions are not applicable, the zoning administrator shall designate the rear lot line. 
(58)   Lot Line, Side. Any lot boundary line not a front or rear lot line. A side lot line separating a 
lot from another lot or lots is an interior side lot line; a side lot line separating a lot from a street is a 
street side lot line. 
(59) Lot Width. The horizontal distance between the side lot lines, measured at the required 
front yard setback line or rear yard setback line, whichever is shorter. 
(60) Mining.  Mining is the extraction of valuable minerals or other geological materials from  
the earth usually from an ore body, vein or (coal) seam. Materials recovered by mining include 
base metals, precious metals, iron, uranium, coal, diamonds, limestone, oil shale, rock salt and 
potash. Also to include, drilling, testing, mining related storage facilities whether they be 
underground or above-ground.
(61) Mobile Home. A detached, single-family dwelling unit of not less than thirty (30) feet in 
length, designed for long-term occupancy, and to be transported on its own wheels or on a flatbed 
or other trailers or detachable wheels; containing a flush toilet, sleeping accommodations, a tub or 
shower bath, kitchen facilities, and plumbing and electrical connections provided for attachment to 
appropriate external systems, made ready for occupancy except for connections to utilities and 
other minor work. Pre-sectionalized, modular, or prefabricated houses not placed on permanent 
foundations, shall be regarded as mobile homes. 
(62) Mobile Home Park.  A space designed and approved by the local jurisdiction for occupancy 
by mobile homes, to be under a single ownership or management, and meeting all requirements of 
the zoning ordinance for mobile home parks. 
(63) Mobile Home Subdivision. A subdivision designed and intended for residential use where 
the lots are to be individually owned or leased, and occupied by mobile homes exclusively. 
(64) Moderate Income Housing.  Housing occupied or reserved for occupancy by households 
with a gross household income equal to or less than 80% of the median gross income for 
households of the same size in the county in which the housing is located.
(65) Modular Home.  A permanent dwelling structure built in prefabricated units, which are 
assembled and erected on the site, or at another location and brought as a unit to the site; said 
modular home is classed as a mobile home until it is placed on a permanent foundation and 
complies with all governing building codes. 
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(66) Motel.  A building or group of buildings for the drive-in accommodation of transient 
guests, comprising individual sleeping or living units, and designed and located to serve the 
motoring public. 
(67) Natural Waterways.  Those areas, varying in width, along streams, creeks, gullies, springs, 
or washes which are natural drainage channels as determined by the Building Inspector, and in 
which areas no buildings shall be constructed. 
(68) Nonconforming Building or Structure.  A building or structure or portion thereof, lawfully 
existing before its current lands use designation and because of one or more subsequent land use 
ordinance changes, does not conform to the setback, height restrictions, or other regulations, 
excluding those regulations that govern the use of land.   
(69) Nonconforming Use.  A use of land that legally existed before its current land use 
designation, has been maintained continuously since the time the land use ordinance regulation 
governing the land changed, and because of one or more subsequent land use ordinance changes, 
does not conform to the regulations that now govern the use of the land.   
(70) Oil and Gas Exploration.   Exploration for Hydrocarbon (oil and gas) is the search by 
petroleum geologists and geophysicists for hydrocarbon deposits beneath the Earth's surface, 
such as oil and natural gas. Oil and gas exploration are grouped under the science of petroleum 
geology.
(71) Parking Lot. An open area, other than a street, used for parking of more than four (4) 
automobiles and available for public use, whether free, for compensation, or as an accommodation 
for clients or customers. 
(72) Parking Space.  Space within a building, lot or parking lot for the parking or storage of one 
(1) automobile. 
(74) Planned Unit Development (PUD).  An integrated design for development of residential, 
commercial or industrial uses, or limited combinations of such uses, in which the density and 
location regulations of the district in which the development is situated may be varied or waived to 
allow flexibility and initiative in site and building design and location, in accordance with an 
approved plan and imposed requirements. 
(75) Plat.  A map or other graphical representation of lands being laid out and prepared in 
accordance with State law. 
(76) Public Agency.  The federal government, the state, a county, municipality, school district, 
special service district, or other political subdivision of the state, or a charter school.  
(77) Public Hearing.  A hearing at which members of the public are provided a reasonable 
opportunity to comment on the subject of the hearing. 
(78) Public Meeting.  A meeting that is required to be open to the Public under state law. 
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(79) Public Notice.  Notice widely disseminated to the public through broadcast media such as 
newspaper, radio, television, in a conspicuous public place or the internet, in conformance with 
state law. 
(80) Record of Survey Map.  A map of a survey of land prepared in accordance with state law. 
(81) Story.  The space within a building included between the surface of any floor and the 
surface of the ceiling next above. 
(82) Story, Half.  A story with at least two (2) of its opposite sides situated in a sloping roof, the 
floor area of which does not exceed two-thirds (2/3) of the floor immediately below it. 
(83) Street.  A public right-of-way, including a highway, avenue, boulevard, parkway, road,  
lane, walk, alley, viaduct, subway, tunnel, bridge, public easement, or other way. 
(84) Structure. Anything constructed or erected, which requires location on the ground or 
attached to something having a location on the ground. 
(85) Structural Alterations. Any change in supporting members of a building or structure, such 
as bearing walls, columns, beams or girders. 
(86) Subdivision.   Any land that is divided, re-subdivided or proposed to be divided into two or 
more lots, parcels, sites, units, plots, or other division of land for the purpose, whether immediate 
or future, for offer, sale, lease, or development either on the installment plan or upon any and all 
other plans, terms, and conditions.  It also includes the division or development of land by deed, 
metes and bounds description, devise and testacy, map, plat, or other recorded instrument except as 
provided in state law, divisions of land for residential and nonresidential uses, including land used 
or to be used for commercial, agricultural, and industrial uses.  It does not include a bona fide 
division or partition of agricultural land for agricultural purposes, a recorded agreement between 
owners of adjoining properties adjusting their mutual boundary if no new lots are created, and the 
adjustment does not violate land use ordinances.
(87) Tourist Court. Any building or group of buildings containing sleeping rooms, with or 
without fixed cooking facilities designed for temporary use by automobile tourists or transients,  
with a garage attached or parking space conveniently located to each unit, including auto courts, 
motels, or motor lodges. 
(88) RV/Trailer Camp. Any area or tract of land used or designed to accommodate two (2) or 
more automobile trailers or camping parties. 
(89) Unincorporated.  The area outside of the incorporated areas of a county. 
(90) Use, Accessory.  A subordinate use customarily incidental to and located upon the same lot 
occupied by a main use. 
(91) Use, Main.  The principal function or use of the land and/or building or structure. 
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(92) Variance.  An authorization by the Planning Commission, acting as the Land Use Authority 
pursuant to state law, relative to specific parcel of land for a modification of a zone’s standard 
height, bulk, area, width, setback, or separation requirement; as distinguished from a conditional 
use, the allowing of a use not listed as permitted in a zone, or any other change in zoning 
requirements.
(93) Yard.  A space on the lot, other than a court, unoccupied and unobstructed from the ground 
upwards, by buildings, except as otherwise provided herein. 
(94) Yard, Front.  A space extending across the full width of a lot, between the front building  
line and the front lot line. The depth of the front yard is the minimum distance between the front lot 
line and the front building line. 
(95) Yard, Rear.  A space extending across the full width of a lot, between the rear building line  
and the rear lot line.  The depth of the rear yard is the minimum distance between the side lot and 
the rear building line. 
(96) Yard, Side.  A space extending along the full depth of a lot, between the side building line 
and the side lot line. The "width" of the side yard shall be the minimum distance between the side  
lot line and the side building line. 
(97) Wind Turbine.  A turbine that is powered by the wind. 
(98) Zoning Map.  A map, adopted as part of a land use ordinance that depicts land use zones, 
overlays, or districts. 
1-6 Building Permit Required 
The use of land or the construction or alteration, of any building or structure or any part thereof, as 
provided or as restricted in this Ordinance shall not be commenced, or proceeded with, except after 
the issuance of a written permit for the same by the Building Inspector.  Farm buildings shall be 
exempt, except when either electric or plumbing will be installed in the buildings, from the 
requirements of a building permit except where such structures are intended as dwellings or for 
human habitation. All dwellings shall require State Board of Health approval prior to issuance of a
building permit (emphasis added). 
Application and Review 
                       (1)        All applications for building permits, except-for single family dwellings and their accessory 
buildings shall: 
(a) be submitted to the Building and Zoning Department.  The design submissions shall 
include architectural and site development plans to scale, which shall show building 
locations, landscaping, prominent existing trees, ground treatment, fences, off-street 
parking and circulation, location and size of the adjacent streets, north arrow and 
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property lines, existing grades and proposed new grades.  All such drawings and 
sketches shall be reviewed with the Planning Commission upon notification and 
request of the Planning Commission to assure conformity with the intent of the 
Master Plan and compliance with all applicable ordinances and regulations. 
(b) then follow the usual process for obtaining a building permit as required by the 
County.  
            (2)         Design review for buildings and uses covered by conditional use permits or 
                          planned unit development approval shall be incorporated within such conditional use                  
                          permit or planned unit development approval and need not be a separate application,   
                          provided the requirements of this Ordinance are met.
(3)         Agricultural buildings are exempt from design-review. 
1-7  Planning Commission Review  
When a question arises whether proposed architectural and site development plans submitted are 
consistent with the general objectives of this Ordinance, the Planning Commission shall make a 
determination.  A negative or unfavorable determination by the Planning Commission may be 
appealed to the Board of County Commissioners, as provided for in this Ordinance. 
1-8  Zoning Administrator to Enforce 
The Zoning Administrator is designated and authorized by the Board of County Commissioners as 
the officer charged with the enforcement of this Ordinance, but from time to time, by resolution or 
ordinance, the Board of County Commissioners may entrust such administration in whole or in, 
part, to any other officer without amendment to this Ordinance. 
1-9  Permits to Comply with Ordinance 
From the time of the effective date of this Ordinance, the Zoning Administrator shall not grant a 
permit for the construction, or alteration of any building or structure or the moving of a structure 
onto a lot if such building or structure will be in violation of any of the provisions of this 
Ordinance, nor shall any local officer grant any permit or license for the use of any building or land 
if such use would be in violation of this Ordinance. 
1-10  Powers and Duties of Building Inspector 
It shall be the duty of the Building Inspector to inspect or cause to be inspected all buildings in 
course of construction or repair.  
1-11 Powers and Duties of Zoning Administrator 
The Zoning Administrator shall enforce all of the provisions of this Ordinance, entering actions in 
the courts when necessary and his failure to do so shall not legalize any violations of such 
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provisions. The Zoning Administrator shall not issue any permit unless the plans of the proposed 
erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration and use fully conform to all zoning regulations 
then in effect. 
1-12 Nuisance and Abatement 
Any building or structure erected constructed, altered, enlarged, converted, moved or maintained 
contrary to the provisions of this Ordinance, and any use of land, building or premise established, 
conducted or maintained contrary to provisions in this Ordinance shall be, and the same hereby is, 
declared to be unlawful and a public nuisance; and the County Attorney shall, upon request of the 
governing body, at once commence action or proceeding for abatement and removal of enjoinment 
thereof in a manner provided by law, and take other steps as will abate and remove such building 
or structure, and restrain or enjoin any person, firm, or corporation from erecting, building, 
maintaining, or using said building or structure or property contrary to the provisions of this 
Ordinance. The remedies provided for herein shall be cumulative and not exclusive. 
1-13  Amendments 
The number, shape, boundary, area or zone, or any regulation or any other provision of the Zoning 
Ordinance may be amended by the Board of County Commissioners from time to time, but any 
such amendment shall not be made or become effective until after thirty days notice and public 
hearing and unless the same shall have been proposed by or be first submitted to the Planning 
Commission, for its recommendation which shall be returned within thirty (30) days to the Board 
of County Commissioners. 
1-14  Hearing and Publication of Notice  
Before finally adopting any such amendment, the Board of County Commissioners shall hold a 
public hearing thereon. Notice of such a hearing shall be disseminated to the public, in accordance 
with state law, at least ten (10) days before the scheduled hearing.
1-15  Licensing 
All departments, officials and public employees of the County which are vested with the duty or 
authority to issue permits or licenses shall conform to the provisions of this Ordinance and shall 
issue no permit or license for uses, building or purposes where the same would be in conflict with 
the provisions of this Ordinance and any such permit or license, if issued in conflict with the 
provisions of this Ordinance shall be null and void. 
1-16  Penalties 
Any person, firm or corporation whether as principal, agent, employee or otherwise, violating or 
causing or permitting the violation of the provisions of this Ordinance shall be charged, for each 
separate, identifiable violation, with a Class C Misdemeanor and punishable upon conviction as a class 
C misdemeanor or by imposing the appropriate civil penalty adopted under the authority of 




LAND USE – ADMINISTRATION 
2-1 Planning Commission 
(1) Organization 
 (a) The Planning Commission shall consist of seven (7) members who shall  
  be appointed by the Board of County Commissioners.  In addition to the regular  
  seven (7) members, the Board of County Commissioners may appoint, one (1)  
  non-voting, ex-officio staff member to serve as liaison between the Board of  
  County Commissioners and the Planning Commission and provide administrative  
  support to the Planning Commission.  Board of County Commission members  
  may not serve as regular members of the Planning Commission. 
(2) Term of Office 
  
 (a) The term of office for regular Planning Commission members shall be  
  staggered so that the terms of at least one (1) member and no more than three (3)  
  members expire each year.  As the term of each regular member expires, the  
  vacancy thus created shall be filled by a majority vote of the Board of County  
  Commissioners for a term of four (4) years, so as to maintain the succession of  
  staggered terms of service. 
 (b) Terms of all regular members begin on January 1st and expire on  
  December 31st  of the 4th year following the year of appointment.  If the Board of  
  County Commissioners has not appointed a new member(s) to the Planning  
  Commission at the expiration of term, the current Planning Commission   
  member(s) will remain on the Planning Commission until replaced by   
  appointment of the Board of County Commissioners.  
  
 (c) The ex-officio member shall be appointed by the Board of County Commissioners 
  and shall continue to serve until replaced by appointment of the Board of County  
  Commissioners.  
  
 (d) If a vacancy occurs other than by expiration of term, the Board of County  
  Commissioners by majority vote shall appoint a new member to fill the unexpired 
  term. 
 (e) Planning Commission members may be removed for cause from office by 
  2/3 vote of the Board of County Commissioners prior to the expiration of the  
  appointed term. 
(3) Method of Appointment 
  
 In early November of each year, the County Administrator shall cause 
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 notice of appointment(s) to be published in a newspaper of general circulation in  
 San Juan County.  The Building and Zoning Department shall be responsible for  
 the costs of such advertisement.  Such notice shall state the nature and term of the  
 appointment(s), the qualification for such appointment, request written statements  
 of interest and qualifications, and establish a deadline for submittal of such  
 statements, which time shall not be earlier than fifteen (15) days from the date of  
 publication. 
(4) Qualifications 
     
Each Planning Commission member shall be a legal San Juan County resident for at least 
two (2) years prior to appointment. 
(5) Powers and Duties 
The Planning Commission shall have the following powers and duties pursuant to Section 
17-27a-302, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended): 
 (a) Each countywide planning commission shall, with respect to the 
  unincorporated area of the county, make a recommendation to the county  
  legislative body for: 
  
  (i) a general plan and amendments to the general plan; 
  (ii) land use ordinances, zoning maps, official maps, and amendments; 
(iii) an appropriate delegation of power to at least one land use authority to 
hear and act on a the land use application;  
  (iv) an appropriate delegation of power to at least one appeal authority  
   to hear and act on an appeal from a decision of the land use authority;  
  (v) application processes that may include a designation of routine 
   land use matters that, upon application and proper notice, will receive  
   informal streamlined review and action if the application is uncontested;  
   and shall protect the rights of each applicant and third party to require  
   formal consideration of any application by a land use authority; applicant,  
   adversely affected party, or county officer or employee to appeal a land  
   use authority’s decision to a separate appeal authority; and participant to  
   to be heard in each public hearing on a contested application. 
2-2 Appeals 
(1) Appeal Authority.  The authority to hear request for variances from the terms of the land 
use ordinance and appeals from decisions applying the land use ordinances shall be vested 
in the Board of County Commissioners.
(2) Appealing Land Use Authority’s Decision.  An applicant, board, or officer of the County, 
or any person affected by the land use authority’s decision applying a land use ordinance 
may, within the time period provided in 2-2(3)(a) below, appeal that decision to the Appeal 
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Authority by alleging there is error in any order, requirement, decision, or determination 
made by the land use authority in the decision applying the land use ordinance. 
  
(a) Time to Appeal.  Any appeal, pursuant to 2-2(3) above, must be filed in writing to 
the County Administrator within ten (10) calendar days of the issuance of the 
written decision applying the land use ordinance. 
(b) Time for Hearing Appeal.  The Appeal Authority should hear the appeal within 
thirty (30) days of the date the appeal was filed. 
(c)   Written Statement Setting Forth Theories of Relief Required.  The appellant shall 
deliver to the Appeal Authority and all other participants, five (5) business days 
prior to the hearing, a written statement setting forth each and every theory of relief 
she intends to raise at the hearing, along with a brief statement of facts in support 
thereof. 
(d) Condition Precedent to Judicial Review.  No person, board or officer of the County 
may seek judicial review of any decision applying to the land use ordinance until 
after challenging the land use authority’s decision in accordance with this part.  No 
theory of relief may be raised in the District Court unless it was timely and 
specifically presented to the Appeals Authority. 
(e) Standard of Review and Burden of Proof on Appeal.  The Appeal Authority shall 
upon appeal, presume that the decision applying the land use ordinance is valid and 
determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.  The 
burden of proof on appeal is on the appellant. 
(f) Due Process Rights.  The Appeal Authority shall respect the due process rights of 
 all participants.  
2-3 Variances.   
(1) Any person or entity desiring a waiver or modifications of the requirements of a land use 
ordinance as applied to a parcel of property that he owns, leases, or in which he holds some 
other beneficial interest may apply to the Appeal Authority for a variance from the terms of 
the ordinance. 
(2) Pursuant to Utah State law, the Appeal Authority may grant a variance only if: 
(a) Literal enforcement of the ordinance would cause an unreasonable hardship for 
the applicant that is not necessary to carry out the general purpose of the land use 
ordinances; 
(b)  There are special circumstances attached to the property that do not generally 
apply to other properties in the same zone; 
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(c)  Granting the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a substantial property right 
possessed by other property in the same zone; 
(d)  The variance will not substantially affect the general plan and will not be contrary 
to the public interest; and 
(e)  The spirit of the land use ordinance is observed and substantial justice done.  
(3) In determining whether or not enforcement of the land use ordinance would cause 
unreasonable hardship under 2-3(a)(i), the Appeal Authority may not find an 
unreasonable hardship unless the alleged hardship: 
(a)  is located on or associated with the property for which the variance is sought; and 
(b)  comes from circumstances peculiar to the property, not from conditions that are 
 general to the neighborhood. 
(4)  In determining whether or not enforcement of the land use ordinance would cause 
unreasonable hardship under Subsection 2-3(2)(a), the Appeal Authority may not find an 
unreasonable hardship if the hardship is self-imposed or economic. 
(5)  In determining whether or not there are special circumstances attached to the property 
under Subsection 2-3(2)(b), the Appeal Authority may find that special circumstances 
exist only if the special circumstances: 
(a)  relate to the hardship complained of; and 
(b)  deprive the property of privileges granted to other properties in the same zone. 
  
(6)  The applicant shall bear the burden of proving that all of the conditions justifying a 
variance have been met. 
(7)  Variances run with the land. 
(8)  The Appeal Authority may not grant a use variance. 
(9)  In granting a variance, the Appeal Authority may impose additional requirements on the 
applicant that will: 
      (a)  mitigate any harmful affects of the variance; or 




SUPPLEMENTARY AND QUALIFYING REGULATIONS  
3-1 Effect of Chapter 
The regulations hereinafter set forth in this Chapter qualify or supplement, as the case may be, the zone  
regulations appearing elsewhere in this Ordinance. 
3-2  Lots in Separate Ownership 
The requirements of this Ordinance, as to minimum lot area or lot width, shall not be construed to prevent 
the use for a single-family dwelling of any lot or parcel of land in the event that such lot or parcel of land is 
held in separate ownership at the time this Ordinance becomes effective. 
3-3  Yard Space for One Building Only 
No required yard or other open space around an existing building, or which is hereafter provided around 
any building for the purpose of complying with the provisions of this Ordinance, shall be considered as 
providing a yard or open space for any other building; nor shall any yard or other required open space on 
an adjoining lot be considered as providing a yard or open space on a lot whereon a building is to be 
erected or established. 
3-4  Every Dwelling to be on a "Lot" 
Every dwelling shall be located and maintained on a "lot" as defined in this Ordinance. 
3-5  Separately Owned Lots - Reduced Yards 
On any lot under a separate ownership from adjacent lots and of record at the time of passage of this 
Ordinance, and such lot having a smaller width than required for the zone in which it is located, the width 
of each of the side yards for a dwelling may be reduced to a width which is not less than the same 
percentage of the width of the lot as the required side yard would be if the required lot width, provided 
that in interior lots the smaller of the two yards shall be in no case less than five (5) feet and for corner lots 
the street side yard shall be in no case less than ten (10) feet or the other side yard be less than five (5) 
feet. 
3-6  Private Garage with Side Yard - Reduced Yard  
On any interior lot where a private garage, containing a sufficient number of parking spaces to 
meet the requirements of this Ordinance, has a side yard equal to the minimum side yard required 
for a dwelling in the same zone, the width of the other side yard for the dwelling may be reduced to 
equal that of the minimum required side yard; and on any lot where such garage has such side yard 
the rear yard of the dwelling may be reduced to fifteen (15) feet, provided the garage also has a 
rear yard of at least fifteen (15) feet. 
R04090552
20 
3-7  Sale or Lease of Required Space 
No space needed to meet the width, yard, area, coverage, parking or other requirements of this 
Ordinance for lot or building may be sold or leased away from such lot or building. 
3-8  Sale of Lots Below Minimum Space Requirements 
No parcel of land which has less than the minimum width and area requirement for the zone in 
which it is located may be cut off from a larger parcel of land for the purpose, whether immediate or 
future, of building or development as a lot, except by permit of the Land Use Authority. 
3-9  Yards to be Unobstructed - Exceptions 
Every part of a required yard shall be open to the sky, unobstructed except for accessory buildings 
in a rear yard, the ordinary projections of skylight, sills, belt courses, cornices, chimneys, flues and 
other ornamental features shall not project into a yard more than two and one half (2-1/2) feet, and 
open or lattice enclosed fire escapes, fireproof outside stairway and balconies open upon fire 
towers projecting into a yard not more than five (5) feet. 
3-10  Area of Accessory Buildings 
No accessory building nor group of accessory buildings, in any residential zone shall cover more 
than twenty-five (25) percent of the rear yard. 
3-11  Additional Height Allowed 
Public, semi-public utility buildings, when authorized in a zone may be erected to a height not 
exceeding seventy-five (75) feet if the building is set back from each otherwise established 
building line at least one (1) foot for each additional foot of building height above the normal 
height limit required for the zone in which the building is erected.  
3-12  Minimum Height of Main Buildings 
No dwelling shall be erected to a height less than one story above grade unless a variance or 
conditional use is secured from the Land Use Authority.
3-13  Maximum Height of Accessory Buildings 
No building which is accessory to a one-family, two-family, three-family or four-family dwelling 
shall be erected to a height greater than two (2) stories or (35) thirty-five feet. 
3-14  Clear View of Intersecting Streets 
In all zones which require a front yard, no obstruction to view in excess of two (2) feet in height 
shall be placed on any comer lot within a triangular area formed by the street property lines and a 
line connecting them at points forty (40) feet from the intersection of the street lines except a 
R04100553
21 
reasonable number of trees pruned high enough to permit unobstructed vision to automobile drivers; 
and pedestal-type identification signs and pumps at gasoline stations. 
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CHAPTER 4  
NONCONFORMING BUILDING AND USES 
4-1  Nonconforming Use.  
A nonconforming use or a non-complying structure may be continued by the present or a future 
property owner.  A nonconforming use may be extended through the same building, provided no 
structural alteration of the building is proposed or made for the purpose of the extension.  For 
purposes of this Subsection, the addition of a solar energy device to a building is not a structural 
alteration.
4-2 Establishment and Changes to Nonconforming Use 
The county permits the establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration, 
expansion, or substitution of nonconforming uses upon the terms and conditions set forth in this 
ordinance; 
The county shall not prohibit the reconstruction or restoration of a non-complying structure or 
terminate the nonconforming use of a structure that is involuntarily destroyed in whole or in part 
due to fire or other calamity unless the structure or use has been abandoned. 
The county shall prohibit the reconstruction or restoration of a non-complying structure or 
terminate the nonconforming use of a structure if: 
(1) the structure is allowed to deteriorate to a condition that the structure is rendered 
uninhabitable and is not repaired or restored within six months after written notice to the 
property owner that the structure is uninhabitable and that the non-complying structure or  
nonconforming use will be lost if the structure is not repaired or restored within six 
months; or 
     
(2)  the property owner has voluntarily demolished a majority of the non-complying structure 
or the building that houses the nonconforming use. 
4-3  Termination of Nonconforming Use 
The County shall terminate all nonconforming uses, except billboards, by providing a formula 
establishing a reasonable time period during which the owner can recover or amortize the 
amount of his investment in the nonconforming use, if any; and 
The County may terminate a nonconforming use due to its abandonment. 
(1) Time period for abandonment.  One (1) year of uninterrupted vacancy as consistent with 




PARKING REQUIREMENTS, LOADING SPACE, AND MOTOR VEHICLE ACCESS 
5-1  Off Street Parking 
There shall be provided at the time any building is enlarged or increased in capacity, minimum off-
street parking space with adequate provisions for ingress and egress by standard-sized automobiles 
as hereafter provided. 
5-2  Size 
The dimensions of each off-street parking space shall be at least nine (9) feet by twenty (20) feet 
for diagonal or ninety-degree (90) spaces; or nine (9) by twenty-two (22) feet for parallel spaces, 
exclusive of access drives or aisles, provided that in parking lots of not less than twenty (20) 
parking spaces the building inspector may approve a design allowing not more than twenty (20) 
per cent of such spaces to be not less than seven and one-half (7 1/2) feet by fifteen (15) feet to be 
marked and used for compact automobiles only. 
5-3  Parking Space for Dwellings 
In all residential zones there shall be provided in a private garage, or in an area properly located for 
a future garage, space for the parking of one (1) automobile for each dwelling unit in a new 
dwelling, or each dwelling unit added in the case of the enlargement of an existing building. 
5-4  Parking Space for Building or Uses Other Than Dwellings 
For a new building, or for any enlargement or increase in seating capacity, floor area or guest 
rooms of any existing main building, there shall be at least one (1) permanently maintained parking 
space of not less than one hundred eighty (180) square feet net area as follows: 
(1)        For church, school, college and university auditoriums and theaters, general auditoriums, 
stadiums and other similar places of assembly at least one (1) parking space for every ten 
(10) fixed seats provided in said buildings or structures. 
(2)        For hospitals at least one (1) parking space for each two (2) beds including infants' cribs 
and children's beds.  For medical and dental clinics at least ten (10) parking spaces and 
three (3) additional parking spaces for each doctor or dentist having offices in such clinic in 
excess of three (3) doctors or dentists. 
(3) For individual sleeping or living units, hotels and apartment hotels at least one (1) parking 
space for each two (2) sleeping rooms, up to and including the first twenty (20) sleeping 




(4)         For boarding houses, lodging houses, dormitories, fraternities or sororities at least one  
             parking space for every three (3) persons for whose accommodation the building is               
             designed or used. 
(5)        For restaurants or establishments that serve meals, lunches, or drinks to patrons either in  
             their cars or in the building, for retail stores selling directly to the public, and for dance      
             halls and recreational places of assembly at least one (1) space for each two hundred (200)  
             square feet of floor space in the building, or one (1) space for each two (2) employees  
             working on the highest employment shift, or five (5) parking spaces, which ever               
             requirement is greater. 
(6)        For mortuaries, at least thirty (30) parking spaces; for liquor stores, at least twenty (20)           
             parking spaces.  
(7)         For all business or industrial uses not listed above, one (1) parking space for each two (2)  
             employees working on the highest employment shift. 
5-5  Location of Parking Spaces 
Parking spaces as required above shall be on the same lot with the main building, or, in the case of 
buildings other than dwellings, may be located not farther than five hundred (500) feet therefrom. 
5-6  Parking Lot Regulations 
Any lights used to illuminate the lot shall be so arranged as to reflect the light away from adjoining 
premises in any residential zone.  
5-7      Off-street Truck-Loading Space 
On the same premises with every building, structure or part thereof, erected and occupied or 
increased in capacity after the effective date of flats Ordinance for manufacturing, storage, 
warehouse, goods display, department store, grocery store, hotel, hospital, mortuary, laundry, dry 
cleaning or other use similarly involving the receipt or distribution by vehicles of materials or 
merchandise, there shall be provided and maintained on the lot, adequate space for standing, 
loading and unloading services in order to avoid undue interference with public use of streets or 
alleys. Such space, unless otherwise adequately provided for, shall include a minimum of ten (10) 
feet by twenty-five (25) feet loading space with a minimum of fourteen (14) feet height clearance 
for every twenty thousand (20,000) square feet or fraction thereof in excess of three thousand 
(3,000) square feet of building floor use for above mentioned purposes, or for every twenty 
thousand (20,000) square feet or fraction thereof in excess of three thousand (3,000) square feet of 
land-use for above mentioned purposes. 
R04140557
25 
5-8  Access Requirements 
Service stations, roadside stands, public parking lots, and all other businesses requiring motor 
vehicle access shall meet the requirements as hereinafter provided. 
(1) Access shall be by not more than two (2) roadways for each one hundred (100) feet or 
fraction thereof of frontage on any street. 
 (2)        No two (2) said roadways shall be closer to each other than twelve (12) feet, and no          
                         roadway shall be closer to a side property line than three (3) feet. 
 (3)        Each roadway shall be not more than thirty-five (35) feet in width, measured at right angles   
                         to the center line of the driveway, except as increased by permissible curb return radii. The  
                          entire flare of any return radium shall fan within the right-of-way. 
             (4) No roadway shall be closer than ten (10) feet to the point of intersection of two property     
lines at any corner as measured along the property line, and no roadway shall extend across 
such extended property line. 
 (5)        In all cases where there is an existing curb and gutter or sidewalk on the street, the  
              applicant for a permit shall provide a safety island along the entire frontage of the property,  
                         except for the permitted roadways. On the two ends and street side of each such island shall  
                          be constructed a concrete curb, the height, the location and structural specifications of  
              which shall be approved by the Building Inspector. 
(6) Where there is no existing curb and gutter or sidewalk, the applicant may, at his option, 
install such safety island and curb, or, in place thereof, shall construct along the entire 
length of the property line, except in front of the permitted roadways, a curb, fence, or pipe 
rail, not exceeding two (2) feet or less than eight inches in height.  
5-9  Location of Gasoline Pumps 
Gasoline pumps shall be set back not less than eighteen (18) feet from any street line to which the 
pump island is vertical and twelve (12) feet from any street line to which the pump island is 
parallel, and not less than ten (10) feet from any residential or agricultural zone boundary line. If 
the pump island is set at an angle on the property, it shall be so located that automobiles stopped for 




CONDITIONAL USES  
6-1 Definition of Conditional Use  
A conditional use is a land use that, because of its unique characteristics or potential impact on the 
county, surrounding neighbors, or adjacent land uses, may not be compatible in some areas or may 
be compatible only if certain conditions are required that mitigate or eliminate the detrimental 
impacts.   
6-2  Permit Required 
A conditional use permit shall be required for all uses listed as conditional uses in the district 
regulations where they are, or will be located, or if the use is specified as conditional use elsewhere 
in this Ordinance.  
6-3  No Presumption of Approval 
The listing of a conditional use in any table of permitted and conditional uses found in Chapter 11, 
Subsection 11-2 of this Ordinance for each category of zoning district does not constitute an 
assurance or presumption that such conditional use will be approved.  Rather, each proposed 
conditional use shall be evaluated on an individual basis, in relation to its compliance with the 
standards and conditions set forth in this chapter and with the standards for the district in which it 
is located, in order to determine whether the conditional use is appropriate at the particular 
location. 
6-3  Application  
A conditional use permit application shall be made to the Zoning Administrator as provided by this 
Ordinance.  The Zoning Administrator shall submit the application to the Planning Commission, 
except that the Planning Commission may authorize the Zoning Administrator to grant, attach 
conditions or deny conditional use permits, subject to such limitations or qualifications as are 
deemed necessary. Applications for a conditional use permit shall be accompanied by maps, 
drawings, statements, or other documents as required by the Planning Commission. 
6-4  Determination  
The Planning Commission, or upon authorization, the Zoning Administrator, shall approve a 
conditional use to be located within any district in which the particular conditional use is permitted 
by the use regulations of this Ordinance. In authorizing any conditional use the Planning 
Commission shall impose such requirements and conditions as are necessary for the protection of 
adjacent properties and the public welfare. The Planning Commission shall not authorize a 
conditional use permit unless the evidence presented is such to establish: 
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(1) That such use will not, under the circumstances of the particular case, be detrimental to the 
health, safety or general welfare of persons residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious 
to property or improvements in the vicinity; and  
(2) That the proposed use will comply with intent, spirit, regulations and conditions specified 
in this Ordinance for such use and the zoning district where the use is to be located, as well 
as make the use harmonious with the neighboring uses in the zoning district. 
(3) The Planning Commission shall itemize, describe, or justify the conditions imposed on the 
use. 
6-5  Fees 
The application for any conditional use permit shall be accompanied by the appropriate fee as 
determined by the Board of County Commissioners and as listed in the County’s Fee Schedule 
Ordinance. 
6-6  Public Hearing 
A public hearing on a conditional use permit application may be held if the Planning Commission 
shall deem a hearing to be necessary and in the public interest. 
6-7  Appeals of Decision 
Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Planning Commission or the Zoning Administrator 
regarding the issuance, denial or revocation or amendment of a conditional use permit may appeal 
such decision to the Board of County Commissioners whose decision shall be final.  All appeals to 
the Board of County Commissioners must be in writing and filed with such within thirty (30) days 
of the date of decision appealed from. 
The decision of the Board of County Commissioners may be appealed to the District Court 
provided such appeal is filed within thirty (30) days of the Commission decision.  Such appeal 
shall be filed with the County Administrator’s office and the court clerk.  
6-8  Inspection 
Following the issuance of a conditional use permit by the Zoning Administrator or the Planning 
Commission, the Zoning Administrator shall approve an application for a building permit, and 
shall ensure that development is undertaken and completed in compliance with said conditional use 
and building permit. 
6-9  Substantial Action Required  
Unless there is a substantial action under a conditional use permit with one (1) year of its issuance, 
the permit shall expire.  The Planning Commission may grant one extension up to six (6) months, 
when it is deemed in the public interest. 
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6-10  Revocation 
A conditional use permit shall be revocable by the Planning Commission at any time due to failure 
of the permittee to observe any condition specified or failure to observe other requirements of this 
Ordinance in regard to the maintenance and improvements or conduct of the use or business as 
approved.  The County shall also have a right of action to compel offending structures or uses to be 
removed at the cost of the violator or owner. 
No conditional use permit shall be revoked until a hearing is held by the Planning Commission.  
The permittee shall be notified in writing of such hearing.  The notification shall state the grounds 
for complaint or reasons for revocation, and the time and location of the hearing.  At the hearing, 
the permittee shall be given an opportunity to be heard.  The permittee may call witnesses and 
present evidence.  Upon conclusion of the hearing, the Planning Commission shall determine 
whether the permit should be revoked. 
6-11  Temporary Permit 
A temporary use permit may be issued for any use listed as a conditional use for that zone for no 





PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT 
7-1  Purpose 
The purpose of the planned unit development is to allow diversification, in the relationship of  
various uses and structures to their sites, and to permit more flexibility in the use of such sites.  
The application of planned unit concepts is intended to encourage good neighborhood, housing, or  
area design, thus ensuring substantial compliance with the intent of the district regulations and  
other provisions of this Ordinance relating to the public health, safety, and general welfare, and  
at the same time securing the advantages of large-scale site planning for residential, commercial  
or industrial developments, or combinations thereof 
7-2 Definition 
Planned unit development, for the purposes of this Ordinance, shall mean an integrated design  
for development of residential, commercial, or industrial uses, or combinations of such uses in  
which one or more of the regulations, other than use regulations of the District in which the  
development is to be situated, is waived or varied to allow flexibility and initiative in site and  
building design and location in accordance with an approved plan and imposed general  
requirements as specified in this Chapter. 
7-3  Planned Unit Development Permit 
Planned unit developments may be allowed by Planning Commission approval in any zoning  
district. No such planned unit development permit shall be granted unless such development  
meets the use limitations of the zoning district in which it is located, including planned unit  
developments in planned districts, and meet the density and other limitations of such districts,  
except as such requirements may be lawfully modified as provided by this Chapter or by district  
regulations. Compliance with the regulations of this Ordinance in no sense excuses the developer  
from the applicable requirements of the subdivision ordinance, except as modifications thereof  
are specifically authorized in the approval of the application for the planned unit development. 
7-4  Required Conditions 
(1)         No planned unit development shall have an area less than that approved by the Planning    
             Commission as adequate for the proposed development. 
(2) A planned unit development which will contain uses not permitted in the zoning district in 
which it is to be located will require a change of zoning except that any residential use shall      
be considered a permitted use in a planned unit development which allows residential uses 




(3)  The development shall be in single or corporate ownership at the time of application, or the 
subject of an application filed jointly by all owners of the property. 
  
(4)  The Planning Commission shall require such arrangements of structures and open spaces 
within the site development plan as necessary to assure that adjacent properties will not be 
adversely affected. 
(a) Density or land use intensity shall in no case be more than twenty-five (25) percent 
higher than allowed in the zoning district, except not more than ten (10) percent 
higher in residential districts. 
(b) Where feasible, least height and intensity of buildings and uses shall be arranged 
around the boundaries of the development. 
             (c)        Lot area, width, yard, height, density and coverage regulations shall  
  be determined by approval of the site development plan. 
(5)       Preservation maintenance and ownership of required open spaces within the development 
shall be accomplished by: 
(a) Dedication of the land as a public park or parkway system, or, 
(b) Granting to the County a permanent, open space easement on and over the said 
private open spaces to guarantee that the open space remain perpetually in 
recreational use, with ownership and maintenance being the responsibility of an 
Owners Association established with articles of association and bylaws which are 
satisfactory to the governing body, or, 
(c) Complying with the provisions of the Condominium Ownership Act of 1963, Title 
57, Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which provides for the 
payment of common expenses for the upkeep of the common areas and facilities. 
(6) Landscaping, fencing and screening related to the several uses within the site and as a means 
of integrating the proposed development into its surroundings shall be planned and 
presented to the Planning Commission for approval, together with other required plans for 
the development. 
(7) The size, location, design and nature of signs, if any, and the intensity and direction of area 
or floodlighting shall be detailed in the application.
(8)        A grading and drainage plan shall be submitted to the Planning Commission with  
 the application. 
 (9)        A planting plan showing proposed tree and shrubbery plantings shall be prepared for the  
              entire site to be developed. 
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(10) The proposed use of the particular location shall be shown as necessary or desirable, to 
provide a service or facility which will contribute to the general well-being of the 
neighborhood and the community. 
(11) It shall be shown that under the circumstances of the particular case, the proposed use 
will not be detrimental to the health, safety or general welfare of persons residing in the 
vicinity of the planned unit development. 
7-5  Uses Allowed 
Subject to the review and approval of the Planning Commission, uses allowed in a planned unit 
development shall be those uses allowed in the planned district or other zoning district in which 
the planned unit development is to be located; provided, that for the purposes of this Chapter and 
Ordinance, multiple-family dwellings may be allowed in a planned unit development approved 
in a single-family zoning district, provided the overall density of the development does not 
exceed ten (10%) percent above the density normally allowed for single-family dwellings in said 
District. 
7-6  General Site Plan 
Application shall be accompanied by a general site plan showing, where pertinent: 
 (1)        The use or uses, dimensions, sketch elevations, and locations of proposed structures. 
(2)        Dimensions and locations of areas to be reserved and developed for vehicular and 
pedestrian circulation, parking, public uses such as schools and playgrounds landscaping 
and other open spaces. 
(3)        Architectural drawings and sketches outlining the general design and character of the 
proposed uses and the physical relationship of the uses.  
(4)        Such other pertinent information, including residential density, coverage, mud open space 
characteristics, shall be included as may be necessary to make a determination that the 
contemplated arrangement of buildings and uses makes it desirable to apply regulations and 
requirements differing from those ordinarily applicable under this Ordinance. 
7-7  Review by Planning Commission 
In order that it may approve a planned unit development, the Planning Commission shall have 
authority to require that the following conditions (among others it deems appropriate) be met by 
the applicant: 
 (1) That the proponents of the planned unit development have demonstrated to the satisfaction 
 of the Planning Commission that they are financially able to carry out the proposed project. 
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(2) That the proponents intend to start construction within one (1) year of the approval of the           
                                      project and any necessary zoning district change, and intend to complete said construction,                     
                                      or approved stages thereof, within four (4) years from the date construction begins. 
                        (3) That application for planned unit development in planned districts meets the requirements of 
such districts, including the requirements of the general development 
 (4) That the development is planned as one complex land use rather than as an aggregation of  
             individual and unrelated buildings and uses. 
 (5) That the development as planned will accomplish the purpose outlined in Section 7-1. 
7-8  Scope of Planning Commission Action 
In carrying out the intent of this Chapter, the Planning Commission shall consider the following 
principles: 
(1) It is the intent of this Chapter that site and building plans for a planned unit development 
shall be prepared by a designer or team of designers having professional competence in 
urban planning as proposed in the application. The Commission may require the applicant to 
engage such a qualified designer or design team.  
(2) It is not the intent of this section that control of a planned unit development by the Planning 
Commission be so rigidly exercised that individual initiative be stifled and substantial 
additional expense incurred; rather, it is the intent of this Section that the control 
exercised be the minimum necessary to achieve the purpose of this Chapter.
(3) The Planning Commission may approve or disapprove an application for a planned unit 
development. In an approval, the Commission may attach such conditions as it may deem 
necessary to secure compliance with the purposes set forth in Section 7-1. The denial of 
an application for a planned unit development by the Planning Commission may be 
appealed to the County Commission. 
7-9 Construction Limitations 
         (1) Upon approval of a planned unit development, construction shall proceed only in 
accordance with the plans and specifications approved by the Planning Commission, and 
in conformity with any conditions attached by the Commission to its approval. 
(2)       Amendments to approved plans and specifications for a planned unit development shall 
be obtained only by following the procedures here outlined for first approval. 
           (3) The Building Inspector shall not issue any permit for any proposed building,  
structure or use within the project unless such building, structure or use is in accordance 




            CHAPTER 8 
MOBILE HOMES AND MOBILE HOME PARKS  
8-1  Purpose 
To require that mobile home developments will be of such character as to promote the objectives 
and purposes of this Ordinance; to protect the integrity and characteristics of the districts contiguous 
to those in which mobile home parks are located; and to protect other use values contiguous to or 
near mobile home park uses. 
8-2  Location and Use 
No occupied mobile home shall be located anywhere within the County where the total enclosed, 
usable floor space of the unit is less than five hundred (500) square feet, with an adequate 
foundation and skirting, and located and maintained on a separate lot having no less than  
the minimum area width, depth and frontage setbacks as required by this Ordinance for the district 
in which the dwelling structure is located.   
San Juan County prohibits the placement or relocation of any pre-HUD-code manufactured 
(mobile) homes, built prior to the MHCSS, 24 CFR 3280, which became effective on June 15, 
1976, anywhere within the County.  (See NCCBCS/ANSI A225.1, Annex D) 
8-3  Mobile Home Parks - Approval 
Mobile home parks may not be constructed unless first approved by the Planning Commission, after 
review of plans for said mobile home park which satisfy the Commission that the said development 
will: 
(1) Be in keeping with the general character of the district within which the development is to be 
located. 
(2) Have written approval from the State Division of Health. 
(3) Be limited to nine (9) units per acre, except mobile homes may be clustered, provided that 
the total number of units does not exceed the number permitted on one (1) acre multiplied 
by the number of acres in the development.  
(4) An overall plan for development of a mobile home park shall be submitted to the  
  Planning Commission for review. The plan shall be drawn to scale no smaller than one 
 (1) inch to fifty (50) feet. At least six (6) copies of the plan shall be submitted. The plan 
shall show: 
(a) The topography of the site represented by contours shown at not greater intervals 
than two (2) feet when required by the Planning Commission. 
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(b) The proposed street and mobile home space layout. 
(c) Proposed reservations for parks, playground and open space. 
(d) Tabulations showing per cent of area to be devoted to parks, playgrounds and 
open spaces, number of mobile home spaces, and total area to be developed. 
(e) Proposed locations of parking spaces. 
(f) Generalized landscaping and utility plan, including locations of water, electricity, 
gas lines, fire hydrants. 
(g) Any other data the Planning Commission may require. 
(5)  Applications for approval shall be in writing, submitted to the Planning Commission at its 
regular meeting and shall be granted or denied within thirty (30) days after the meeting 
date, unless an extension of such time is approved by the applicant. An application denied 
by the Planning Commission may be appealed to the Board of County Commissioners, 
which appeal must be made in writing within ten (10) days after the denial is made by the 
Planning Commission. 
(6)       Standards and requirements for mobile home parks shall be as provided: 
(a) Storm drainage facilities shall be so constructed as to protect residents of the 
development as well as adjacent property owners. Such facilities shall be of 
sufficient capacity to insure rapid drainage and prevent the accumulation of 
stagnant pools of water in or adjacent to the development. 
(b) To accommodate anticipated traffic, roadways shall be designed including the 
following standards, unless modified by an approved planned unit development 
plan: 
(i) One-way traffic: A minimum of fifteen (15) feet in width plus extra width 
as necessary for maneuvering mobile homes. 
(ii) Two-way traffic: A minimum of thirty (30) feet in width. 
(iii) Access: Each mobile home park shall have at least two (2) accesses to 
public streets. 
(c) In a mobile home park, no home or add-on shall be located closer than twenty (20) 
feet from the nearest portion of any other home or add-on. All such homes and add-
on's shall be set back at least ten (10) feet from road curbs or walks. If the mobile 
home tongue remains attached, it shall be set back a minimum of six (6) feet from 
road curbs or walks. All mobile homes shall be set back at least fifteen (15) feet 
from any boundary of the mobile home park. 
R04240567
35 
(d) Off-street parking shall be provided at the rate of two (2) parking spaces per mobile 
home space and each such parking space shall have a minimum width often (10) feet 
and the minimum depth of twenty (20) feet. In no case shall the parking space be 
located farther than one hundred (100) feet from the mobile home space it is 
designed to serve.  
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CHAPTER 9  
CONSTRUCTION SUBJECT TO GEOLOGIC, FLOOD, OR OTHER 
NATURAL HAZARD 
9-1  Requirements 
(1) When the Planning Commission or the Zoning Administrator deems it necessary, any 
application for a conditional use permit, a planned unit development approval, or a building 
or use permit, shall be accompanied by a geologic and soils survey report for the land, lot 
or parcel for which application approval is sought. The report shall be prepared at 
applicant's expense by a geologist or soils engineer and shall show the suitability of soils on 
the property to accommodate the proposed construction, and any discernable flood or 
earthquake hazards. 
(2) Whenever a geologic and soils survey report indicates a parcel to be subject to unusual,  
potential or actual hazards, the applicant shall meet the special conditions required by the 
Planning Commission or zoning administrator, to reduce or eliminate such hazard, or if such 





10-1  Establishment of Zoning Districts 
For the purposes of this Ordinance, San Juan County is divided into the following listed zoning 
districts: 
(1) Multiple Use District MU-1 
(2) Agricultural District A-1 
(3) Rural Residential RR-1 
(4) Controlled District CD 
(5) Indian Reservation District IR 
10-2  Filing of Ordinance and Map 
This Ordinance and map shall be filed in the office of the County Clerk and may be examined by 
the public subject to the reasonable regulations established by said clerk. 
10-3  Rules for Locating Boundaries 
Where uncertainty exists as to the boundary of any District, the following rules shall apply: 
 (1)        Wherever the District boundary is indicated as being approximately upon the center line of a   
                         street, alley, or block, or along a property line, then, unless otherwise definitely indicated   
                         on the map, the center line of such street, alley, block or such property line, shall be  
                         construed to be the boundary of such District. 
 (2)        Whenever such boundary line of such District is indicated as being approximately at the  
                         line of any river, irrigation, canal, or other waterway, or railroad right-of-way, or public  
                         park or other public land, or any section line, then in such case, the center of such stream  
                         canal or waterway, or of such railroad right-of-way, or the boundary line of such public  
                         land or such section line shall be deemed to be the boundary of such District. 
(3)  Where such District boundary lines cannot be determined by the above rules their location  
             may be found by the use of the scale appearing upon the map. 
             
(4) Where the application of the above rule does not clarify the District boundary location, the  




MULTIPLE-USE, AGRICULTURAL, RURAL RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS  
11-1  Purpose 
(1)         Multiple Use. To establish areas in mountain, hillside, canyon, mountain valley, desert and  
              other open and generally undeveloped lands where human habitation would be limited in  
              order to protect land and open space resources; to reduce unreasonable requirements for  
              public utility and service expenditures through uneconomic and un-wise dispersal of  
               population; to encourage use of the land, where appropriate, for forestry, grazing,  
              agriculture, mining, wildlife habitat, and recreation; to avoid excessive damage to  
              watersheds, water pollution, soil erosion, danger from brush land fires, damage to grazing,  
              livestock raising, and to wildlife values; and, to promote the health, safety, convenience,  
              order, prosperity, and general welfare of the inhabitants of the community. 
 (2)         Agricultural. To promote and preserve, in appropriate areas, conditions favorable to  
                          agriculture and to maintain greenbelt open spaces. Such districts are intended to include  
                          activities normally and necessarily related to the conduct of agricultural production and to  
                          provide protection from the intrusion of uses adverse to the continuance of agricultural  
                          activity. 
(3)  Rural Residential. To promote and preserve, in appropriate areas, conditions favorable to  
             large-lot family life, the keeping of limited numbers of animals and fowl, and reduced  
             requirements for public utilities. These districts are intended to be primarily residential in  
             character and protected from encroachment by commercial and industrial uses. 
11-2  Use Regulations 
No building, structure or land shall be used and no building or structure shall be hereafter erected, 
structurally altered enlarged or maintained, except as allowed in the districts as shown as 
"permitted uses" indicated by a "P" in the appropriate column, or as "conditional uses", indicated 
by a "C" in the appropriate column. If a use is not allowed in the district, it is either not named in 
the use list or it is indicated in the appropriate column by a dash, "-". If a regulation applies in the 
district, it is indicated in the appropriate column by a numeral to show the linear or square feet, or 
acres required, or by the letter "A". If the regulation does not apply, it is indicated in the 
appropriate column by a dash, "-". 
        MU-1 A-1 RR-1 
(1)       Accessory buildings and uses customarily           P       P   P  
incidental to permitted areas 
(2)        Accessory uses and buildings customarily    C C C 
  incidental to conditional uses 
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         MU-1 A-1 RR-1
           (3) Temporary buildings for uses incidental    C C C 
to construction work, including living quarters  
for a guard or night watchman - such buildings  
must be removed upon completion or abandonment  
of the construction work 
(4) Agriculture and Forestry 
  a. Agriculture, except grazing and pasturing   P P P 
                                   of animals 
  b. Agriculture, including grazing and pasturing  P P P 
              of animals 
  c. Agriculture, business or industry      P P C    
  
 d.         Animals and fowl for recreation or for   P P P 
  family food production for the primary use  
  of persons residing on the premises.    
e. Nursery or green house, wholesale or retail,   P P P                  
fruit/vegetable stand   
f. The tilling of soil, the raising of crops,   P P P 
horticulture and gardening 
g. Farms devoted to raising and marketing of   P P C 
chickens, turkeys, or other fowl or poultry,  
fish or frogs, including wholesale and retail  
sales           
h. Forestry, except forest industry   P P C 
i. Forest industry, such as a saw mill, wood   P P  C 
products plant, or others 
(5) Apiary        P P P 
(6) Airport / Airstrip      C C C 
(7) Aviary        P P C 
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         MU-1 A-1 RR-1
(8) Cluster subdivision of single family dwellings: 
a. Provided that the residential density is not  - - C 
increased by more than one hundred (100)  
percent for the district based on  
single-family units       
b. Provided that the area, in acres of the parcel   - - 5  
is not less than: 
(9) Dude ranch; family vacation ranch    C C C 
          
(10) Dwellings 
a. Single-family dwellings: Provided that one   P P P 
additional dwelling on at least one-half (½) 
acre per unit for an employee, seasonal  
worker or a member of the property owners  
immediate family may be allowed subject to  
approval by Planning Commission and the  
Board of Health. 
b. Pre-HUD-Code Manufactured (mobile)  - - - 
 Homes.  Pre-HUD-Code Homes are homes 
 built prior to the MHCSS, 24 CFR 3280,  
 which became effective on June 15, 1976.   
 (See NCCBCS/ANSI A225.1, Annex D)    
c. Two-family dwellings    C C C 
1. Seasonal home or cabin   P P P 
2. Farm or ranch housing    P P P 
(including mobile homes) 
(11) Home occupation      P P P 
(12) Household pets      P P P 
(13) Kennel        P P C 
(14) Mine, quarry, gravel pit, rock crusher, concrete   P P C 
batching plant, or asphalt plant, oil wells or  
steam wells. 
(15) Evaporation ponds      C C C 
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         MU-1 A-1 RR-1
(16) Power generation      C C - 
(17) Renewable energy – solar, wind farms   C C -   
(18) Private park or recreational grounds or private   C C C 
recreational camp or resort, including accessory  
or supporting dwellings or dwelling complexes  
and commercial service uses which are owned by  
or managed by the recreational facility to which it  
is accessory.            
(19) Motor Park       C C C 
(20) Public stable, riding academy or riding ring, horse   C C C 
show barns or facilities 
(21) Public use, quasi-public use, essential services,  C C C 
including private school, with a curriculum  
corresponding to a public school, church; dams  
and reservoirs; radio and television transmitting  
stations or towers, cemetery 
(22) Signs 
 a. One identification sign, not to exceed   P P P 
thirty-two (32) sq. ft. in total surface area 
b. One development sign, not to exceed    P P P 
thirty-two (32) sq. ft. in total surface area 
c. One civic sign, not to exceed sixteen (16)   P P P 
sq. ft. in total surface area 
d. One real estate sign, not to exceed eight (8)   P P P 
sq. ft. in total surface area 
e. One residential sign, not to exceed two (2)   P P P 
sq. ft. in total surface area 
(23)  Wind Turbine(s), Anemometer(s)    C C C 
11-3  Area Regulations 
The minimum lot area in acres for any main use in the  1 1 1 
districts regulation by this chapter shall be  
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         MU-1   A-1   RR-1  
      
11-4  Frontage Regulations 
       The minimum frontage in feet for any lot in the districts  25 25 25 
regulated by this chapter on a public street or a private  
street approved by the governing body shall be:    
             
11-5  Front Yard Regulations 
       The minimum depth in feet for the front yard for main  25 25 25 
buildings shall be property line 
11-6  Rear Yard Regulations 
The minimum depth in feet for the rear yard in the   
Districts regulated by this chapter shall be: 
 For main buildings -       
             for accessory buildings     25 25 25 
11-7 Side Yard Regulations 
       The minimum side yard in feet for any dwelling,    
other main or accessory buildings in districts 
regulated by this chapter shall be:     15 15 15 
- Except corner lots which shall have twice the  
Setback of:      30 30 30  
11-8  Height Regulations 
       The maximum height for all buildings and structures in 
Districts regulated by this Chapter shall be:    
 In feet       35 35 35 
 In number of stories     2.5 2.5        2.5
  
11-9  Coverage Regulations 
The maximum coverage in percent for any lot in the   - - 20




CONTROLLED DISTRICT CD 
12-1  Purpose 
To provide, in appropriate locations, a district where agriculture, industrial, commercial and 
residential uses may exist in harmony, based on planned development for mutual benefit and 
flexible location of uses.   
12-2  Permitted Uses 
Agriculture, Residential, Commercial, Highway Commercial, and Industrial (Industrial subject to 
approval). In additional to the uses regulated in RR-22 districts, the following uses may be 
permitted by variance within each sub-zone. 
Community Commercial CD 
Grocery Store 
Drug Store 
Automobile Service Station 
Bakery 




Ice Cream Store 
Variety Store 
Medical and Dental Offices 
Professional Office 
Public Utilities, public and quasi-public 
Stores, shops and offices supplying commodities or performing services such as department stores, 
specialty shops, banks, business offices, and other financial institutions and personal service 
enterprises. 
Restaurants, beer taverns, pool hall lounges, theaters, similar enterprises provided that all uses be 
conducted within buildings. 
Business and technical schools, and schools and studios of photography, art, music and dance. 
Bowling alley, dance hall, roller skating rink. 
Carpenter shops, electrical, plumbing, heating and air conditioning shops, printing and publishing 
or lithographic shops, mortuaries, and furniture upholstering shops, provided all uses shall be 
within and enclosed building. 
New car dealers. 
Garages for minor repairs of automobiles. 
Garages for storage of automobiles, commercial parking lots. 
Hotels and Motels. 
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Any other similar retail business or service establishments which the Planning and Zoning 
Commission finds to be consistent with the purpose of this chapter and which will not impair the 
present or future use of adjacent properties. 
Highway Commercial CDh 
Restaurant or drive-in cafe 
Motels 
New and Used Automobile Agency 
Farm Machinery and Equipment Sales 
Nurseries and Greenhouses 
Mobile Home Sales 
Mobile Home Park 
Drive-in Theater 
Bowling Alley, other commercial recreation facilities 
Automobile Service Station, Auto Accessories 
Accessory Buildings and uses 
Other uses approved by the Planning Commission as being in harmony with the intent of the 
neighborhood commercial zone and similar in nature to the above listed uses. 
12-3  Conditional Uses 
All other uses than those listed.  
12-4  Special Provisions 
(1)       Within the CD District there may exist three sub-zones, CD- Community Commercial, CDh -    
            Commercial Highway, CDi - Industrial. Designation of such sub-zones shall be the    
            responsibility of the Board of County Commissioners upon the recommendation of the  
            County Planning Commission. 
(2)      Applications for conditional uses or requests for variances in CD district must first have  
appropriate sub-zone designation. Such designation shall become part of the official county 
zone plan. Applicants are required to provide a reproducible mylar or linen and three (3) 
copies of detailed site plan drawings of their proposed use and sub-zone boundary 
including: 
(a) Format size not less than 81/2" x ll" or greater than 24" x 36". 
(b) Precise dimension at a convenient engineering scale. 
(c) Location of all existing structures and improvements (buildings, roads, fences, 
ditches and canals, utility systems), and other information as required by Planning 
Commission within five hundred (500) feet of the proposed sub-zone boundary. 
(d)  Proposed methods of providing utility needs including water, sewer,  electrical, and 
fuel services, access and parking, and appropriate methods from dealing with any 
special site problems such as storm water drainage. 
(3)       No commercial or industrial building shall be erected within twenty-five (25) feet of a  
            residential building or residential district boundary. Commercial or industrial buildings           
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            within one-hundred (100) feet of a residential district boundary shall not exceed the height  
            limitations of that district. 
(4) The Planning Commission shall review all pertinent information on the proposed sub- 
zone designation and submit their recommendation to the County Commission. Upon 
receiving the Planning Commission’s recommendation(s), the Board of County 
Commissioners shall advertise for and hold a public hearing to receive public input in 
order to make an informed decision whether or not to designate the sub-zone by 
ordinance. 
(5)        The following uses require an approval from the Planning and Zoning Commission prior  
             to any use: 
Industrial Cdi 
Manufacture of any of the following products from raw materials: acids, asphalt, carbide,  
caustic soda, carbon or bone black, cellulose, charcoal, chlorine, creosote, fertilizer,  
hydrogen, industrial alcohol, nitrates of an explosive nature, plastics, portland cement,  
potash, synthetic and resins, fibers.  Any of the following processes: distillation of wood or  
bone; filtrating of cotton or other materials; reduction, refining, smelting and alloying of  
metals or metal ores and radioactive materials; refining of petroleum and petroleum  
products; slaughtering and packing of animals larger than poultry and rabbits; tanning of 
raw, green, or salted hides of skins. Automobile salvage and wrecking operations, and 
industrial metal, rag, glass or paper salvage operations provided that all operations are 
conducted within a solid view obscuring wall or fence not less than eight (8) feet in 
height.  
12-5  Signs 
            (1) Business signs shall be allowed after approval of a "Request for Business Sign Permit" 
and shall be governed by Federal and State Highway rules and regulations, provided, that 
the Planning Commission may require that signs shall not exceed one (1) sq. ft. of sign 
area for each one (1) linear foot of street frontage abutting the development portion of the 
property, provided that any one sign for any one business shall not exceed one-hundred 
(100) sq. ft. in total surface area and the number of signs for each business may not exceed 
three (3), the total area of which shall not exceed the total sign area allowance.   
 (2)        Non-business signs shall be permitted or provided with no more than two (2) signs for each               
                         use or occupancy.  The total allowable square footage for signage are as follows: 
(a) Development - maximum 40 square feet 
(b) Civic - maximum 14 square feet 
(c) Real Estate - maximum 32 square feet 
(d) Residential - maximum 2 square feet 
(3)        All signs are to be flat wall or free standing and such signs shall not be revolving or have 
moving parts, flashing or intermittent lighting. 
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12-6  Boundaries 
(1) Boundaries for all Controlled District (CD) zones shall be established by the Board of  
            County Commissioners who may amend the number, shape and area of  
such districts, provided, it has received a recommendation from the Planning Commission 
concerning a proposed amendment and a public hearing has been held by either body. 
(2) Description of all Controlled Districts (CD) zones should be included as part of this section  
            of the County Zoning Ordinance, and changes in some shall be written in similar language  
            and made part of this section. 
(3) Controlled District (CD) boundaries.   
(a) An area parallel to all State Highways extending outwardly one thousand (1000)  
             feet each direction from the center line of said highways and terminating at County  
             Boundaries, or municipal corporate. 
(b) All of the area, except that within the corporate limits of Monticello City, in  
Township 33 South, Range 23 East Sections 25 and 36; Township 33 South, Range 
24 East, Sections 30 and 31. 
(c) All of the area, except that within the corporate limits of Blanding City, in 
Township 36 South, Range 22 East, Sections 22, 23, 26, 27, 34, and 35; Township 
37 South, Range 22 East, Sections 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, and 15 
(d) All of the area in Township 40 South Range 21 East, Sections 23, 24, 25, 26; and 
Township 40 South Range 22 East, Sections 19 and 30. 
(e) All of the area in Section 14, Township 30 South Range 20 East
(f) All of the area in the West half of Section 4 and the East Half of Section 5, 
Township 29 South Range 23 East 
(g) All of the area in Sections 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 Township 37 South, Range 18 
East. 
(h) All of the area, except that in the boundaries of Natural Bridges National 
Monument, in Sections 14,15, 22 and 23, in Township 37 South, Range 18 East. 
(i) All of the area in Sections 21 and 28, Township 39 South, Range 16 East. 
(j) All of the area within the boundaries of San Juan County in Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 
20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29 mad 30 in Township 38 South Range 11 East. 




INDIAN RESERVATION DISTRICT (IR) 
13-1  Purpose
To provide, in appropriate locations, areas where the various Indian Tribes may exercise 
self determination. 
13-2  Permitted Uses
All uses and conditions thereof are subject to approval by the authorized representatives of the 




IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WITIDN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NORTHERN MONTICELLO 
ALLIANCE, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, 
Petitioner and Plaintiff, 
v. 
SAN JUAN COUNTY COMMISSION, 
a 
political subdivision of the State of Utah, 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah, 
Respondents and Defendants, 
SUSTAINABLE POWER GROUP, 
LLC, and LATIGO WIND PARK, LLC, 
Intervening Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON 
THE AUGUST 30, 2016 HEARING 
Case No. 160700001 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
This matter is before the court on three motions: (1) San Juan County Commission's 
(County) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (2) Northern Monticello Alliance, LLC's 
(NMA) Motion for Summary Judgment, and (3) County's Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment. After full briefing on each motion, the court held a hearing on August 29, 2016. 
Having considered the briefing and argument, the court now rules as follows: 
Factual Background 
NMA is a Utah limited liability company. NMA claims that it has several members, 
but its articles of incorporation identify only one. At least this member, in addition to other 
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purported members, owns land adjacent to a wind turbine electric generating facility owned 
and operated by Sustainable Power Group, LLC (SPower). 
The project required a conditional use permit because the project is located in the 
A-1 zone of the county. The original applicant for the project was Latigo Wind Park, LLC 
(Latigo), a subsidiary of Wasatch Wind Intermountain, LLC (Wasatch Wind). The permit 
included a provision requiring, 
as much flicker, light, sound[] mitigation as possible, and to 
meet all industry standards of those challenges, ... and 
reiterating that all and any new land purchase lease deals be 
in writing for any contiguous and affected landowners .... 
[A]ny mitigation and standards and conditions of this CUP 
must be met by any and all project development people, be 
they owners now or in the future, and all of these be met at 
the time of building pennit issuance. 
Latigo entered into a written Purchase Agreement Option to buy NMA property at a 
specific per acre dollar amount in exchange for NMA withdrawing its appeal of the 
conditional use permit. The term of the option was two years after execution. 
The project was later sold to SPower. SPower chose not to exercise the Option 
Agreement and allowed it to lapse by its terms. SPower then began efforts to negotiate a 
new purchase agreement with the NMA landowners. All but one ofNMA's members 
refused to accept the lower price. SPower also changed the location of several proposed 
wind turbines. NMA responded with a complaint requesting that the conditional use permit 
be revoked. 
The San Juan County Planning and Zoning Commission (Commission) held a 
revocation hearing on September 9, 2015 where SPower presented updated studies 
regarding sound, flicker, and light. The Commission took the matter under advisement and 
2 
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voted not to revoke the permit on September 14, 2015. NMA appealed to the County, 
arguing that the commission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that 
the Commission should have allowed NMA to present evidence at the hearing. 
The County found that the record was insufficient to support a finding that the 
mitigation conditions had been met and concluded that it was improper for the Commission 
to prohibit NMA from commenting at the hearing. It reversed and remanded the decision 
for further hearing. 
On December 3, 2015, SPower, through its attorney, sent a letter to the County, 
claiming that the County's order stated that no evidence of mitigation was presented, but 
the Commission's brief had clearly referenced the studies presented at the hearing. SPower 
noted that it would suffer "significant damages" if the decision were not reversed and 
requested that the County reconsider and issue an amended order "no later than 4:00 p.m. 
MST, Monday December 7, 2015." 
After a properly advertised closed meeting, the County issued an amended order, 
finding that SPower was correct that they had failed to consider the mitigation evidence 
presented to the Commission. The County upheld the Commission's decision in its entirety, 
concluding that further hearing would be unnecessary. NMA then filed this action to appeal 
the amended decision. 
Analysis 
The County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings argues that NMA lacks 




NMA has standing to appeal the County's decision. 
The County claims that NMA itself does not own the property adjacent to the wind 
facility. NMA does not dispute this fact, but argues that it has associational standing 
because its members own the land. The County responds that NMA's aiiicles of 
incorporation disclose only a single member and therefore cannot qualify as an association. 
An association has standing if "[I] its individual members have standing and [2] the 
participation of the individual members is not necessary to the resolution of the case."
1 
However, the County argues that there is a third requirement: the association must be a 
"traditional voluntary membership organization." This requirement is derived from the 
United States Supreme Court case, Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising 
Commission,
2 
where the Court concluded that the commission did not qualify because it 
3 
had "no members at all." 
In formulating the test for associational standing, the Utah Supreme Court partially 
adopted the test developed in the federal courts.
4 
However, the court also noted that it was 
"not bound to follow federal precedent in this area" and emphasized that 
"[t]his test is a pragmatic one. Where, as a practical matter, 
the rights asserted and the remedies sought do not require 
direct participation by affected individuals who would have 
standing, there is no reason not to pennit associations to press 
claims common to their members."
5 
In Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock,
6 
the Utah Supreme Court again stated the 
1 Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ,I 21, 148 p.3d 960 (citing Utah 
Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Utah 1985)). 
2 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
3 Id. at 342. 
4 See Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Utah 1985) 
sld. 
6 743 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1987). 
4 
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rule as having only two requirements. 
7 
The court recognized that some courts had adopted 
the third requirement announced in the Hunt case, but it did not "feel compelled to adopt or 
to reject this requirement in Utah at [that] time."
8 
Subsequent cases have continued to use 
the two-part test.
9 
Accordingly, because Utah appellate courts have declined to adopt the 
additional element, this court declines to do so here. 
10 
Turning now to the two part test, in order to find that NMA's individual members 
have the right to sue, the court must conclude that "own or occupy property within the 
jurisdiction of the decisionmaking body."
11 
The member ofNMA listed on its articles of 
incorporation owns land in the county and will be affected by the County's decision on the 
conditional use permit at issue. Its other members are similarly situated. 
Next, the court must find that the participation of the individual members is not 
necessary.
12 
In Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board ofHealth,
13 
the Utah 
Supreme Court found that this element was not met with regard to association members' 
money damages claims, but allowed the suit for declaratory judgment to proceed. 
14 
Here, 
NMA is not seeking money damages, but for the court to determine the validity of the 
County's decision. The individual participation ofNMA's members is not necessary for the 
7 Id. at 1175. 
8 Id. at 1175 n.10. 
9 Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ~ 21, 148 p.3d 960; Architectural 
Committee v. Kabatznick, 949 P. 2d 776, 779 (Ut. Ct. Apps. 1997). 
10 Even if the court were to apply this element, Hunt found that the test was not met where the association had 
no members at all, suggesting that an associations consisting of only one member might qualify. See Hunt, 
432 U.S. at 342. Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court's call for pragmatism in applying the test is relevant 
here. See Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Utah 1985). 
The purpose of associational standing is to allow litigants to use the assets of an association to bear the costs 
of litigation. Id. That purpose applies to an association of one just as it would to an association of many. 
11 Cedar Mountain Environmental, Inc. v. Tooele County, 2009 UT 48,214 P.3d 95. 
12 Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ~ 21, 148 p.3d 960. 
13 709 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1985). 
14 Id. at 1162. 
5 
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court to grant the relief requested. 
Accordingly, NMA has met the requirements for associational standing and the 
County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied. 
The County's Amended Order was illegal. 
Under Utah Code§ 17-27a-801, the district court has authority to reverse the 
decision of a land use authority if the decision is "arbitrary, capricious, or illegal."
15 
The 
court is required to presume that the decision is valid and its review is limited to the record 
·ct d . 16 prov1 e to 1t. 
A decision is arbitrary and capricious when it is not supported by substantial 
evidence.
17 
The County's decision to reverse its earlier order was based on its failure to 
consider "two three ring binders of information" on SPower's mitigation efforts. In these 
binders, the County found sound, light, and flicker studies that it relied on to conclude that 
SPower's mitigation efforts met the requirements of the permit. Accordingly, the court 
cannot find that the County's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence. 
A decision is illegal when it "violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the 
time the decision was made."
18 
NMA argues that the County Commission's reconsideration 
was illegal because it was not authorized by any statute and because it was based on an ex 
parte communication. 
Utah Code § 630-4-302 provides that a state agency may reconsider its decision if a 
party files a request within twenty days and mails a copy of the request to all other parties. 
15 Utah Code§ l 7-27a-801(3)(a). 
16 Utah Code§ l 7-27a-801(3)(a) & (8). 
17 See Arbitrary, BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY (10th Ed. 2014). 
18 Utah Code§ 17-27a-801(3)(d). 
6 
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This statute does not apply to the County because it is specifically excluded. 
19 
No similar 
provision exists under the County Land Use, Development, and Management Act.
20 
However, as the County points out, "[i]nherent in the power to make an administrative 
decision is the authority to reconsider a decision. The absence of specific authority in the 
governing statutes is not determinative. Every tribunal has some power to correct its own 
. k 21 m1sta es." 
This is not to say that this authority to reconsider is unlimited. The County's 
procedures must still comply with basic due process in order to be valid.
22 
Due process 
requires that a proceeding "afford the procedural protections that the given situation 
demands."
23 
At minimum, this means "adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.',2
4 
Here, the County based its decision on an ex parte communication. NMA received neither 
notice of the letter nor an opportunity to be heard in opposition. 
In Hollenbach v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Comm 'n,
25 
a Commissioner had an ex 
parte conversation with the Deputy Chief of the Police Department about the outcome of 
the department's Internal Affairs investigation.
26 
The Commissioner disclosed the details of 
this conversation on the record.
27 
While the Commission acknowledged that the 
communication was improper, the court found that the Commissioner's concerns had 
originated with the evidence and not the ex parte communication.
28 
Indeed, the 
19 Utah Code§ 63G-4-103(b) (defining "agency" to exclude "any political subdivision of the state"). 
20 See Utah Code 17-27a-101 et seq. 
21 Clark v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 914,915 (Utah 1981) (citations omitted). 
22 U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV. 
23 Dairy Product Services. Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, ,r 49, 13 P.3d 581. 
24 Id. 
25 2015 UT App 116,349 P.3d 791. 
26 Id. ,r 12. 
27 Id.~[ 13. 
28 Id. ,r,r 14-15. 
7 
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conversation, if anything, worked to the complaining party's benefit.
29 
Ultimately, the court 
concluded that the ex parte communication did not affect the Commission's decision.
30 
In contrast, the County's reconsideration here did not originate from the evidence, 
but from the ex parte communication. While the County's decision to reverse its earlier 
decision was based on evidence properly before it, NMA did not have the same opportunity 
to argue its side of the case with regard to that evidence or to present its own evidence. The 
ex parte communication also included an implicit threat of litigation when it suggested that 
SPower would suffer "damages ... in excess of $100 million." It is likely that this affected 
the Commission's decision as well. NMA should have been heard in opposition and was 
prejudiced by the denial of due process. 
Accordingly, the court concludes that the County's decision to reconsider its earlier 
order was illegal because it violated NMA's due process rights. The County's cross-motion 
for summary judgment is denied and NMA's motion is granted. NMA's counsel is directed 
to prepare a judgment consistent with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58A. 
29 Id. ,~) 12-13. 
30 Id., 15. 
8 
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SAN JUAN COUNTY COMMISSION et 
al., 
Respondents, 
SUSTAINABLE POWER GROUP, LLC; 
and LATIGO WIND PROJECT, LLC, 
Intervening Respondents. 
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND GRANTING RESPONDENTS’ 
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 170700006 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
The Court, having considered cross-motions for summary judgment filed by         
petitioner Northern Monticello Alliance, LLC (“NMA”) and respondents the San Juan          
County Commission and San Juan County (collectively, “County”) and the briefing          
thereon, and having heard oral argument, and reviewed the proposed order submitted            
The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: February 28, 2018 /s/ LYLE R ANDERSON
11:52:34 AM District Court Judge
February 28, 2018 11:52 AM 1 of 5
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by the County, the objection filed by NMA, and the County’s response thereto, now              
decides the motions as follows. 
This petition arises from a decision of the San Juan County Commission, acting            
in its capacity as the county appeal authority under Utah Code § 17-27a-701, made on               
remand from this Court’s order in a prior petition for review between these parties and               
heard by this Court, case no. 160700001 (“NMA I”). That petition arose after the county               
commission affirmed the county planning commission’s decision not to revoke a          
conditional use permit for a wind power facility held by Sustainable Power Group, LLC              
and Latigo Wind Park, LLC (collectively, “sPower”). The county commission did so via             
an amended decision after initially reversing the planning commission’s decision upon          
finding that sPower had presented no evidence beyond bare statements that it was             
complying with the permit’s conditions requiring it to mitigate the project’s flicker, light,             
and sound impacts. In a letter dated December 3, 2015 seeking the county commission’s              
reconsideration, sPower contended that the county commission’s initial decision was         
mistaken, and that it had presented extensive evidence showing its compliance. The            
county commission issued its amended decision as a result. But sPower did not send             
NMA a copy of its letter, and the county commission reconsidered its decision without              
involving NMA. 
In NMA I, this Court held that the county commission’s failure to involve NMA in               
its reconsideration violated NMA’s due process rights, but otherwise held that the           
county commission’s amended decision was supported by substantial evidence and         
February 28, 2018 11:52 AM 2 of 5
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legal. This Court vacated the county commission’s amended decision and remanded this            
matter back to the county commission “for proceedings consistent with the Court’s            
Decision.” (NMA I, Ruling Am. J. (Nov. 14, 2016).)  
On remand, the county commission took briefs from both sPower and NMA on             
sPower’s request for reconsideration and held a hearing where attorneys for both parties             
presented arguments. The county commission limited the parties to the evidence           
already in the record, reasoning that it was considering sPower’s contention that,            
contrary to the county commission’s initial decision, the record contained more than its             
representative’s bare statements that it was complying with the permit’s conditions. The            
county commission then issued a new amended decision affirming the planning           
commission. This petition for review followed, where NMA again argues that the county             
commission’s decision is illegal and unsupported by substantial evidence. 
While the law of the case doctrine may not strictly apply to this situation, the               
Court nonetheless may, as it has considered and decided these matters on effectively the              
same record in NMA I once before, determine that it need not reconsider them and               
instead rely on its prior determination that, but for the due process violation, the county               
commission’s decision was not illegal and was supported by substantial evidence. 
In NMA I, the Court explained that, “[w]hile the County’s decision to reverse its              
earlier decision was based on evidence properly before it, NMA did not have the same               
opportunity to argue its side of the case with regard to that evidence or to present its                 
own evidence.” (NMA I, Mem. Dec. on Aug. 30, 2016 Hr’g at 8 (Sept. 9, 2016).) The                 
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Court expected that on remand the county commission would remedy its denial of due             
process to NMA by giving it a chance to respond to sPower’s December 3, 2015 letter,                
which was essentially sPower’s motion to reconsider, and to evaluate those arguments            
and consider any evidence in the record that NMA would want to call to the county               
commission’s attention in evaluating whether it should have reconsidered its decision.          
(The Court did not mean for the county commission to take evidence if it hadn’t taken                
evidence in the first place.) The Court hasn’t read anything in the memoranda or heard               
anything at argument that persuades it that the county commission didn’t do what the              
Court expected it to do. 
The Court therefore DENIES NMA’s motion for summary judgment and         
GRANTS the County’s cross-motion for summary judgment. This order fully resolves all            
claims at issue in this matter and serves as the Court’s FINAL JUDGMENT. 
-----------------------------------------END OF ORDER------------------------------------------- 
Ordered by the Court as indicated 
by the date and seal at the top of the first page. 
Approved as to form this 20 February 
2018. 
Goebel Anderson PC 
/s/Barton H. Kunz II 
Barton H. Kunz II 
Attorneys for County Respondents 
Approved as to form this ____ February 
2018. 
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Approved as to form this ____ February 
2018. 
 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
 
[unsigned] 
Paul W. Shakespear 
Elizabeth M. Brereton 
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BEFORE THE SAN JUAN COUNTY COMMISSION 
SIDING AS THE SAN JUAN COUNTY LAND USE APPEAL AUTHORITY 
NORTHERN MONTICELLO ALLIANCE, LLC, 
Appellant, 
VS. 
SAN JUAN COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION, 
Appellee 
AMENDED WRITTEN DECISION ON REMAND 1 
After remand and rehearing, we amend our December 2, 2015 "Written Decision'' 
to affirm the San Juan County Planning and Zoning Commission's decision not to 
revoke the conditional use permit first issued for what is known as the Latigo Wind Park 
in July 2012 and later amended in October of that year ("Latigo CUP"). 
BACKGROUND 
The San Juan County Planning and Zoning Commission ("Planning 
Commission") originally issued the Latigo CUP to the wind park's owner at the time. 
Wasatch Wind, in July 2012. The County issued an amended conditional use permit in 
October 2012. The successful motion to amend the conditional use permit required the 
permit holder to: 
1 This amendment pertains only to the issues raised in NMA's petition for review, 
Northern Monticello Alliance, LLC v. San Juan County Commission et al., case no. 
160700001. The portions of our initial December 2, 2015 decision applicable to Summit 
Wind Power, LLC's appeal, which it did not petition to review, are not hereby amended, 
and remain our final written decision as to those issues. 
1 
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[l]ncorporate as much flicker, light, sound{ ] mitigation as possible, and to 
meet all industry standards of those challenges, ... and reiterating that all 
and any new land purchase lease deals be in writing for any contiguous 
and affected landowners. {A]ny mitigation and standards and 
conditions of this CUP must be met by any and all project development 
people, be they owners now or in the future, and all of these be met at the 
time of building permit issuance. 
(R0855, R0860-61 )' Sometime later, Wasatch Wind sold the wind park to Sustainable 
Power Group, LLC ("sPower''), which applied for and received a building permit from the 
County in February 2014. At the time of the revocation hearing and the subsequent 
reviews, sPower was in the process of constructing the wind park. sPower has since 
completed construction and the project is now operational. 
After the county received complaints that sPower was not complying with the 
Latigo CUP conditions, the Planning Commission voted unanimously to hold a 
revocation hearing '·to have sPower answer the challenges brought before the Planning 
and Zoning Commission and answer all of the questions of the land owners and the 
original CUP to show that permit holder is in compliance." (R0031 ) 
An sPower representative appeared at the revocation hearing held before the 
Planning Commission on September 9, 2015 to answer whether the Latigo CUP should 
be revoked due to sPower's alleged failure to meet its conditions. sPower presented 
evidence to the Planning Commission, including studies regarding flicker, light, and 
sound, and testified that sPower was satisfying the Latigo CUP's conditions. On a four-
to-two vote, the Planning Commission decided to wait to decide whether to revoke the 
Latigo CUP until it had reviewed "any other pertinent information." (R0579.) 
2 These references are to the record on NMA's petition for review. 
2 
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At the Planning Commission's following meeting held September 14, 2015, it 
determined that, based on the sPower testimony and evidence, "as much as possible 
mitigation had taken place addressing sound, light and flicker." It accordingly voted 
unanimously not to revoke the Latigo CUP. (R0581.) The Planning Commission did not 
allow Northern Monticello Alliance, LLC ("NMA"), a company whose members are the 
owners of property nearly surrounded by the project and who were among those whose 
complaints prompted the revocation hearing, to participate in the hearing. 
NMA and the owner of a competitor wind park, Summit Wind Power, LLC, filed 
appeals of the Planning Commission's decision to the San Juan County Land Use 
Appeal Authority. NMA's members own about eighty acres of property. (One of its 
original members has settled separately with sPower.) The NMA properties are zoned 
Agricultural A-1 and are undeveloped. None of the remaining NMA members has 
submitted an application for subdivision approval or a building permit. A well permit was 
issued for one property, which we understand was dug. NMA contends its members 
intended to develop and subdivide their properties for residential purposes. 
NMA charged that the Planning Commission's determination that sPower had 
satisfied the Latigo CUP's conditions to mitigate flicker, light, and sound was not 
supported by substantial evidence. NMA also argued that the Planning Commission 
erred when it prohibited NMA from speaking at the revocation hearing regarding NMA's 
claim that sPower was required to buy its properties according to what it termed a "self-
imposed" condition. (R1629-39, R1826.) 
3 
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We rendered a written decision in this matter under Utah Code§ 17-27a-708 on 
December 2, 20153 upholding the Planning Commission's decision in some respects 
and reversing it in others. For purposes relevant here, we stated that "(w]e have been 
presented with no evidence in this appeal that s*Power has worked to mitigate sound, 
light, and flicker other than s*Power's representation that it has done studies and 
mitigated effects that exceeded the thresholds it set." (R0035-36) We held that those 
bare representations were insufficient to determine whether sPower had met the 
mitigation conditions and consequently held that "it was also insufficient for the 
Commission to conclude that s*Power was satisfying the condition_" (R0036.) We 
reversed the Planning Commission's decision and remanded the matter to it for 
reconsideration. 
As to NMA's argument that it should have been allowed to address the Planning 
Commission during the revocation hearing, "particularly to raise its concern that 
s*Power had failed to satisfy a self-imposed condition that it purchase land surrounded 
by the wind park," we stated that we were "unaware of any legal obligation imposed by 
statute or ordinance that requires the Commission to hear from third parties during a 
CUP revocation hearing." (R0036.) We nonetheless reversed the Planning 
Commission's decision not to hear from NMA because we were remanding the dispute 
anyway, and the Planning Commission had stated during its August 13 meeting that it 
intended to have sPower answer landowners' questions. Although we acknowledged 
that the Planning Commission may have simply meant that it would ask sPower 
----------
3 Although the decision is dated November 23, 2015, it does not appear to have actually 
been served until December 2, 2015. 
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questions raised by the landowners, we found that it was "also reasonable to believe 
that the Commission intended to allow the landowners to directly ask questions." 
(R0037.) 
On December 3, 2015, the day following the issuance of our "Written Decision," 
the Appeal Authority received a letter from sPower requesting that we reconsider. fn 
that letter, sPower raised concerns with our decision. including our statement that 
sPower had provided no evidence of mitigation beyond its bare allegations. sPower 
asserted that, to the contrary, it had provided us with studies, reports. and analyses. 
sPower also claimed that our decision would inflict over $100 million in damages, asking 
that we reconsider our decision or, presumably, face some sort of damages claim. 4 
sPower did not copy its letter to NMA 
We met in a properly closed meeting to consider sPower's complaint on 
December 7, 2015, and we issued an "Amendment to Written Decision" based on a two-
to-one vote on December 9, 2015. In our amendment, we conceded that our statement 
that we had not received mitigation evidence from sPower other than its bare 
representations was mistaken, and that, based on our review of the evidence sPower 
had, in fact, submitted, we determined that the Planning Commission's decision not to 
4 NMA without support other than the timing of our "Amendment to Written Decision." 
persistently asserts that we were cowed into amending our decision by sPower's 
alleged damages. NMA's characterization is unfair. While we would be foolish not to 
consider a claim of over $100 million in damages from a well-financed corporate entity a 
serious matter (as even a fraction of such an award would be economically catastrophic 
for San Juan County), we also bristled at what we perceived as sPower's threat. It is, 
unfortunately, not unusual for us to receive threats of lawsuits and claimed damages 
when we make decisions that carry adverse consequences for someone. Nonetheless, 
we diligently undertook addressing sPower's complaint as dispassionately as possible 
in our roles as members of the land use appeal authority, and attempted to respond in 
fairness and in compliance with our ordinances. 
5 
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revoke the Latigo CUP was not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. We therefore affirmed the 
Planning Commission's decision and, because the case no longer needed to be 
remanded to consider evidence, declined to remand the issue to the Planning 
Commission. Commissioner Lyman authored a dissent. 
NMA then filed a petition for review of our amended decision to the district court. 
It asserted that our decision was arbitrary and capricious because the Planning 
Commission's decision not to revoke the Latigo CUP was not supported by substantial 
evidence. NMA also claimed that our decision to reconsider our "Written Decision" was 
illegal because we lacked such authority The court issued a decision on September 9, 
2016 reversing us. Although the court determined that it could not ·'find that the County's 
decision was unsupported by substantial evidence," i.e., that it was not arbitrary and 
capricious, the court nonetheless held that our amended decision was illegal because, 
although it recognized our inherent authority to reconsider our decisions, our 
reconsideration here without involving NMA and based on sPower's ex parte letter 
violated NMA's due process rights. (Mem. Dec. on Aug. 30, 2016 Hearing, pass;m 
(Sept. 9, 2016).) The court's decision was later formalized into a final judgment that 
vacated our amended decision and remanded the matter to us ·'for proceedings 
consistent with the Court's Decision." (Am. J. at 1 (Nov. 17, 2016).) 
We informed the parties that we would again consider the issues raised in 
sPower's December 3, 2015 letter, but requested supplemental briefs from both sPower 
and NMA and set a hearing_ We received supplemental briefs from both and heard 
arguments from attorneys for both sPower and NMA on January 3, 2017. After 




Those appealing a land use decision must "alleg[e] that there is error in [the] ... 
decision[ J or determination made by the land use authority in the administration or 
interpretation of the land use ordinance:· Utah Code§ 17-27a-703(1). See also SJCZO 
§ 2-2(2). We are to "presume that the [Planning Commission's] decision applying the 
land use ordinance is valid " SJCZO § 2-2(2)(e). It is the appellant's burden to 
prove that the Planning Commission's decision was error. Utah Code§ 17-27a-705. 
We are to "determine only whether or not the [Planning Commission's] decision 
is arbitrary, capricious, or illega1.·· SJCZO § 2-2(2)(e). An arbitrary and capricious 
decision in this context is one that is not supported by substantial evidence, which is 
defined as "a quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a 
reasonable mind," which is ··more than a mere 'scintilla' of evidence and something less 
than the weight of the evidence." Becker v. Sunset City, 2013 UT 51, 1f 21, 309 P 3d 
223. See also Utah Code§ 17-27a-801(3)(c). A decision 1s illegal if it violates a statute, 
ordinance, or regulation in effect at the time it was made. Utah Code § 17-27a-
801 (3)(d). 
Under our ordinances. the Planning Commission may revoke a conditional use 
permit if the permittee fails "to observe any condition specified" or other requirements 
imposed by our ordinances "in regard to the maintenance and improvements or conduct 
of the use or business as approved." The Planning Commission may not revoke a 
conditional use permit without giving the permittee advance written notice and an 




We preliminarily note that we instructed the parties on rehearing not to present 
us with any addiUonal evidence not already in the record. We did so because the 
purpose of our rehearing was solely to consider sPower's request for reconsideration 
based upon its complaint that. contrary to our finding, it had indeed provided evidence 
of mitigation beyond its bare representations. The parties generally complied with our 
direction. Each party presented us with a handout during the rehearing. We consider 
those demonstrative and do not otherwise rely on them as a basis for our decision. 
Objections were also raised to statements made during the hearing as outside the 
record, and we have tried to avoid such statements in rendering this decision. 
A Our statement in our initial December 2, 2015 decision that sPower had 
presented no evidence of mitigation of light, sound, or flicker beyond its 
representatives' bare statements was mistaken. 
We have confirmed that sPower had, indeed, submitted extensive 
documentation, including various studies and reports, to the Planning Commission 
regarding its efforts to mitigate light, sound, and flicker. Whether that information was 
before us when we heard this appeal on November 10, 2015 or was otherwise provided 
in time to review before rendering our December 2, 2015 written decision is the subject 
of different recollections and disagreement among us. Regardless, our statement that 
sPower had offered nothing more than bare oral representations was, we now 
recognize, erroneous. 
sPower's December 3, 2015 letter prompted us to review the documents that had 
been submitted. In reliance on those documents, assuming the validity of the Planning 
Commission's decision, and in light of the arguments made during the January 3, 2017 
rehearing, we now affirm the Planning Commission's decision. 
8 
1978
B. In light of the record evidence. NMA has not persuaded us that the 
Planning Commission lacked substantial evidence for its decision. 
As stated above, we must presume that the Planning Commission's decision is 
valid and may overturn it only if we determine that it was not supported by substantial 
evidence, which is defined as something more than a scintilla but less than the weight of 
the evidence. Given this presumption and deferential standard of review, upon 
examining the evidence submitted we conclude that NMA has not shown otherwise. 
We cannot say that the Planning Commission's decision not to revoke the Latigo 
CUP lacked substantial evidence. In light of the record evidence, we will not disturb the 
Planning Commission's conclusions that sPower has and is meeting the Latigo CUP's 
conditions and its decision not to revoke the permit. 
C. Remand to the Planning Commission is not necessary or helpful. 
As we stated in our "Written Decision," we are unaware of any legal obligation 
imposed by statute or ordinance that required the Planning Commission to hear from 
third parties during the revocation hearing. While our ordinance explicitly provides 
permittees the right to be heard, it does not extend that right to others. See SJCZO § 6-
10 
Prior to our first reconsideration, we had remanded this appeal back to the 
Planning Commission to make several factual determinations regarding the mitigation 
that we said at the time did not appear to be based on evidence in the record. Because 
we were remanding the appeal back to the Planning Commission for factual 
determinations, we extended to NMA the opportunity to address the Planning 
Commission on those issues. But upon rehearing and considering all the record 
evidence .. however, we no longer view such a remand as helpful because now its sole 
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purpose would be to allow NMA to comment, which we have determined is not a right 
that the Planning Commission was obligated to recognize. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of our rehearing and consideration of all of the record evidence, at least 
some portion of which we had erroneously concluded in our December 2, 2015 "Written 
Decision" had not been submitted. we affirm the Planning Commission's decision not to 
revoke the Latigo CUP. NMA has not persuaded us that the Planning Commission's 
decision lacked substantial evidence. Nor has NMA convinced us that its members were 
entitled to be heard at the revocation hearing or that sending this matter back to the 
Planning Commission is necessary. 
We therefore VACATE our December 2. 2015 "Written Decision" insofar as it 
addressed NMA's appeal and AFFIRM the Planning Commission's decision not to 
revoke the Latigo CUP. 
Finally, we encourage the parties to meet together and possibly mediate their 
dispute. It seems to us that their quarrel is chiefly about an option contract entered into 
between NMA and sPower's predecessor_ The expense of county resources on what 
seems to us to be a private contract dispute concerns us. We have nonetheless striven 
to diligently fulfill our legal obligations, and will continue to do so. 
Per Utah Code §§ 17-27a-708 and -801(2)(a), any person aggrieved by this 
·'Amended Written Decision on Remand" shall have thirty days from its issuance to file a 
petition for review with the district court 
DATE: February 21, 2017. 
SAN JUAN COUNTY COMMISSION, 
10 
1980
SITTING AS THE 
SAN JUAN COUNTY LAND USE APPEAL AUTHORITY 
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San Juan County Planning and Zoning Commission Meeting 
Latigo Wind Park 
Tuesday, October 4, 2012 
7:05 p.m. 
In Attendance:  Steve Redd, Trent Schaefer, Marsha Hadenfeldt, Joe Hurst, Carmella Galley 
1st Item on Agenda:  Consideration of a Conditional Use Permit for a Private RV Park in 
Spanish Valley 
Starts at 10:12 minutes on 1 of 3: 
Chairwoman: All right.  Ladies and gentlemen.  We will now move along from Spanish Valley.  
like the wind.  So, the consideration - 
Consideration of a Conditional Use Permit for Latigo Wind Park north of 
eg, explaining where we are 
moving as quickly and as thoroughly as possible.  So Greg will only speak for a 
few minutes to introduce it.  Latigo Wind Park, we would ask them to just keep it 
to about 10 or 15 minutes, going over the most important highlights, which for 




So with that in mind, I would ask the Board to open a public hearing.  A motion to 
open? 
Woman: Motion to open. 
Man: Second the motion. 
Chairwoman: Okay.  A motion to open for the Latigo Wind Park, and we have a second.  All in 
favor? 
All: Aye. 
Chairwoman: Aye.  Okay.  Greg, would you introduce it, please? 
Greg: This first park is the Latigo Wind Park, which is located just north of Monticello, 
in this area.  Monticello is right there.  This one would be probably the most 
visible to residents of Monticello.  This one - we issued a Conditional Use Permit 
back in July 5, I believe, for this, and there were some concerns about the 
completeness of that application.  The Wasatch Wind Group said, we will do a 
supplemental Conditional Use application and a more 
done that.  They have given us their - what they have done in this book here, and 
so this is really a supplemental hearing to that initial one that was approved in 
 the updates, and 
to the things that they have done since that initial Conditional Use Permit.  Do 
you have any questions other than that?  ________ can explain it better than I can. 
Chairwoman: Any staff questions of Greg of where we are?  To clarify, at this moment, they are 
withdrawing the one we gave them and starting over? 
R07770920
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Greg: No.  This is supplemental to the original application. 
Chairwoman: Okay. 
Greg: And that application is, they just agreed - instead of going to an appeal, they said, 
let us present all of our current information that has been updated since July.  We 
want to present that, have everyone that would like to comment on it here, and so 
Chairwoman: Okay. 
Man: Do we believe that they still have an existing Conditional Use Permit? 
Greg: Yes. 
Man: Okay. 
Chairwoman: The action this evening would be adding or changing conditions accordingly, 
then?  Is that what your ... 
Greg:  ... 
Chairwoman: Okay. 
Woman: Or not.  Say that everything fell apart or something.  Okay. 
Man: 
Greg: No.  We need to take into account the things that were already said.  I mean, they 
gave us a wonderful presentation then, probably 45 minutes. 
Man: Yeah, I read this whole thing, too. 
Man: What portion of the application was incomplete? 
Greg: 
complete.  They changed some locations.  If you read your manual, I mean, they 




Greg: Well, that first section really explains most of the ... 
Woman: Right.  Right. 
Greg: ... the changes that were made, and their concerns, and they were answering the 
concerns that came up in the initial Conditio
and because there is a -  acres that 
belong to the State of Utah right here. 
Man: What section is that? 
Greg:  23.  And there are 9 property owners in there that are concerned 
about that.  This is the plat for that subdivision, and it sits approximately right 
are - we 
the other reason that we wanted to re-address these, to make sure that the citizens 
of the community, and those people who are in the 80 acres, have an opportunity 
to express their feelings. 
Chairwoman: Okay, we would ask the representatives of Wasatch Wind/Latigo Wind Farm to 
make a presentation to us, and just ask - you just focus on target because you did 
ull it together. 
Man: Did everybody get the email from Greg Adams? 
Chairwoman: Yeah. 





Chairwoman: Did you get that one printed out?  Part of one of the things that we can talk about 
understand that anybody on this Board should be responsible for what was handed 
out today in the email becau
see if they can answer many of your questions before you even ask them. 
Stevens: Thank you, Chairman, members of the San Juan Planning Commission.  My name 
back again, and thank you, Greg, because your comments were spot on, so thanks 
for summarizing for me.  Also with me tonight is Christine Michae
president of Wasatch Wind, and you have all met her before, too.  We have some 
now, but they might stand up and field some questions as we go.  So, just as the 
Chai
in July, and then basically, with this supplemental statement, we restated 
the old application, and then we supplemented it with additional information, and 
going to focus on mostly what is new.  But the existing information is still in this 
deck that we handed to you, and if you have any questions about the old 
information, we can cover that here.  Um, so the why are we here?  This is not a 
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information that we believed the Planning Commission should be aware of and 
should hear.  We have, first of all, further defined and clarified the guidelines and 
strate  acres that 
 - the in-
acreage.  Last time, we talked about the potential to maybe add some acreage to 
the north to have some more 
owners in the vicinity to make them aware of the project and answer any 
questions. 
 So we just thought we should come back and bring all this new 
information to you, and then give some people some opportunities to present their 
 months.  
ntinue to occur, 
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ourselves.  Um, our company is Wasatch Wind.  We told you about us last time.  
provided a statement, or an overview, of our company in the supplemental 
your deck is my page 
exact overview we gave last time, which is a project with a capacity of 
60 megawatts, up to 27 turbines.  We anticipate somewhere between 20 and 27 
turbines, based on the type of turbine that we ultimately select.  An overhead 
transmission line(?) would connect the project to the Pinto Substation.  This is 
basically - 
questions about generally what the project is about? 
Um, the next slide is called location and land control.  This basically gives 
you an idea of the acres that we leased, and everything is the same as last time, 
area that you should think could be used at some point for turbines, especially if 
we need some additional flexibility for micrositing, we might use those two 







Man: Okay.  And these are getting clo
standards and ... 
Stevens: Yeah.  So actually, the parcel to the east of 42 is, part of it is off limits because of 
the airport, so the further east you go there is off limits.  And the next slide, site 
layout, 
point to a few highlights that have changed.  You can see the southern string of 
turbines, turbine 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 have been moved further north, away from the 
city of Monticello.  Turbine 10 was moved up, but turbine 9 was also moved to 
the west, further from the properties - the existing residences and commercial 
spaces to the east, and then we actually moved, just to the north of the non-
participating in-holding properties, we moved turbine 17 completely over there to 
the west, and we moved turbine 18 further north.  And then I want to mention that 
location of turbine 9, and further south than the southern string, as you currently 
see it. 
 And for those in the audience, this is our layout today.  So we moved 
some turbines that were right here.  This string of turbines was moved further 
north since the last time you were here.  A turbine that was located here was 
moved up here, and then this string was moved further to the west, away from 
properties that are over here. 





Stevens: Actually, that is what it is.  So the next slide is land use analysis, and this is taking 
a look at the San Ju
with the intent (intense?) spirit regulations and conditions specified in this 
ordinance for such use in the zoning district where the wind park is to be located.  
Nothing has changed about the information that we presented last time, but just to 
restate, Latigo Wind Park has proposed to be located in the agricultural district.  
Wind turbines are a conditional use in the agricultural district, per your ordinance.  
The purpose of ag land is stated in the 
here, and Latigo Wind Park is consistent with the purpose I stated last time, 
because wind farms can co-exist and preserve agricultural practices and ________ 
land.  So nothing has changed since last time. 
 On the next slide, land use analysis, this is a look at, again, the San Juan 
County Ordinance, and whether the Latigo Wind Park will be harmonious with 
the neighboring uses in the zoning district.  And again, in July, we reviewed the 
reasons why we felt Latigo Wind Park will be harmonious with the neighboring 
uses, and some of the neighboring uses include agriculture and ranching, 
recreation, hunting, and limited residential and commercial use.  So the Latigo 
Wind Park is harmonious with these neighboring uses.  The only items that have 
minimize the potential impacts on a few residential and commercial properties.  
render the project 
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harmonious with existing residential and commercial uses, and therefore, we 
again conclude that Latigo Wind Park will be harmonious with the neighboring 
uses in the zoning district. 
 The next slide is the economic benefits, and nothing has changed here.  I 
just thought we would recap that there will be economic benefits, as a result of a 
wind project, and the Latigo Wind project.  We expect 50 to 100 laborers during 
construction; 30 to 50 percent of those most likely would be from the local area.  
The construction work force total payroll, we estimate between $200 and 
$400,000 per month to the group as a whole.  We estimate that $4.3 million would 
be paid to local subcontractors over the duration of the ________ [too much 
noise here]. 
Chairwoman: 
stipulation that a big business coming to town will do economic wonders for those 
four full-time employees and benefits to the local landowners who have leased 
this. 
Stevens: Very nice summary there. 
Chairwoman: s on the things that we can work on. 
Stevens: 
environmental analysis that we provided last time.  In this supplemental 
statement, we provided the studies that we references last time, so you can read 
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not done with that analysis, but the initial analysis is included in your 
supplemental packet.  Did you want me to go into more detail that that? 
Chairwoman: 
get to those. 
Stevens: Okay. 
Man: Do we ask questions later? 
Chairwoman: I think we shou
Stevens: Okay.  Then, summary of the potential impacts.  Like you said, any big 
development that comes in will have benefits.  It will also have some impacts.  So 
-engaged and engaged additional experts to help us 
-case scenario turbine to analyze these 
this go around, we clarified those standards and then we adopted some standards 
that we want to talk to you about that we plan to live by in this round and any 
further micrositing.  And then we proposed some mitigation measures, such that 
the Latigo Wind Park will not be detrimental to the health, safety, or general 
welfare of persons in the area, and the Latigo Wind Park will not be injurious to 
property improvements in the vicinity. 
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 And the first impact that we assessed last time and this time is visual, and 
visual in(?) light, we talked about at length last time.  The only thing that I want 
to add to last time is that we relocated turbine no. 10.  We moved several turbines 
away from the city and further west from those eastern periphery properties, and 
we adopted setbacks from property lines, all that will minimize, or mitigate, the 
potential visual impacts to the area.  Also, last time, we committed to apply dark 
night standards to our substation, and ensure that only when employees need to 
enter the substation at night will the substation be lit.  And then regarding the
FAA required lighting on the turbines, we will select FAA approved lighting for 
towers that minimizes impact to the surrounding area.  So they do have LED 
bulbs now that seem to have a lower angle, which you can see the light, and we 
will work with the best technology that we can. 
few new things to, is sound.  We had hired DNV KEMA and then J.C. Brennan 
and Associates, and actually brought our sound expert, Luke Saxelby, from 
J.C. Brennan with me today, in case anyone has any specific questions about 
human annoyance, not health, because no scientific studies have concluded that 
health issues are being cau
be a potential annoyance by humans, and so we modeled the sound projections at 
the Latigo Wind Park using the loudest possible turbine that we would be 
considering, and then we used our experts, and their recommendations about - 
from reputable agencies, like the Massachusetts EPA and the U.S. EPA, to apply 
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standards for noise limits and sound limits at areas around the wind farm to ensure 
that these agencies are recommending standards based on their observations of the 
standards so that we follow their guidelines for avoiding human annoyance.  Does 
that make sense? 
 here.  We 
have standards for existing residences in residential areas, existing residences in 
rural areas, existing residences in places of business during the day, ag and 
undeveloped land with future for residences, and then vacant or agricultural land 
w
annoyance.  So to give you an example of some of the sound limits that are 
mentioned here, we have a 49 decibel limit, we have a 37 decibel limit.  A 50 
decibel level is a sound that you might hear inside an office building, like inside 
the office.  And a 40 would be simil
contribution of the turbine without consideration for any of the background noise, 
or that the wind that you would hear in your ear, which could actually mask the 
ooked at it 
from the perspective of vacant agricultural lands and currently vacant agricultural 
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lands that may one day build a residence.  So with respect to four adjacent non-
participating currently vacant properties, there could be very minor exceedances 
of these standards 
.  And actually, if you turn to the next page, you would be 
able to see that the red line is where we believe, using the worst-case scenario 
turbine, that there could be exceedances of our limits - of our standards.  And on 
those properties, if you can identify the red lines where they cross those 
the left where no homes could possibly 
that, but on private properties where homes could possibly be built, there are four 
properties where we exceed the standard.  On a small portion of those properties, 
standard, and they can build a home and be within our recommended standard.  
So for those four properties where we have a small amount of exceeding of the 
t we would 
provide $4,000 per property so that they could install insulation in a home if they 
were ever to build a home, and that would bring the sound level down to a 
recommended limit.  And those four properties are currently vacant right now. 
Woman: Th -case scenario turbine. 
Stevens: -




Stevens: We could either show the projector, or we can hand out some of the maps. 
Woman: 
Chairwoman: Well, can somebody be looking i
whatever you need to use.  Michelle, maybe you can keep going over the general 
information and then you can flash through and go with the sound, the red line for 
the sound.  Sorry. 
Stevens: No worries. 
Chairwoman: 
Stevens: So the next potential impact that we talked about last time, and that we again 
reassessed after the turbine moves this time, is the potential for shadow flicker.  
And as we explained last time, shadow flicker is simply when there is a receptor, 
so a human receptor, in one spot, and you have the sun in another spot and a 
 - 
when the blade moves. 
Chairwoman: You end up doing this a lot and thinking and ________. 
Stevens: This is very calculat
day, and sunrise and sunset, and the number of cloudy days in the area, and the 
weather.  So the consultant that ran the models can pretty much say what the 
worse-case scenario is, and then what a more realistic scenario is, based on cloud 
potential for impact from shadow on human annoyance, again, and not health 
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nce issue, and we engaged 




what we were looking at for sound, and then you can do the same for flicker, and 
Stevens: So there are four properties that are adjacent to the project that would exceed the 
 this property right here.  You 
smaller corner here on this property, and the small corner of this property that are 
within the limits that are recommended. 
Chairwoman: It still leaves the owner a building envelope? 
Stevens: Um-hm.  And then we propose to offer the mitigation payments to compensate if 
they were to build a home and would help with additional insulation. 
Woman: So, what do the other lines indicate?  The yellow and the green and blue? 
Stevens: Okay.  So, the yellow is a decibel level of 45 to 48.  The green is a decibel level 
between 40 and 44.  So this bold green right here is actually 42 decibels, and the 
and you can see that the rural residences that are out here are outside of that 
recommended limit.  And then this dark blue line is 37 decibels.  This is our 
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standard for residences in a residential area, and then you can see that the city of 
Monticello, the residences in the city of Monticello, are all outside of that 
recommended decibel limit. 
 - 
setts 
Environmental Protection Agency, and this is what they recommend.  For existing 
 - the potential for 
existing residences, they recommend up to 30 hours per year, and up to 
30 minutes a day.  Places of business would be, most of the time, places of 
30 hours a year and 30 minutes a day.  And again, vacant agricultural lands, there 
is no suggested limit because there are no humans to be annoyed by it.  But again, 
we took into consideration, when we were doing the modeling, whether there 
could be a future home built on that land, so we were working on applying these 
standards to keeping that in mind. 
 At all residences and businesses in adjacent lands, where humans currently 
inhabit, there were a few exceptions where we did exceed the standards, actually, 
for just one existing residence, we may exceed these standards up to 11 days a 
year, and at the property line of one commercial space to the east of the project, 
we may exceed this limit, or this recommended standard, up to 17 days a year.  
There were some currently vacant agricultural lands where we do exceed this 
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 - on six of the in-holding properties, we do exceed the limit, and 
then on one undeveloped property on the periphery, the limit is exceeded and we 
have proposed a mitigation strategy that would provide $4,000 to each of these 
owners for opaque window shades or trees to minimize this impact and bring it to 
within the recommended limit.  And this, again, is with the worse-case analysis - 
worst-case turbine. 
Woman: Would you consider turning that turbine off during certain days or hours? 
Stevens: Yeah.  I think if - first we would look at whether or not a home would be built, 
keep it within the limit.  The next impact that we evaluated, this is completely 
new, and the reason that we are bringing this up, and the reason we looked at this 
is because some people expressed this concern after the July 5 meeting, and this is 
an in-power(?), an issue called ice throw, which we engaged experts to analyze 
this for the Latigo Wind Park, and in normal circumstances, the turbines have an 
auto shutoff when they feel ice on the blades so that this is avoided.  And then, 
with 4 
two or three icing events per year, so we looked at the worst-case turbine, and just 
using a published formula, not related specifically to the factors here, we came up 
with a maximum risk area of 312 meters.  Now, this risk area could be a lot 
smaller, based on the type of turbine that you use, and also, the probability that it 
could happen could also be calculated to be much less.  But this is the maximum 
risk area if this were to occur, is 312 meters.  So the risk of ice throw at all at the 
Latigo Wind Park is de minimis, but we have committed to mitigate this potential 
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turbine -  miles from 
Highway  191 about 2 miles.  As I understand, this 
trafficked, especially during a storm that would create an icing event, but we 
would put up that signage there to warn people if they were out there in a big 
wind storm. 
 Another area crosses a vacant adjacent parcel to the north of turbine 20.  
well.  Another impact that we wanted to clarify, we had actually taken it into 
clarify it here, is tower collapse.  This is a very rare event.  People may have seen 
it on YouTube - 
public roads and adjacent non-participating property lines 110 percent of the 
turbine height at its maximum with its blade up, so in case it were to ever fall, it 
If you want to go back to that slide real quick, this outlines some of the setbacks 
that we have in place in the current layout. 
 And then the next slide, just to give you a recap of some of the things that 




impacts, on one existing residence and one commercial property line, not sound 
impacts on two undeveloped agricultural parcels on the periphery of the projects, 
and t
along County Road 196, and at one currently undeveloped agricultural parcel. 
 On this next slide, we wanted to give some specific attention to the 
80 acres that you mentioned before, the in-holding parcels, because we know 
tential for sound and shadow 
flicker impacts at the six in-holding parcels.  Additional mitigation measures 
Ellison, from Stoel Rives in Salt Lake. 
Ellison: With deference to the Commission, I have a couple of points to make.  I am 
responsible, and I apologize for the late arriving information.  So what I propose 
to do is just let you go to public comments, and then I can handle my comments 
later more as an additional public comment. 
Chairwoman: Do you need to finish the idea by continuing this moment, or would you rather we 
Ellison: -holding parcels, and I 
think it may help you to wrap things up more completely if I ... 
Chairwoman: You answer at that time? 
Ellison: Yeah.  Yeah. 
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Chairwoman: Okay.  Thank you for that.  Okay, Michelle, are you comfortable stopping for 
questions at this point? 
Stevens: Yes. 
Chairwoman: 
hoping that she answered quite a bit of your concerns, or at least gave you the 
information for your concerns, and now, b
questions.  Carmella, go.  Do you have questions for Michelle? 
Carmella: 
igate something like 
that? 
Stevens: Well, the ________ is actually currently sited (cited?) to mitigate potential for 
 miles away from those. 
Chairwoman: And their flight patterns actually cross through, so how does that ... 
Stevens:  ... 
Woman:  & Wildlife Service.  Whenever you develop a 
Washington on this issue, and Sam, feel free to chime in.  But, um, so you always 
meet with U.S. Fish 




ue to work with the U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service. 
Chairwoman: Carmella, could I interject a question with yours because it would just finish this 
subject. 
Carmella: Sure. 
Chairwoman: Are there rules that you must meet for Fish & Wildlife, and do they come and 
Woman: They do. 
Chairwoman: Okay. 
Man: I have a question. 
Chairwoman: So if want to go through ... 
Man: So the local Fish 
Woman: Well, we put together a survey protocol 
throughout the 2 
you show it to them and they do a fatality assessment - how many eagles you 
they might ask you to elect for an eagle take permit, by which you can take one 
hat could happen.  
one.  [Inaudible.] 
Man:  & Wildlife have been involved in this process? 
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Woman: Well, we meet in Salt Lake with the U.S. - the regional U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Service office. 
Man:  & Wildlife Service? 
Woman:  & Wildlife Service. 
Chairwoman: It takes precedence over state? 
Man: I thought state always took precedence over federal. 
Chairwoman: 
Carmella: Oh, I thought Jeff was still talking. 
Chairwoman: No. 
Carmella: I think that was actually it.  That was my concern, just looking at the flight pattern 
within the whole wind thing. 
Woman: Oh, wow. 
Woman: So the owner just described that.  When they went out and flew the area, so they 
flew 10 miles from the outside of our boundary, and when they were flying their 
helicopter for that 10 miles, they said, these are all the birds we saw that day.  It 
could be a raven, it could be a sparrow, I mean, whatever they saw.  So those 
Woman: Okay. 
Woman: ay. 
Woman: But there are Golden and Bald in the area, according to the other ... 
Woman: Yeah, there was a ________, so if you see where Blue Mountain is, there are nests 
have territories.  They fly in their territories. 
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72730547.1 0034204-00009 24
Chairwoman: Okay.  Carmella?  Joe. 
Joe: 
doing these wildlife studies.  What I read, the study was done for 1 day.  Does the 
Fish & Wildlife Service accept that 1-day study? 
Woman: 
habitat.  You go and look and see what the habitat characteristics - what is likely 
ne what kind of surveys you do.  So 
we did that in 2011.  If you remember, we made application to the FAA and said 
can we build a wind farm here, and it came back and said that there were very few 
turbines that we could actually site here because of the ai
until this past spring where FAA came back and said, you know, actually, you can 
put these turbines here.  So at that point, we commenced our surveys again, and 
we do at least, you know, two to four surveys a month all year round for 2 years. 
Joe:  & Wildlife Service will accept the studies of 
this ________?  Okay.  Um, I looked through the Bible there that you gave us, 
us that you have leases from all landowners at this point? 
Woman: Yeah.  So the two new - we have leases from all the landowners, except the 
statements of agreement that are allowed by the Conditional Use Permit for the 
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Joe: Okay.  The nine parcels in the middle of this?  Did I hear 
buy those?  Or did I mis-hear something? 
Woman: You heard correctly. 
Joe: Okay. 
Woman: 
Tom: I will address that. 
Joe: Have you selected your turbines? 
Woman: We have not. 
Joe: Okay.  At what point do you select those turbines? 
Woman: 
manufacturers, and just as the time goes on, we analyze the data, we crunch the 
know.  Do you have any other ... 
Woman: 
we start constructing in 2014, we would use a different turbine that would not be 
the - most likely -
modeled here, but we said, well, what if it is?  But the most likely turbine we 
would use is a Siemens turbine, and it has a 113 rotor diameters, and the sound 
levels are much lower. 
Chairwoman: 




Steve: More curiosity than anything, the Spanish Fork turbines, what are they in terms of 
Woman: Can I tell you in a 
head. 
Steve: Sure.  I was just curious - wanted something to refer to. 
Woman: Yeah.  What was your impression of the sound there? 
Steve:  idea what that distance 
Man: Did you get hit by any ice? 
Steve: 
Woman: ________ closer that turbine to the road than - that turbine is closer to the road 
than any of our turbines are to any homes or businesses or ... 
Chairwoman: Jeff?  The record should reflect that Jeff Nielsen joined us at 7:47.  Jeff, can you 
let us know of any questions or comments? 
Jeff: 
Chairwoman: Okay.  Thank you.  I have a couple more from where we were.  Um, you alluded 
bad ice throw day or a bad noise day or a bad flicker day, can you individually 
 - making the problem - or do you - 
looking for hints here. 
Woman: 
to have some sort of shutoff. 
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Chairwoman:  ...  You would absolutely have an 
there with a light panel going, um, not one this one, not this one, for those things, 
but can you?  And do you ________ do that? 
Woman:  ... 
Woman: 





Woman: ________ that the ... 
Woman: Yes, I read it. 
Chairwoman: Well, and I did, too, but ... 
Woman: ________, but I read it. 
Chairwoman: Okay.  So you can, in an emergency ... 
Woman: It can be done. 
Chairwoman: Okay.  
quoting, for example, Massachusetts has standards on sound or flicker, or if, when 
we condition a permit, and I think we talked about this in July and did some of 
this, we are to say to you, to industry standards, you know, please meet industry 
standards for lighting and sound and those things.  You would be meeting them 
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based on all the new technologies that each of these are doing, but who would 
s a little muddled up there ... 
Woman: Right. 
Chairwoman: ... to say, keep the lights low, you know? 
Woman: Right.  Um, well, for the setbacks, you know, we could show you on a map that 
those are the setbacks, and you know, build a turbine, and somebody could come 
out inspect it.  The flicker, actually, is modeled, and the model takes into 
impact would be because some people might not even be home on those 11 days 
where the up to 11 days of the flicker occurs, so it would actually be hard to make 
 ... 
Chairwoman: Right. 
Woman: ... because we might not have any impact at all. 
Chairwoman: I guess part of it would be, is if the community were to come to the 
attorney to tell us.  So then my last question is, on my notes, you keep mentioning 
all these sort of self-imposed mitigation plans and self-imposed, but you, I 
believe, are the developer of this project, hoping to sell it to the company that will 
run this thing.  Will those conditions carry through to any sales contract so that 
Woman:  ... 




Chairwoman: I think that was a concern of some neighbors was, wait a minute, who really owns 
u put the 
project together and sell it as a fait accompli to someone who runs it and puts it 
in? 
Woman: Yeah, and we are making these commitments for Latigo Wind Park. 
Chairwoman: Okay.  For whoever.  Okay.  Anymore questions from the Board?  Ladies and 
gentlemen, I will open it to the public for questions, and she will direct them to 
Michelle and let her specify who might best be able to answer you.  I would ask 
keep these questions to just a minute at a time so that we have quick answers and 
keep going.  Who would like to go?  Yes, sir? 
Wright: 
Reservoir and the canal that crosses from the Forest Service to that wind park 
________ than that. 
Chairwoman: Um-hm. 
Wright: 
Stevens: So we would not be building anything on this piece of land. 
Wright:  - [inaudible]. 
Stevens: Is that over here? 





there and goes to that reservoir. 
Stevens: Okay.  So, do you think it would pass through this land right here? 
Wright: 
Stevens: One of the standards that we put up on the screen earlier was a setback from any 
wetlands or streams.  We actually have people that have gone out and looked for 
those types of things, and we stayed far enough away from them that we do not 
impact them.  So we are very aware - these turbines are set back from any canals 
nderground lines there. 
Wright: They also have a pipeline going through that reservoir, northeasterly, down to the 
Stevens: Yup.  We have, actually, a setback from pipelines, too. 
Wright: Okay, now.  How are you going to get your power from this area to the high line, 
and where are you going to go with it? 
Stevens: So, the Pinto Substation is right here, and then this blue line, which is really faint, 
the power. 
Wright: 
Stevens: A smaller substation.  And this collects power, and then it comes across in an 




reimbursed for the ...  ________ lady called me up and asked me about it and I 
ght? 
Stevens: No.  We actually entered into voluntary leases with the people along this 
transmission line already.  We have those, and we make annual payments to them.  
Wright: Okay now, on the project itself, are you going to have above-the-ground power, or 
bury the power lines? 
Stevens: 
Wright: Okay.  Thank you. 
Chairwoman: Thank you, Mr. Wright.  Next, please.  Questions or comments?  Yes. 
Bennett: My name is Lee Bennett.  I also live in Monticello.  Does the building and 
maintenance of the overhead power line between your substation and Pinto, is that 
Stevens: It is.  We provided the leases, and then, you know, we have it on our map here, 
all transmission lines. 
Bennett: Are you going to run into difficulty when that transmission line crosses through 
the city of Monticello to get to Pinto because of zoning? 
Stevens: I know we have to get a building permit for anything that passes through, but I 
Chairwoman: Does it pass through, Michelle? 
Stevens: It passes through the city of Monticello.  It does, yes. 
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Chairwoman: Right.  By the highway, kind of? 
Stevens: By the Pinto Substation. 
Chairwoman: 
Man: Is there city ordinances that would prevent a power line going through the city?  I 
Chairwoman: I would doubt it. 





________ to the city and would work with them. 
Bennett: Can you give me some kind of a description of what that overhead power line 
would look like?  I mean, I know what the big ones coming out of Pinto look like.  
Are you talking about something of the same ________? 
Stevens:  feet tall?  Approximately 70 feet tall, 
wooden poles. 
Man: 
Stevens: Yeah, not the super large ones. 
Man: Not the 345. 
Chairwoman: Thank you, Lee.  Anybody else, please?  Okay.  Yes, go ahead. 
Eric: My name is Eric ________.  I am a resident of Monticello, and most of us have 
comments and concerns.  For me, people passing through Monticello, the most 
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prominent feature is the mountain, and not to get sentimental, but the Horsehead, 
and I think it draws a lot of people to our community to golf, to hunt, to camp, to 
recreate.  Some people fall in love with the area and choose to live here.  I feel 
long-
twenty-seven 400- -
term, the impacts to Monticello will be negative.  I feel it will lower property 
values.  I think most of the economic benefit will go outside the city of 
Monticello, and I think this came in a little under the radar.  I think my house is 
the house in Monticello probably most close to a turbine, or one of the most 
 weeks ago.  
Apparently, a permit was issued in July.  I feel a lot of other residents of 
Monticello probably were also unaware of this.  We need more time to discuss 
this and to ________ as a community before any permission is given.  Thank you. 
Chairwoman: 
Notice given.  Okay, yes, sir, in the back. 
Man: Greg, is now the time for the landowners to have any word here? 
Chairwoman:  - everybody.  Yes, sir. 
Man: Greg said that I could take the podium for at least 10, 15 minutes. 








Chairwoman: And who are you, please? 
Bingham: My name is Dan Bingham. 
Chairwoman: Ah, okay. 
Bingham: -page objection to the ________. 
Chairwoman: Right.  The letter in the original. 
Bingham: Do you all have copies of that letter? 
Chairwoman: e that came to us a while back.  Did 
you give it to me or to everybody? 
Bingham: 
Chairwoman:  Bingham, please. 
Bingham: Well, thank you for allowing me to come before you tonight to represent the 
________ citizens and owners of the nine parcels of property in San Juan County.  
Citizens and owners of the nine parcels of property in San Juan County, less than 
2 miles from Monticello.  It is our belief that your decision about the CGP 
request, by the wind turbine ________ company, kept a map of Wasatch Wind, 
Specifically, I represent the members of the Northern Monticello ... 
Chairwoman: Excuse me, just a moment.  Mr. 
everyone can hear, and I might ask the audience to please refrain from talking 
Bingham: Yeah, can you imagine wind turbines at that rate, on top of that?  Specifically, I 
represent the members of the Northern Monticello Alliance.  All of its members 
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have strong ties to the county, region, and Utah.  Personally, my ancestors were 
original settlers, and bear with me, t
numbers and $200  ... 
Chairwoman: I understand that, sir, but we are on a time basis here.  We do have more to do ... 
Bingham: I realize that.  Personally, my ancestors were original settlers and pioneers in 
Utah.  I grew up spending many summer vacations in Utah, hearing stories about 
our Southern Utah history, and even about a guy named Jack Red Senior.  My 
grandparents owned and ran the first Moab pharmacy and soda shop, as well as a 
hog farm there.  I grew up and graduated from BYU, and later moved to Utah, 
over 12 years.  I have worked, camped, fished, kayaked, hiked, hunted, and held 
family reunions in and around San Juan County, on that particular property that I 
raised, and lived most of my life.  I appreciate my 20 acre scenic place and views.  
I appreciate its water.  Its proximity to Monticello, Moab, and Blanding.  My area 
appreciate my ________ sacred buildings that are here, having worked and 
traveled around the world to more than 16 countries.  Excuse me [he was choked 
up here].  I am still amazed and I love this area, its access to state and federal 
lands and national parks.  Each NMA land, each Northern Monticello Alliance 
landowner, has their own similar and/or affinity to the area.  Several have spent a 
good part of their lives in the city of Monticello.  Most of us have been, or are, 
lifelong public servants, sometimes serving in the most dangerous environments, 
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including a junior high classroom.  Most of us, about to reach our retirement, 
with, and some of us already have initiated a plan to develop our San Juan County 
properties.  We are not carpetbaggers.  We, the donut hole landowners, as so 
casually referred to by the front company personnel PEP, or whatever like name
they decide to use on their next application, want and deserve the protection of 
our constitutional property rights.  Constitutional property rights.  We will do 
what the law allows to protect those rights.  We will go to court if we have to.  
You will p
there.  We are also pragmatists and good citizens.  We owed it to ourselves to hear 
what the developers had to say once they finally revealed their plans, apparently, 
over a year in the 
Sixty days later, the developers have demonstrated little or no good faith in their 
dealings with us or the residents of San Juan County.  As expressed by this 
Some things, however, should not be their choice.  Having only recently received 
a copy of the latest Latigo Wind Park LLC Conditional Use Permit request, we 
stand by - this recent one that they provided - we stand by, and one just 60 days 
ago - we stand by the underscore and we add to our objections to the business 
plan as noted in our August 2012 letter to San Juan County Board of 
Commissioners.  We made four main points that, if you even have that letter, I 
hope that you will review those four main points.  They still stand.  Let me get in 
just a little bit to it, and ... 
Chairwoman: Very quickly please, sir. 
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Bingham: More specifically, they have not addressed our concerns about the project, which 
itself would destroy the value of our property, in their words, 100 percent.  And as 
they have already acknowledged.  In addition to our concerns about the failures 
and deceptions during the initial CUP notification process, NMA members have - 
Northern Monticello Alliance members have again experienced 60 days of what 
can only be described as managed timelines of bad faith.  At the onset of our 
contact with PEP, the Northern Monticello Alliance realized that PEP started the 
clock ticking.  It was they who started it.  We immediately provided them with 
what they asked, with their requested documentation.  We formed the NMA as 
encouraged by them to do so, and even identified for them area real estate 
properties for sale, that PEP could use as a basis, were offered to us a landowners, 
who otherwise have no interest in selling.  What did PEP do?  ________ PEP, 
Wasatch Wind Incorporated again, whatever name they want to go by ... 
Chairwoman: We need to stop(?). 
Bingham: PEP strung out the process, believing that it was for their benefit to string it out.  
Just before this meeting, about a week ago, we finally received the purchase price 
offer based on grazing . 
Bingham:  ... who otherwise have no interest in selling.  What did PEP 
do?  PEP, Wasatch Wind Incorporated, again, whatever name they want to go by, 
.
PEP strung out the process, believing that it was for their benefit to string it out.  
Just before this meeting, about a week ago, we finally received the purchase price 
offer based on grazing property values, multiple ________.  I called the Planning 
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and Zoning Committee to ensure we were able to have at least 30 days beyond 
tonight, given this situation.  As recently as 3 days ago, we again provided PEP 
with some of the original and other comparable real estate valuations that we had 
already provided them on our day 1 meeting with them.  We were honest from the 
beginning with them.  We reiterated what has always been our position, that their 
the appraisers and to all these surveyors.  PEP stopped what little communication 
they had initiated with us, actually - I initiated the communication - and has not 
can appreciate that.  As a matter of respect for the procedural timelines and 
kept our word and never changed our fundamental position.  Early on, ready to 
granted, we will use the next 30 
ill-advised and substandard plan for the construction of 27, more than 40-story 
high, wind turbines surrounding our properties, destroying their values, negatively 
environmental issues.  No noise studies have been completed, and what has been 
completed actually show a severe impact, given the potential health issues related 
-frequency noise, cigarettes 
ago, last time I heard about it.  In fact, they were 
of a mile - a third of a mile from the noise level alone.  They barely just got 
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setbacks out of a little bit of pressure, and they only made them 110 percent 
improvement.  I appreciate that.  The flicker impact study underscores the flicker 
problem as being severe.  Can you translate what all these numbers mean?  I have 
-like effect that occurs as long as there is sunlight.  
Their site is twice the size of Monticello, and will have to be controlled, 
especially now giving ice throw conditions.  How do you control a teenager in a 
little signs going to do to the 15-year-olds running around out in that large area 
that you have?  The bat study is very limited, but nonetheless, shows extremely 
high bat activity.  Can you interpret that?  You really need to be comfortable with 
this whole is
bats and bats reproduce slowly.  This can devastate a bat population, as a result of 
the low reproduction rates.  Also, you have a natural mosquito - 
mosquito abatement value.  All of the time West Nile Virus transmitted by 
mosquitoes is an increasing threat to human life.  No visual impact simulations 
have yet been produced and/or revealed to the public.  Contrary to common wind 
industry development standards, they 




for the next 20 years, will be impacted by your decision.  One of the 
disadvantages for the turbine is that their presence will suppress other economic 
development in and around Monticello and the county, and especially 
opinion, that you have, flashing lights will dominate your night sky.  We know 
PEP, Wasatch Wind, has failed to document its parent company in financial 
support.  Not in all that documentation that you have, as I understand it, because 
 their money 
call a clue.  Step up and own it. 
Chairwoman: Sir, you have 1 minute left. 
Bingham: -going Supreme 
Utah.  We may need them.  There has still been no public notification about this 
shifted three turbines, by my looking at the map.  They can talking about shifting 




going to buy the property there and have any views?  Thank you for your time, 
think, for a lot of residents, if they knew the facts as I understand them.  Thank 
you. 
Chairwoman: Thank you, Mr. Bingham.  
ask a Wasatch Wind attorney to address a couple of the matters.  The couple of 
no one sitting in this room who is
what this Board is doing, is taking into account the fact that things are changing.  
o your emotions ... 
Bingham: May I ask a question? 
Chairwoman: No, sir.  No. 
Bingham: 
them speak? 
Chairwoman: Not yet.  We may call on him to answer something for us.  And so the emotions 
are there, I know that.  This other thing I just want to address generally this 
evening is, one of the challenges that this Board has come up with in our work is 
to find out that the notice part of our zoning code is perhaps not up to quite the 
-investigate some of this, and why 
this Board has put on its list of things to do to update some notification processes 
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is public notice, and there was public notice, for the procedures that we have gone 
through alr
notice; we will look at some other public notice issues later.  And lastly, the last 
heart is the wildlife, be it the bat or the eagle, or anything between, and one of the 
about bats and eagles in our decision.  What we have to say is, you must meet bat, 
eagle, and other wildlife requirements as put into place by the federal, or state, 
wildlife.  So I would just remind the public and Mr. Bingham, who emotionally 
involved us all, that while we want to protect, we can only protect within our 
purview, and ask others to do their job - the wildlife and other land use.  Having 
said all that, I will ask the attorney to ... 
Man: Well, it sounded like Mr. Bingham had somebody else who he was concerned 
might not be allowed to talk. 
Chairwoman: Okay.  Is there someone else who needed to ...  Go ahead. 
Man: 
understanding that the attorney in charge of this would be able to just go on and 
speak their mind the way they do. 
Chairwoman: No, this is not a last-word situation, sir.  This is calling on the public in a public 
forum, and I will do so accordingly.  I afforded you a few extra minutes as you 
represent a larger group, and I appreciate that.  I appreciate you speaking for that.  





Planning Commission, in your shoes, dealing with a range of issues that are very 
difficult, and Adrienne, who works with me, is handing you two documents, and I 
wish to address t
late-arriving documents, is the document from J. Phillips, who is an appraiser.  
The last comment that came up on the slide presentation was that we were 
offering additional value days m
good faith offer and several times of what Mr. Cook has indicated, or a range of 
values for the land.  But notwithstanding that, we think this Commission needs to 
understand that its decision can go forward, understanding that there will be 
processes put in place, to address, you know, basic concerns.  So over and above 
which again, have been indicated to be applicable to these in-holding parcels.  So 
even though there are no residences there, we want to preserve the ability to 
construct homes on these parcels with the appropriate mitigation.  So those 
payments are there, but the additional thing is to try to address the proximity 
-holdings.  So, Mr. Cook is an expert in the 
appraisal business of energy facility impacts on adjacent properties.  And the front 
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part of this letter merely sets forth that there are very industry-standard ways, 
appraisal processes, following established industry standards, that can be used to 
assess residual value impacts, and we are essentially saying, we will follow a 
valuation process, following normal industry - appraisal industry standards, to 
ultimately assess residual value impacts that would come by reason of proximity.  
The second part of this study, or this letter to you, indicates a brief summary of a 
review of statistical appraisal surveys that have been done on wind farm impact, 
and statistically, as Mr. Cook says, the majority of evidence from statistically 
based studies, indicates that wind farm infrastructure has no value impact on 
Mr. Cook has said that he would do, is look at additional studies associated with 
other electrical facilities.  The big 345s, the towers, those kinds of properties are 
indicating that in those cases, adjacent property impacts tend to range in the range 
of 1 to 13 percent for those.  Now, these are not intended to be indicative of a 
value.  And again, we hope to buy the property, but you can tell that these owners 
feel very strongly about the property.  So we are specifying, as a condition, that 
we are willing to mitigate through a value-based appraisal process over and above 
these other ... 





brought to the table, and it addresses, or I mean, this is a proposed set of findings.  
But there were several questions raised earlier about what this Commission needs 
to do within its power to assure that its conditions are complied with.  So, under 
Section 
 just spend a couple of minutes and discuss.  Because I think the 
Commission does need to understand that the conditions you impose can actually 
be complied with.  There are, for example, white standards that are technical 
standards, but we should be able to bring to you the technical specifications and 
studies at the time of the building permit, to make sure that lighting is being 
building permit condition to be ascertained at building permit through technical 
establish what the sound standards are, but through micrositing and other 
adjustments, we need to bring you a final impact, and again, these are maximum 
bring that to you, and if our standards that are in our documents, which you would 




and if at the time of building permit, our documentation indicates there are 
peripheral impacts, or in-
C for those properties impacted.  We would, at the time of building permit, 
provide a demonstration of compliance by proof of payment, offers of payment, 
or in cases where payment had not been made, the funding of an escrow or other 
source which will assure that the money is there to make the mitigation payments.  
And then D covers, in particular, this in-holding issue and this additional appraisal 
appraisal industry standards. 
Chairwoman: 
y a property, it will be done by the 
time you go ________. 
Ellison: 
appraisal standard processes. 
Chairwoman: 
might have lost in the value? 
Ellison: 
extra costs of building a home to accommodate t
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county can move forward with its land use decisions as a land use matter under 
cuments are 
attempting to do. 
Chairwoman: Okay. 
Man: What is the estimation, in your opinion, for the loss of value? 
Chairwoman: 
Davidson: 
Chairwoman: Okay.  Go ahead. 
Davidson: And I own what I think you guys are calling 87, which is north ... 
Ellison: Yes. 
Davidson: And then also, the 142 acres to the east at that far north corner. 
Ellison: 
appraiser listed.  I mean, this is 
seasonal road. 
Davidson: Some of us have plans to build homes. 
Ellison: Right, right.  And so, you know, we have assumed that, notwithstanding existing 
conditions, we would offer up mitigation payments to affected properties to 
ensure that they had the capability to reduce sound, flicker impacts.  Your parcel 
87 was outside of, and not adversely affected by, sound or flicker, as I recall.  So 
we would not be offering any particular mitigation strategy in your case. 




appraisers, ________.  There are other issues here, just specifically regarding your 
Chairwoman: part of this 
deal making.  We can, perhaps, if we decide to do so, include some sort of 
condition that might say, the landowners must have all been spoken to, or 
whatever it is we decide to say, but this is the discussion that you gentlemen 
should have amo
sir.
Bingham: Well said.  I agree with that.  Can I then ask you this question?  Can you describe 
for me what the parameters of the intended use language is in terms of the 
ordinances that exist out there? 




Bingham: ... evaluation, so I want to make clear your philosophy, or your position, as you 
see it here. 
Chairwoman: Well, the Conditional Use Permit, and I will do this in just a moment when we 
Conditional Use Permits so we can do this.  I am looking for the last and final 
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your hand earlier. 
Roley: 
And you guys are talking about the eagles and the bats and the light flicker and 
the noise, but esthetically, our house is - 
ut also, 
-D model of what this is going to look like?  Why have I not 
going on, and is the decision already made, or is there still steps that we can do to 
Monticello when there is so much vastness out there? 
Chairwoman: Um, just quickly addressing some of that, this is a public hearing that was 
publicly noticed, and that is procedural.  This is the County Planning and Zoning 
Commission.  The town is not dealing with this, spe
the town limits, so this is a county article. 
Roley: 
Chairwoman: 
zones, okay?  So the zoning here is agricultural, and this is a use that can be 
conditioned if it goes in.  As far as what a citizen can do is, you are here doing the 
first and most important step, which is conveying your questions and concerns 
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and challenges for us to consider.  Beyond that, there are processes in place for 
appeals and other things, should you not like what is determined. 
Roley: Okay. 
Chairwoman: I can say that at this particular moment, we clarified earlier in the process that 
there is a Conditional Use Permit that was issued for this project in July ... 
Roley: 
Chairwoman: There was appeal - the appeal was withdrawn.  The appeal was given to the 
Commissioners, it was withdrawn for this procedure. 
Bingham(?): My understanding 
Chairwoman: Okay. 
Bingham(?): We have a supplemental ... 
Chairwoman: To try and answer some of the questions. 
Bingham(?): ... to answer these questions, so that you can ... 
Chairwoman: So they tabled it momentarily so they could hear this. 
Bingham(?): Right, so that we give this audience an opportunity to hear this, and make their 
comments. 
Chairwoman: And was this second one also challenged and withdrawn, or also tabled? 
Bingham(?):  - and the legal advice from the 
county was to table that and ... 




Chairwoman: Tabled means set aside, not acted on, until more information is supplied.  It can be 
taken, literally, off the table, by motion to say, now we will act on it based on 
other things.  We, however, never get the appeal.  The appeal goes to a higher 
authority.  This Board gave a Conditional Use Permit.  I believe we said things 
like, you will meet lighting, you will meet sound, you will meet industry 
standards f
something that says, you must flicker at two times an hour.  We say, meet the 
standard for flickering, or whatever. 
Woman:  valid? 
Chairwoman: 
Use Permit.  Our Conditional Use Permit stands, as of July, and it was very 
specific to the site, saying we allow this with the following conditions, and as I 
mentioned, we put some on there.  The tabling was that the folks that, I think it 
was Mr. Bingham and his party, had filed with the Commissioners to say we 
so that we can continue here tonight. 
Woman: So can we still put appeals in? 
Chairwoman: Absolutely.  The process is, every time something happens here, you appeal to a 
higher authority, which in this case, is the San Juan County Commission.  Jeff, 
did you ... 




Jeff: Right.   - until all the conditions are met to meet 
the criteria set by the standards, nothing can happen. 
Chairwoman: 
to this Board, if we say we would like to issue the permit, the Conditional Use 
be met, or there is no project.  In the meantime, the public has a right to approach 
If we do that.  I mean, we have to keep going tonight. 
Man: 
appeal?  Both sides have that right. 




Mike: My name is Mike ________.  
Chairwoman: Okay.  Very quickly, sir.  We really need to move on. 
Mike: 
experience in wind energy development, and actually with some of the personnel 
getting leases for this for many years.  They had our phone numbers, they could 




5th, so I have 
phone number, Christine ________ had my phone number in her cell phone.  She 
actually make this project real.  The  - I
 ...  How could they go 
t done anything about them.  
said that Christine led the development of the Spanish Fork Wind Farm, which 
participating in that ... 
Chairwoman: 
is not part of our ________. 
Man: Who is the controlling owner of this company?  Do you know? 
Chairwoman: Actually, I have it here.  They gave us a very cute little, there it is. 
Man: 
Chairwoman: The Wasatch Wind was formed when(?) Wasatch Wind Canada was separated 
out, and then this is Wasatch Wind Intermountain with Latigo Wind Park and 
Pioneer Wind Park. 
Man: Who owns Wasatch Wind Intermountain? 
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Chairwoman: You know what ... 
Man: Does all of it? 
Man: Does it matter to us? 
Chairwoman: 
fraudulence here, which I hope our county attorney can look up ... 
Man: 
Chairwoman: No, because you know what ... 
Man: You look at the Board, you can see on public record, they have one of the three 
votes. 
Chairwoman: 
before us, because as they have said up front, they are merely the development 
 ...  I 
eg and 
for Tower 1, get out.  So we have the power to work on the land, you want to go 
throug  ... 
Man: ________ is, there was plenty of time to notify us in advance. 
Chairwoman: Okay. 
Man: That was not done.  With the Spanish Fork Wind Farm, they sent out 1,200 





Man:  ...  But they sent out 1,200 postcards to neighboring(?), and 
e postcard out here? 
Chairwoman: I know.  We understand that. 
Man: 
Warren: 
Man: When did you get it? 
Woman: She lives in Ogden. 
Warren: Well, I was born and raised in Monticello.  My name is Carolyn Warren.  As far 
donut hole, as far as I know, and I may be wrong. 
Chairwoman: 
Warren: t?
Chairwoman: No.  Okay. 
Warren:  ... 
Man: What was the answer?  When did you get the postcard? 
Warren: Uh, September 10.  We mailed information to you about the proposed Latigo 
Wind Project, and the hearing was going to be on September 24, and that 









Chairwoman: Okay.  You just have 2 minutes, sir. 
Man: I appreciate their expert got quite a bit of time, the attorney. 
Chairwoman: Okay.  Go on. 
Man: 
Chairwoman: 
Man: Proposing their own standards.  I would think it would be your responsibility to 
look at what standards are appropriate. 
Chairwoman: Okay. 
Man: Now, 37 decibels is a standard that really ought to be applied for the whole wind 
park.  I mean, they should really know - 
really the noise standard that should be applied, and 
areas.  One of the areas of most wind energy in North America is Ontario, 
Canada.  They use an 1,800 foot setback for all their requirements.  They have 
guidelines for birds and bat studies.  Those are all available.  To have a 
birthday(?) that lasted one day is laughable.  And the batting pack was amazing.  
Man: 
Chairwoman:  - 
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Man: But the point here is, I think your responsibility is to make su
harmonious with the land use, right?  And there are people here who have owned 
this land for a long time, and were planning on putting houses for their retirement 
and for their use on this property.  And they talked about value to impact on 
la
middle of this, can you imagine trying to build a house and sell it at that point?  I 
a situ
just me, that got the same, exact message.  And we got that recorded, so we know 
that was the way it was done.  And we felt like that was just not a way to honestly 
approach negotiating with us or talking with us.  We could have been reasonable a 
year ago.  Why wait u
responsibility of the Planning Commission, in my opinion, to just, you know, to 
really look at it and say, what are the appropriate standards for noise?  We ought 
to look and have somebody consider that for us, and have them pay for it.  You 
know, should we just take at face value what they say is appropriate for noise, 






M___ Royalty controls this business is an interesting point of view, and really 
being discussed when they are the controlling owner of this?  And I think, really, 
we need to take 
decision then quite yet, but decide that really, we need to look at what the 
standards are, whether notification has been done properly, and whether we - if 
g to affect this property for 60 years.  These 
leases run 60 years, and right now, there may not be houses in that area, and there 
this city for our lifetime. 




Janet: My land is outside of that green ________. 
Chairwoman: Just your name, please, for the record. 






Monticello, and we should embrace it.  And all these tree huggers that want to get 
rid of windmills and green power should be ________. 
[Laughter here.] 
Chairwoman: Wait a min  - 
Ross: 
oposed 
development.  One of the things that this body can address is ________ lots of 
municipalities, states, counties, whatever, do set setback standards from human 
habitations.  As far as the Discovery Center goes, I am respectfully requesting a 
kilomete
ot a lot of things hemming them in on this piece of 
of issues they have to deal with besides my concerns, but I think a reasonable 
setback distance from any human habitation is a kilometer.  If you look at setback 
distances internationally, and there are web sites where you can do that, so I 
would ask this Board to consider setting the setback from all human habitation, 
not just the Discovery Center, but the city and other people, as well.  And that sort 
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of is going to answer a lot of questions that have come up tonight if you set a 
setback.  So, but this is a resolution, the Board ________ school passed in August, 
. 
Chairwoman: Michelle, can you just tell everybody what the closest your tower is to anything 
Stevens: A kilometer is .62 ... 
Man: .62. 
Stevens: So we are .44 from the Discovery School property boundary, and .5 from the 
closest home. 
Chairwoman: 
Stevens: Not quite .62 yet. 
Chairwoman: Is there some fudging you might still be working on, or are you just studying it 
there? 
Stevens: No, well, we continue to fudge with it, but you know, .62 from an existing 
commercial building and an existing residence might be possible.  We would still 
need to look at it, though. 




[Inaudible.]  This was a city project to get, an economic development project, to 
n will 
be this [inaudible], you know, so it is a concern to us visually.  And I think, you 
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there, and you know, Mr. ________ sold(?) that property in hopes to build it into 
a
know, 8 to 10 times higher and wider, and ________, and I think it can be of 
considerable concern to people that live in that area, and the future growth of that 
Corner School has architect
can see how it looks in the landscape.  Would it be too much to ask Wasatch 
Wind to do that, and show us what it looks like from maybe two or three places in 
the city?  You know, it may mitigate some objections to it.  It may heighten some 
of the objections to it, too.  But I think, you know, seeing how this was economic 
development project by the city of Monti
am for preserving Monticello as a great place to live. 
Chairwoman: 
e we are about 
to close the public hearing.  We have a lot to do.  Anybody?  Yes, sir. 
Monte: My name is Monte Belton.  I represent the ________ land on the lower plat, 
here before the town of Monticello, and this was ________ landlocked.  He 
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and I love them. 
Chairwoman: Thank you, sir.  All right.  Last call.  I need a motion to close the public hearing, 
please. 
Man: 
Chairwoman: We have a motion to close.  I need a second. 
Man: Second the motion. 
Chairwoman: Second.  Steve?  All in favor?  Aye. 
Multiple: Aye. 
Chairwoman: I want to thank you all, and I want you to understand that we do take into account 
everything you say, and we take into account the emotions that go with it.  I will 
ask the Board now to discuss any questions, concerns, and then lead us to action 
tonight, which the actions can be to grant a Conditional Use Permit addendum, if 
you will, that adds new information or conditions.  The action can be to deny the 
an we 
it would leave things hanging.  So I turn to the Board now.  Jeff, would you like 
to start? 
Jeff: You know, I think a clarification is, based on the information we have, of what 
are the standards?  And you know, I guess when we talked about that earlier, I 
-do list, because I think that the 
experts to know those standards.  And, you know, based on what those standards 
are, I think can clarify our decision or change our decision. 
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Chairwoman: And are you asking about what San Juan County standards are, or industry 
right now. 
Jeff:  any standards to base that on.  I think industry in other 
affected areas, the standards would be ________. 
Chairwoman: Okay. 
Jeff:  ... 
Chairwoman: Right. 
Jeff: I guess the clarification I was hoping was coming from them, so that we could, 
you know, our decision was good or invalid. 
Chairwoman: So if, for example, we put a condition on that said, we want you to meet those 
industry standards, we need our staff to know what those are, is that kind of ... 
Jeff: Yeah, exactly. 
Chairwoman: Okay. 
Jeff: 
that, but if I have the right data, then I could probably make a decision on 
________.
Chairwoman: Okay.  Is that - okay.  Steve? 
Steve: 
some regard, my biggest concern right now is that we not pass, or not pass 
something that sets a prece
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bit confused.  My feeling is, they have done what they need to, that there is, no 
doubt, all kinds of opposition, and that people are going to be affected, and all 
how people may feel about it is different. 
Chairwoman: Trent? 
Trent: Um, okay.  I, too, agree with Mayor Allen and the Roleys that, you know, every 
going to see these wind towers.  Do I want to?  No, you know, it kind of takes 
away from our little small town community.  On the other side of that, these 
peop
requirements to build a wind farm.  You know, the people in the middle, you 
it on two sides, you know.  Maybe you can go out and look to the east and to the 
other projects, and they are zoned identical to this project.  How do we say, we 
 we can the two out north where, you know, maybe 
 - 
zoned exactly the same, and these people have rights.  These people that own this 
land have rights.  You people back there that own the donut hole, you have rights.  
But the people that have signed the contracts to have the wind project, they have 
deny them just because you have the donut hole. 





Chairwoman: Thank you, Trent.  Joe? 
Joe: 
pro  - conditions tonight 
until we have a chance to discuss it, and maybe even when we can be not so 
interfered with, with emotion. 
Chairwoman: Okay.  Carmella? 
Carmella: I actually agree with Jeff.  I think we need more time to investigate other 
standards, other things that are going on out there.  And I do believe people 
needed more time, more notice to what was going on. 
Man: 
Chairwoman: ant to say about notice is, that the public 
notice requirements of July 3, of tonight, were legally met by the county process 
where they publicize this stuff.  There is no requirement in our code that the 
neighbors need to be notified personally.  That is something that is on this 
 comments from 
interesting information.  I will add my two and a half - one and a half cents - 
e that 
San Juan County is in a position to write its own standards at this time, and 
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therefore, we need to go with what industry standards are stated, and perhaps not 
just the ones handed to us by the company involved, but much like Jeff said, to 
have our staff ready to support those conditions.  If we say they have to meet 
Planning and Zoning, because we have to plan.  Frankly, these projects, all three 
from the Board.  I stand to - I ask this Board for action, please.  And the actions 
can be to a motion with proper conditions to add to the CUP, a motion to not issue 
a CUP, or a motion to table decision pending, but if you make that motion, I 
request that you put specifics on the timetable and what 
Man: I make a motion to not do anything other than the CUP that exists with Wasatch 
Wind, other than try to push the 1 
ower 10. 
Chairwoman:  - adding to this existing CUP, the 
1 kilometer request. 
Man: If at all possible. 
Chairwoman: If possible.  Okay.  I have a motion on the table.  Do I have a second for 
ond it for discussion purposes.  So the basic idea here is that 
that with you.  Oh, the minutes for July ... 
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Joe: Let me just look at the July ________. 
Chairwoman: Are you looking at the July minutes, what we said, because we said I know that 
they have to meet - Joe? 
Joe: 
Chairwoman: Okay.  This is from our July meeting.  Go ahead. 
Joe: Okay.  We approve the permit upon the conditions that all federal, state, and local 
statutes and ordinances be met.  That all FAA fish and wildlife regulations and all 
industry standards be followed.  The Planning and Zoning Commission would 
review this permit in 1 year.  Also, before any building permit could be obtained, 
all leases and documentation must be completed. 
Chairwoman: Did everybody hear that?   
Man: Not a word. 
Chairwoman: Do you want to do that again, or do you want to ...  Nice and loud, yeah.  Okay, 
this is what the Conditional Use Permit was voted on in our July meeting.  Joe is 
going to read what we said, that it was approved.  Trent is making a proposition 
that we add just one more condition.  Go. 
Joe: Okay.  All federal, state, and local statutes and ordinances must be met.  All FAA 
fish and wildlife regulations, and that all industry standards be followed.  And the 
Planning and Zoning Commission would review this permit in 1 year.  Also, 
before any building permit could be obtained, all leases and documentation must 
be completed.  An amendment to the 




Joe: That was the conditions we imposed. 
Chairwoman:  - pardon me? 
Woman: 
Chairwoman: Well, that was the industry standards for sound and light. 
Woman: The lights at the substation were a concern ________ lights would only be 
________ employees, so that was probably ________. 
Chairwoman: Um, so as you can see, the Conditional Use Permit we issued talks about just what 
have the 
So they have to meet those requirements.  Trent is saying tonight, so far, the 
motion on the table is to keep the existing Conditional Use Permit and add the 
condition that the 1 kilometer distance be met at all possible points. 
Man: I have a question. 
Chairwoman: Certainly. 
Man: So what is - do we know what the industry standard is? 
Chairwoman: 
like flicker and lighting, that there are industry standards.  For example, I think 
you quoted Massachusetts a couple of times, that the states that have come up 
something, was




Chairwoman:  - these proposals are ahead of us, just like when the 
saying, you have to meet, but you have to meet them. 
Man: Dang it. 
Man: 
out there. 




no, wait, meet the California standards.  Oh no, wait, meet the - we have to direct 
talking to, that the standards be met at a particular point in 
time.  The proposed standards as of October 2012, in you know, in the industry, 
or something that gives them, I think.  Jeff, what ideas do you have to come up 
with this? 
Jeff: t think I - 
 - that data can be supplied to us, and ... 
Chairwoman: 
Jeff: 




might be one of the only states - or California ... 
Man: California has that. 
Chairwoman: They must have regs. 




Woman: Should we even be doing this? 
Chairwoman: 
Woman: s up to? 
Chairwoman:  - 
Okay.  At the moment, I have exactly one motion on the floor.  L
CUP will stand with the additional condition of a 1 kilometer distance for 
setbacks, if at all possible.  Yes, sir? 
Man: Can I amend that then? 
Chairwoman: Absolutely.  You can try. 
Man: 
Chairwoman: San Juan County - you want San Juan County standards? 
Man: 
Man: e the standards. 
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Chairwoman:  ... 
Man: Well then, they have to establish them in order to make them. 









Steve: I was just going to say, I mean, the other option is to approve it based on the 
 - 
yet set. 
Chairwoman: Well, we actually did approve a motion last time that already said this.  We 
already said ... 
Man: 
Chairwoman: I know, but all the others.  In other words, whenever you pass something, you 
approve something, you say, you must meet all the standards. 




stand  ... 
Man: 
too many people that are involved in it that are emotional, but I just think, you 
Man: We still have the building permit to issue, and we have some control left. 
Chairwoman: I worry that if we stop the process to incorporate rules into San Juan County at 
process, if you will. 
Man: 
Chairwoman: Right.  Exactly.  So it is my thought that what we have to say is, industry 
standards just for the moment, and then work behind the scenes to get our zoning 
tonight with adding to the CUP, however we decide we want to, but keep the 
wording that says industry standards because the people in the industry seem to 
At the moment, we just have the 1 K distance.  Do you want to amend the motion 
in some way, or - 















impacting visual and other factors of people - esthetic factors that people are 
worried about in the county.  I think that we did what we could the last time, 
County Commission, if they see it different, let them deal with the emotions and 
Chairwoman: I believe that - I did want to mention this when it came to the words appeal, 
he appeal is made, based on what 
we say tonight.  The appeal to the Commissioners cannot be made - well, it can be 
made, but it cannot be acted on, based solely on emotion.  If an appeal comes to 
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the Board, the Commissioners, and they say, those P&Zers gave them a 
appeal.  What they would have to say is, we are appealing because the CUP did 
not take into concern the health, welfare, and benefits of this - or, I mean, health, 
welfare, and safety of its citizens when making the conditions.  For example, we 
care.  If we said something like that, they would appeal a specific part of it, so I 
agree with you that if we do our land use work correctly, the appeal would go 
through, based on our land use decisions, and the Commissioners would be faced 
with their decision based on our work, not just their emotion.  Because emotion, 
e here. 
Man: Do you want to buy some property then? 
Trent: 
in July, CUP? 
Chairwoman: It was in July.  No change? 
Trent: Leave it as is. 
Chairwoman: Okay.  At this point, Trent has withdrawn his motion, and we stand with a 
to hear an action, then, from the Board. 
Steve: Can we discuss ... 
Chairwoman: Absolutely. 






them to what they have presented now, or would it? 
Chairwoman: retation, Steve.  They have offered up a few more things.  
what land to buy or who to buy it from, we could conditionally say, taking 
advantage of any mitigation issues as presented, or some general term that would 
ot more information.  Some of 
the information we got was just expounding on what existed.  Go ahead, Jeff. 
Jeff: 
some more landowners? 
Man: No more towers or anything. 
Man: They had to have all those places in ________. 
Chairwoman: 
Jeff: To me, it makes sense to approve it in its entirety, or disapprove in its entirety, 
versus, say, oh never mind, ________ came tonight. 
Chairwoman: Right. 
Jeff: Does that make sense? 
Chairwoman: 
motion be the existing one plus a few more pieces of information we got.  So yes, 
I do think that they gave us some more things to consider. 
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Man: Well, I just think, though, that we can approve that, but the standards have got to 
go under Greg, because otherwise, he has no way to measure that. 
Chairwoman: Well, what you might be able to say, then, is ... 
Man: ________ all projects, right? 
Chairwoman: But you could use the submitted ... 
Man: Because I see flaws in all of them.  For example, we said state and federal 
wildlife. 
Chairwoman: Okay. 
Man:  seen nothing 
from state, so I mean ... 
Chairwoman: Nothing said you have been in touch with state. 
Man:  - 
wildlife ... 
Chairwoman: they come in for the building 
report because they have to ... 
Man: 
Chairwoman: Of course.  Of course. 
Man: y to fill all the requirements. 
Chairwoman: Correct. 
Man:  ... 





mitigation of the wind and the flicker and all that?  Those are the added on things 
that we need to say yes or no to. 
Woman: Exactly. 
Chairwoman:  - we have another one of these to do, so I 
would love to move this along, please.
Woman: 
Man: No. 
Chairwoman: No, no, no, no, no.  The donut hole people have the right to confer with these 
folks and work a deal. 
Woman: Right. 
Chairwoman: 
to our conditions. 
Woman: Gotcha.  Okay. 
Man: Process question?  I have a process question. 
Chairwoman: A process question only.  Yes? 








Chairwoman:  - Steve, do you have enough thought of what you saw 
tonight to finish a motion for us? 
Steve: Not emotion, but a motion. 
Chairwoman: You got one? 
Steve:  ... 
Carmella: I know. 
Steve: We talked about the flicker and all the other stuff before ... 
Carmella: 
already written in ordinance and policy.  Lots of us would like to change that.  We 
Chairwoman: After your initial presentation, we had a great work session discussion about the 
ordinance, light ordinance, and things like that, but in order to move this county 
along, because Heaven forbid you would ever use the word moratorium or 
something like that, you need to go with the standards that are, you know, on the 
table.  So, does someone have an action for us this evening? 
Man: Well, I think the action is, is that we accept, you know, we do the, whatever, the 
CUP, but determine that those standards have to be on some type of a check and 
balance in order to approve them. 
Man:  ... 
Man:  ... 
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Man:  saying ...  
 - you can tell me ... 
Chairwoman: I understand.  There are other standards out there. 
Man: 
Chairwoman: 
Man: Are you saying, put that burden on building permit ________ for the time being? 
Chairwoman: 
them that.  You know, we want them to meet as much and as stiff, you know, as 








public notice twice.  They provide more information and not approve it.  You 
know, regardless of the overall emotion, and I guess what makes me feel bad ... 
Chairwoman:  ... 
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Man: Right.  The fact that there is a process for appeal. 
Chairwoman: Okay.  Okay. 
Man: And in all fairness, those towers have been up there for how long? 
Chairwoman: What, the met towers? 
Man: Yeah.  The met towers have been up there for a long time, so we need to 
________.
Chairwoman: Okay.  Does anyone have an action?  I would move that the Planning and Zoning 
Commission amend, or supplement - put an addendum on the Conditional Use 
incorporate as much flicker, light, sound, mitigation as possible, and to meet all 
industry standards of those challenges, and that all - reiterating that all and any 
new land purchase lease deals be in writing for any contiguous and affected 
landowners.  I further say that any mitigation and standards and conditions of this 
CUP must be met by any and all project development people, be they owners now 





Chairwoman: Okay.  Trent has second.  I have a motion and a second.  What I tried to say was, 
onight, which are 
mostly mitigation issues.  The landowners that are dealing with them on purchase 
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Man: I guess my only amendment will be is so the general public and all of us will 
know what those standards are when it comes time. 
Man: -
imposed upon themselves. 
Chairwoman: Okay.  The self-imposed standards - the self-imposed industry standards to the, let 
me say this first and then I can amend the motion to include it.  The self-imposed 
minimums - self-imposed industry standard, as presented for mitigation.  Does 
that say it right? 
Man: hat self-imposed ... 
Chairwoman: Self-presented.  They gave us, no, well, some of it is, but they gave us - I mean, if 
you read this, you can sit here and go, they say 37 ... 
Man: etts 
[inaudible]. 
Chairwoman: There you go.  You could do it that way. 
Man: 
Chairwoman: 
 - how would you approve this when 
they walked into your office?  Would you be able to have something in front of 





met the sound or the flicker or the light. 
Man: 
Woman: And then you can read what it says? 
Chairwoman: Okay, um ... 
Man: 
explore some standards ... 
Chairwoman: Do you have time to eat? 
Man: 
standards that you found. 
Man:  saying ________. 
Chairwoman: Yeah.  What do you mean? 
Man: When you say leave this motion alone, what do you ... 




Man: our motion. 
Chairwoman: No.  But what do you want me to do with my motion?  And be nice. 
Man: 




Commission next time. 
Chairwoman: In other words, we need some work sessions to study all of this, but tonight, you 
want to pass this motion and tell them ... 
Man: Yes. 
Man: Why study them? 
Man: 
Chairwoman: Go ahead. 
Man: 
give me some guidance as to what direction to go to find ... 
Chairwoman: What the industry standards are. 
Man: 
willing to help. 
Man: Okay.  Works for me. 
Chairwoman: 
? 
Man: I am, if ________. 
Chairwoman: 
meeting standards and meeting standards, and in the meantime, as we begin to set 
 - night.  We 
R08581001
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go, wow, but ... 
Man: Well, I just think that goes for both cases.  One, they can move forward if they 
know what they are, two, if people impose them, they know what they can 
________.
Chairwoman: 
standards are in here.  They say, we study the sound, the standards are 47 
decibels, we meet - lling us what 
to go with . 
Chairwoman: 
standards are in here.  They say, we study the sound, the standards are 47 
need to go with [the first part of t
 something. 
Man: 
on the table now for this, and to hold them to these standards, right? 
Chairwoman: Um-hm.  Exactly. 
Woman: And the mitigations that are [inaudible]. 
Chairwoman: And the mitigation.  They offered up some ideas for mitigation.  Some of them 
were monetary, some of them were ... 
R08591002
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Man: If someone does not like those - other landowners, whatever - they have this time 
in their appeal process to tell the county what they think it should be, and anyway, 
is that ... 
Chairwoman: Absolutely, and one issue for the Commissioners should they, if we approve and 
somebody appeals, one of the issues the Commissioners may or may not be able 
that have been approved until we have those standards in place, or they ... 
Man: [Inaudible.] 
Chairwoman: ack here working on them 
 add 
so I ask for ... 
Man: [Inaudible and write it up?] 
Chairwoman: ... I ask for the vote, please, on this, that includes ... 
Woman: [Inaudible.] 
Chairwoman: ... the standards, as presented.  The industry standards, as presented, and we have 
Man: Industry standards as presented by him or them? 
Chairwoman: In calling the question if this was ...  Carmella? 

















Jeff: I said, we need to move on.  I said Aye. 
Chairwoman: 
gentlemen, thank you.  We have another wind farm to go through this evening.  
and 




Chairwoman: All right, ladies and gentlemen.  Okay, consideration of a Conditional Use Permit 
for the Blue Mountain Wind Farm northeast of Monticello.  We are going to take 




LATIGO WIND PARK, LLC 4525 SOLTH '\X!ASATCI I BOUL.EV.'\RD, SCITE 120 
SALTL'\KE CITY, l'T;\H 84124 
FebruaryS,2013 
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL 
Mr. Daniel Bingham 
Northern Monticello Alliance 
I 82 East Lewis Park Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Re: Option to Purchase Real Property 
Dear Mr. Bingham: 
This letter, when fully executed, shall constitute an agreement pursuant to which Latigo Wind Park, LLC, a Delaware limited liability corporation (''Latigo Wind''), shall have an option to purchase certain real property owned by the memhers (each an ''Owner'') of the Northern Monticello Alliance, a Utah limited liability company (the "NMA"), which real property consists of approximately 80 acres subdivided into nine (9) parcels ( each a "Parcef') situated near Monticello, San Juan County, Utah, as more particularly described in attached Exltibit "A" (the Parcels are collectively referred to herein as the "Property"), inclusive of any and all rights, title and interests appurtenant to each Parcel, including, without limitation, water rights. Th is agreement is made in consideration of the promises, mutual covenants and agreements set forth below. 
1. Grant of Option. Each Owner herehy irrevocably grants, conveys, transfers, and assigns to Latigo Wind an exclusive option to purchase such Owner's Parcel on the terms and conditions herein provided (each an "Option"). 
2. Option Payment; Purchase Price; Term: Latigo Wind shall pay as consideration the following amounts (collectively, the "Consideration·'): 
a. Option Payment. Within five (5) business days of the full execution of the letter by the NMA and each Owner, Latigo Wind shall deposit ONE TIIOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY AND N0/100 DOLLARS ($1,250.00) per acre of the Property (the ·'Option Payment') with Anderson Oliver Title Company (the '•Titfe Company"), which Option Payment shall be held and disbursed by the Title Company as follows: 
i. To the Owner of each Parcel in the amount of ONE THOUSAND TWO 
HUNDRED FIFTY AND N0/100 DOLLARS ($1,250.00) per acre of such Owner's Parcel immediately fo!lowing the fo!I and complete withdrawal of the "Appea/1,·" (as defined helow) on or before February 25, 2013 by the NMA and Daniel Bingham in accordance with the provisions of Section 8 below; provided that Latigo Wind shall have received confirmation from the Title Company that each Owner is the owner of record of a Parcel prior to the disbursement of the Option Payment to such Owner. Except as otherwise set forth in this Jetter, each Option Payment shall be non-refundable to Latigo Wind and shall not be 
applicable to the "Purcltal·e Price" (as defined below). 
ii. To Latigo Wind in the event that (A) the NMA and Danie! Bingham fail to fully and completely withdraw the Appeals pursuant to the provisions of Section 8 
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below on or before February 25, 2013, or (8) Latigo Wind provides timely "Due Diligence Termination Notices" (as defined below) to each Owner in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 below. Upon the occurrence of either event 
described in subparts (A) and (B), this letter shall terminate, and, except as stated otherwise herein, neither Latigo Wind, the NMA nor each Owner shall have any further obligation to each other pursuant to this letter. 
b. Purchase Price. In the event Latigo Wind elects to exercise each Option in accordance with the terms of this letter, the purchase price to be paid for each Parcel shall be TEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY AND NO/I 00 DOLLARS ($10,450.00) per acre (the "Purchase Price"), payable in cash at each "Closing" (as defined below), less typical deductions for title insurance and closing costs. Latigo Wind also shall reimburse the Owners for any out-of-pocket water development costs incurred as of September 1, 2012; provided that the total amount of al I payments to all Owners for water development costs shall not exceed $20,000.00 (the "Water Development Reimbursement"). The Water Development Reimbursement shall be due and payable at Closing, subject to reasonable evidentiary documentation of such costs. 
c. Term. The term of each Option shall be for a period of time commencing as of the full execution of this letter and continuing for two (2) years (the "Term"). Each Option shall be exercised, if at all, by written notice from Latigo Wind to each Owner ( each an "Exercise Notice") prior to the expiration of the Term. 
3. Title Review; Due Diligence Period. Latigo Wind shall have that period of time following the full execution of this letter up to and including February 22, 2013 (the "Due Diligence Period") to confirm and verify that each Parcel is acceptable to Latigo Wind, to conduct any studies, investigations, tests or other examinations as Latigo Wind deems necessary ( collectively, the "Due Diligence Investigations"), and to verify that (a) there are no unacceptable title matters affecting each Parcel, (b) there are no toxic or hazardous substances or any other environmental conditions on or underneath each Parcel, and ( c) there are no other unusual, significant or unacceptable matters or issues that create significant liability, or impair the use or value of each Parcel, for Latigo Wind for its intended purposes. Prior to the expiration of the Due Diligence Period, Latigo Wind may terminate this letter for the reasons stated in (a), (b) or (c) of this Section by providing written notice to each Owner (each a "Due Diligence Termination Notice"). Except as and to the extent caused by each Owner, Latigo Wind shall indemnify each Owner for any damage to such Owner's Parcel caused by or at the direction of Latigo Wind, personal injury caused by Latigo Wind's activities on the such Owner's Parcel or other claims resulting from Latigo Wind's due diligence activities on such Owner's Parcel through the term of the Due Diligence Period. In connection with any such Due Diligence Investigations by Latigo Wind, Latigo Wind shall exercise commercially reasonable efforts and, further, shall endeavor not to unreasonably disrupt each Owner's use of such Owner's Parcel, if any. 
4. Exercise of Option; Termination of Option. In the event that Latigo Wind determines to exercise each Option for the acquisition of each Parcel in accordance with the provisions of this letter, Latigo Wind shall provide an Exercise Notice to every Owner prior the expiration of the Term. If Latigo Wind elects to exercise any of the Options, Latigo Wind shall be obligated to exercise each and every Option in accordance with the terms of this letter, and further, shall be obligated to exercise each and every Option prior to commencing any significant construction activities of any wind farm project on parcels adjacent to the Property (the "Wind Farm"); provided, however, that Latigo Wind shall retain the right at any time prior to the commencement of significant construction activities of the Wind Farm to terminate each Option and this letter for any reason so long as Latigo Wind provides a written termination notice to each Owner (each an "Option Termination Notice"). Latigo Wind and the Owners expressly agree that no 
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construction activities shall be commenced on any of the Parcels prior to Closing, unless 
otherwise agreed to, in writing, by Latigo Wind and the Owner of such Parcel. 
For purposes of this letter, "significant construction activities" shall not, and shall not be deemed 
to, include installing, erecting or constructing any meteorological or other wind assessment 
towers and/or equipment, undertaking minor grading or related earthwork, or undertaking other 
construction activities or actions which may be required to demonstrate the "beginning of 
construction" under the federal Production Tax Credit ("PTC") program. 
5. Closing. Unless otherwise waived by Latigo Wind, the closing of the acquisition of each Parcel 
by Latigo Wind (each a "Closing" and collectively, the "Closings") shall occur 
contemporaneously within thirty (30 days) after issuance of an Exercise Notice but no later 
fifteen (15) calendar days prior to the commencement of any significant construction activities of 
the Wind Farm. The Closing shall comply with the terms and provisions included in attached 
Exhibit "B" (the "General Provisions"), and furthermore, at each Closing, each Owner shall duly 
execute and deliver to Latigo Wind a special warranty deed for such Owner's Parcel, together 
with any and all water rights and interests, easements and rights-of-way interests appurtenant to, 
or associated with, such Owner's Parcel, free and clear of all liens, restrictions, reservations, and 
encumbrances arising by, through and under such Owner (each a "Special Warranty Deed"). 
6. Conditions Precedent to Closing; Additional Terms and Conditions: The obligation of 
Latigo Wind to purchase each Parcel under this letter is subject to the satisfaction, on or before 
the date of the Closing, of the following conditions, unless otherwise waived by Latigo Wind: (a) 
each Parcel is in substantially the same condition on the Closing date as existing as of the date 
this letter is fully executed; (b) Latigo Wind has had the opportunity to inspect each Parcel prior 
to Closing to confirm that there are no unusual, significant or unacceptable title, environmental or 
other matters or issues that create significant liability, or impair the use or value of each Parcel, 
for Latigo Wind for its intended purposes, and (c) each Owner can deliver good, marketable and 
insurable title of its respective Parcel, free and clear of all liens, encumbrances or other 
exceptions to title, except for the "Permitted Exceptions" (as defined in Exhibit "B"). Further, 
unless otherwise waived by Latigo Wind, each Closing is contingent upon, and shall occur 
contemporaneously with, the Closing for all other Parcels, and in the event that, at any time prior 
to the Closing, the Closing for one or more Parcels shall fail to close as contemplated hereunder, 
Latigo Wind shall have the right to extend the date of the Closing for all Parcels as may be 
necessary or appropriate to accommodate such delay. 
7. Notice of Option: Concurrently with the execution and delivery of this letter, Latigo Wind and 
each Owner shall execute and deliver, as evidence of each Option, a Notice of Option suitable for 
recording in the official real estate records of San Juan County, which shall be recorded against 
each Parcel, respectively, subject to no prior liens, encumbrances, reservations, or restrictions 
arising by, through or under each respective Owner ( other than real property taxes and 
assessments not yet due and payable). 
8. Dismissal of Appeals; Prohibited Activities. On or before February 25, 2013 the NMA and 
Daniel Bingham, in his individual capacity, shall formally withdraw any and all appeals filed by 
Daniel Bingham and/or the NMA with San Juan County Board of Commissioners challenging the 
San Juan County Planning Commission's approvals of a conditional use permit for the Wind 
Farm (the "Appeals"), and shall provide Latigo Wind and the Title Company with reasonably 
satisfactory evidentiary documentation of San Juan County's confirmation and acceptance of the 
withdrawal. Further, upon receipt of the Option Payment, each Owner and each Owner's 
representatives (including, without limitation, Michael E. Cole), the NMA, and their respective 
agents, successors and assigns, agree and covenant not to engage, undertake or otherwise 
participate in any "Prohibited Activities" (as defined below) for the duration of the Term so long 
as the Option Payment is paid to each Owner in accordance with Section 2(a) and, in the event 
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that Latigo Wind exercises each Option to purchase each Parcel, for an additional period of twenty-four (24) months following the Closing (the "Non-Disparagement Period''). 
In the event that an Owner or its representative (including, without limitation, Michael E. Cole), the NMA, or Daniel Bingham commits a material breach of this letter by engaging, undertaking or otherwise participating in a Prohibited Activity during the Non-Disparagement Period (a "Material Breach"), in addition to any other legal or equitable remedies available to Latigo Wind, all Option Payments shall be returned to Latigo Wind by each Owner upon receipt of written notice of such Material Breach from Latigo Wind, together with reasonable evidentiary documentation thereof; provided that if a Material Breach occurs anytime during the Term, Latigo Wind shall have the option to terminate this letter, but in the event that Latigo Wind elects not to terminate this letter and, then, proceeds to exercise each Option in accordance with the term and conditions hereof, each Option Payment not otherwise returned to Latigo Wind by each Owner as required hereunder shall be deducted from the Purchase Price for such Owner's Parcel at Closing. 
For purposes hereof, "Prohibited Activities" shall include the following: (a) protesting, appealing or challenging any governmental approvals, permits and other authorizations for the Wind Farm (collectively, the "Project Approvals"), including, without limitation, speaking out against the Wind Farm at any public hearings; (b) influencing, or attempting to influence, the opinion of any public official with respect to the Wind Farm and/or the Project Approvals; (c) making 
disparaging, negative or derogatory comments or statements to any third parties that would reflect unfavorably upon the image or reputation of Latigo Wind and its member, Wasatch Wind 
Intermountain, LLC, including, but not limited to, each entity's officers, directors, members and employees (collectively, the "Latigo Parties"); or (d) assisting any third party in any way with any of the actions or activities prohibited in subsections (a) through (c) hereof. 
In addition, the Latigo Parties shall not make any disparaging, negative or derogatory comments or statements to any third parties that would reflect unfavorably upon the image or reputation of any Owner or any Owner's representative (including, without limitation, Michael E. Cole), the NMA or Daniel Bingham. 
9. Waiver of Claims. In exchange for the mutual promises, covenants and agreements set forth herein, (a) the NMA represents and warrants that Michael E. Cole, a representative of the Owner of Parcel 7, and Thomas F. Lind, an Owner, each shall execute a release and waiver of claims, both of which are attached as Exhibit C (together, the "Waivers of Claims"), concurrently with the execution of this letter by the NMA and each Owner; and (b) Latigo Wind represents and warrants that Wasatch Wind, Inc., a Delaware corporation, shall execute the Waivers of Claims with Michael E. Cole and Thomas F. Lind, respectively, concurrently with the execution of this letter by Latigo Wind. 
I 0. Confidentiality. Except as and to the extent required to effect the transactions contemplated hereunder (including disclosure to third-party legal counsel and consultants, accountants, and/or advisors of the respective parties, as the case may be, solely for the purpose of evaluating, negotiating and implementing the transactions) or to enforce the terms hereof, the terms and conditions of this letter, and any agreements entered into in connection with this letter, shall be kept strictly confidential by the parties and shall not be disclosed to any person or entity without the advance, written consent of each of the parties to this letter, which consent may be withheld in each party's sole discretion. 
I I. Assignment. Latigo Wind, in its sole discretion, shall have the right to assign its interests in and to, and its obligations under, this letter or any other agreements executed in connection herewith. 
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This letter conveys Latigo Wind's offer to purchase the NMA Property for the Consideration for and under the tenns and conditions stated herein, inclusive of the General Provisions in attached Exhibit "B." If each Owner accepts the terms of this offer, please have each Owner sign below, where indicated, and return the original signed Acknowledgment and Acceptance. Upon execution by each Owner, this letter shalJ be a binding contract for the purchase and sale of each such Owner's Parcel in accordance with the tenns and provisions stated herein, which provisions shall be binding upon the parties hereto and enforceable according to their terms. The exhibits attached hereto are hereby incorporated into this letter by this reference. 
The response to this offer is requested on or before February ! 2, 201 3, after which, unless the offer is accepted as specified herein, this letter shall be deemed withdrawn and shall be ofno further force and effect. 
Thank you for your consideration of this offer. 
LATIGO WIND PARK, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company 
By its Member, WASATCH WIND INTERMOUNTAIN, LLC, 
a Delaware limited liability company 
I/ i 1/, { ,,/" 
, !J .J f-·.,; /\-,.<.,_ l 
~ 
By: __ , _________ , ____ _ 
Christine Watson Mikell, Manager 
ACKNOWLEDGED, AGREED AND ACCEPTED BY: 
NORTHERN MONTICELLO ALLIANCE, a Utah limited liability 
company 
By: 
Name: ________ _ 
Its: 
Dated this __ day of_ .. ___ , 2013 
ACKNOWLEDGED, AGREED AND ACCEPTED by ANDERSON OLIVER TITLE COMPANY, as the Title Company, ,,..hich hereby acknowledges the tenns and conditions of this letter and agrees to hold and disburse the Option Deposit, and all other monies, documents and instruments to he deposited with the Title Company in accordance herewith. 
ANDERSON OLIVER TITLE COMPANY, a Utah corporation 
By: __ _ 
Pnnt Name. ____ _ -----Title: _______ _ 
Dated this ___ day of ___ _ -.' 2013. 
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This le!ter conveys Latigo Wind's offer to purchase tl1c l\MA Propcny for the Consideration for 
and under the tenns and conditions stated herein, inclusive of the General Provision~ in attached E.l:hibit 
"B." If each Owner accepts the tcnns of this offer, please have each Owner sign below, where indicated, 
and return the original signed Acknowledgment and Acceptance. Upon execution by each Owner, this 
letter shall be a bmding e011trnct for the purchase ,md sale of each such Owner's Parcel in acrordancc with 
rlie term; and pro;bions stated herein, which provisiorn. shall be binding upon the panics hereto and 
enforceable accordi11g to their terms. The exhibit~ attached hereto are hereby incorporated into this Jette!' 
by this reference. 
The response to this offer i~ re1.1uested on or before February 12., 2013. after which, llJllcS~ the 
offer is i1cceptcd as specified herein. this letter slmll be deemed withdrawn and shall be of no further force 
(tnd effect. 
Thank you for your consideration of this offer. 
LATIGO WIND PARK, LLC. a Delaware limited liability company 
By its Member, WASATCH WIND T1',.TTERMOUNT AJN. LLC. 
a Ddaware limited liability company 
By•c ~-~-~~~-----
Chri.mne Watson Mikell. Manager 
ACKNOWLEDGED. AGREED A,VD ACCEPTED Bl',-
l\ORTHERl\ \101\T!CELLO ALLlAI\CE, a Utah limited liability 
wmpany 
By: 
~ame: ~ ,r._,,, ...,. , ~ r.f ,,<A 
]ts: ('11tt../ ~f1V'7 1- t , .. ~:'It.--;¼._ 
Datcdthis 1 2dayof re-:¼ , 20!3 
ACKNOWLEDGED, AGREED AND ACCEPTED by ANDERSON OLIVER TITLE 
COMP /\NY, as the Title Company. whidi hereby acknowledges the tcnm and condition~ of this letter 
and agrees to hold and dishursc the Option Deposit, and al! other 111onies, document~ and instruments to 
be deposited wi1h the Titk Company in accordance he rev. ilh. 
ANDERSON OLIVER TITLE C:0~1PANY, a U1ah corporation 
By.·_---------------Print Name: ________________ _ 
Title: _________________ _ 
Dated this t.luy uf _______ , 2013. 
, 2.WM48. I 2 003'12U~·1XJ(){N 
Addendum I 
Evidence submitted to Planning Commission prior to its September 14, 2015 Decision (Based on 
Declaration of Sean McBride) 
1. IFC Substation Design Drawing LAT-EL-01R3 (R726) 
2. Latigo Wind Farm Sound Assessment dated July 28, 2015 (R730), which included the sound 
assessment completed in 2014 (R732); 
3. Updated Shadow Flicker Impact Assessment dated January 28, 2014 (R755) 
4. Updated Shadow Flicker Impact Assessment dated August 21, 2015 (R763) 
5. sPower and Discovery Center Agreements; (R774) 
6. Setback Requirement Maps with updated turbine locations (R775) 
 
Evidence submitted to County Commission on Appeal but not submitted to Planning Commission prior 
to its September 14, 2015 Decision 
1. E-mails with Daniel Bingham (R449) 
2. NMA Purchase Option Agreement (R619) 
3. November 9, 2015 Water Report (R0647) 
4. October 16, 2015 Appraisal Report (R0657) 
5. Unsigned Conditional Use Permit Application Latigo Wind Park Summary of Findings and 
Conclusions (R0891) 
6. Wind Lease Agreements (R1084) 
7. Transmission Easement Agreement (R1139) 
8. Transmission Easement Option Agreements (R1141) 
9. 2012 Sound study report (R1198) (showing original turbine locations) (R1207) 
10. 2012 Flicker report (R1219) (showing original turbine locations) (R1223) 
11. 2012 Ice Throw report (R1269) (showing original turbine locations) (R1271) 
12. Avian Habitat report (R1273) 
13. Bat acoustic report (R1280) 
14. 2012 Raptor Nest Survey Report (R1283) 
15. February 2014 Existing access road assessment (R1346) 
16. July 9th, 2014 Geotechnical Engineering Services Preliminary Findings (R1352) 
17. Transmission lines report (R1370) 
18. September 19, 2013 PSC Hearing transcript (R1374) 
19. December 18, 2013 Transformer Purchase Agreement (R1667) 
20. HVT Purchase Agreement (R1673) 
21. Assembly, Vacuum Filling and Field Tests (R1683) 
22. December 17, 2013 Latigo Wind Park, LLC Latigo Wind Project Brochure (R1689) 
23. December 2013 Certificate to Latigo Wind Park, LLC Regarding Construction of Generation 
Transformer (R1701) 
24. January 29, 2014 Access Road Photos (R1708) 
25. September 23, 2015 sPower Mitigation letter (R1748) 
26. September 30, 2015 Greg Adams letter supporting February 2015 building permit (R1757) 




BEFORE THE SAN JUAN COUNTY COMMISSION 
SITTING AS THE SAN JUAN COUNTY LAND USE APPEAL AUTHORITY 
SUMMIT WIND POWER, LLC and NORTHERN MONTICELLO ALLIANCE, LLC, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
SAN JUAN COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION, 
Appellee. 
AMENDMENT TO WRITTEN DECISION 
Commissioner Phil Lyman Dissent: 
Mitigation is a central point in the two appeals filed by Northern Monticello 
Alliance (NMA) and Summit Wind. On February 8, 2013 Latigo Wind Park, LLC (Latigo) 
paid NMA $1,250 per acre for an option to purchase all of the land of the NMA for 
$10,450 per acre. The agreement was signed by Christine Watson Mikell as Manager 
for Latigo and, as near as I can tell, by all the land owners in the NMA, by Dan Bingham 
as the official representative of the NMA, and by Daniel Anderson for Anderson Oliver 
Title Company. (see tab 4 of the black binders given to the Commissioners at the 
November 10, hearing). 
That option agreement said that "each Option Payment shall be non-refundable 
to Latigo Wind and shall not be applicable to the "Purchase Price". It also was 
con1ingent on, among other things, NMA withdrawing its appeals before February 25, 
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2013 and then cooperating with Latigo by not filing appeals for two years thereafter. 
(Item 8 of the option agreement). 
I do know all the specifics of the negotiations between Latigo and NMA, but it is 
clear that the option was not exercised. I am troubled that Latigo has since criticized 
NMA for not filing timely appeals. Whether there were formal appeals in place prior to 
February 25, 2013, I don't know, but from my observation, NMA at least complied by not 
filing additional appeals during the time agreed upon in the Option Agreement. 
Also included in the black binders from November 10th is a string of emails 
between Sean McBride, legal counsel for Latigo, and Dan Bingham. That string of 
communications chronicles the back-and-forth negotiations between the two entities 
following the lapse of the option agreement, but the purchase price range had dropped 
to between $1,000 and $9,000 per acre. 
When it comes to a fair mitigation settlement between a private business and 
private individuals, it would be inappropriate for the County insert themselves into that 
process other than to the extent that the Planning and Zoning Commission made 
financial mitigation a condition of the Conditional Use Permit. 
Clearly the payment of the $1,250 per acre was for an option. This option is a 
separate financial instrument. It was purchased, and it was allowed to expire 
unexercised. It was specifically not "applicable to the Purchase Price." That $1 ,250 was 
a cost incurred in the course of doing business on the part of Latigo. It allowed them to 
move forward in developing the Project. Had they been unable to ultimately bring the 
project to fruition then they would not exercise the option and would not be stuck with 80 
acres of land. The option was a hedge against that potentiality. Since the project did 
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move forward Latigo could be certain that they would not be taken advantage of and 
their Project held hostage by the NMA land owners because they had a solid option 
agreement in place. By letting the option lapse, they gave up that insurance, and are 
now faced with striking some sort of mitigation deal with the NMA landowners. 
In relation to the Summit Wind/Kimberly Ceruti appeal, the matter is a bit more 
direct. Summit claims that Latigo obtained their CUP and Building Permit without having 
leases in place, or claiming leases on parcels that were actually under lease with Mrs. 
Ceruti. 
Mitigation Evidence: 
On November 6, San Juan County Administrator, Kelly Pehrson forwarded via 
email, a Letter and 10 attachments from Snell & Wilmer, legal counsel for Latigo. The 
attachments were 
1) The original conditional use permit signed by Greg Adams on July 5, 2012, 
and apparently submitted and signed by Christine Mikell on July 18, 2012. 
2) The Conditional Use Permit Use Application prepared by the San Juan 
County Planning and Zoning Board. 
3) A March 28, 2013 letter from San Juan County Deputy Attorney, Walter Bird, 
clarifying that the effective date of Latigo Wind Park's San Juan County Conditional Use 
Permit is officially October 4, 2012. 
4) A February 25, 2014 letter from Santee detailing their inspection of existing 
roads. 
5) A geotechnical report from Terracon. 
6) A map showing transmission line location 
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7) An August 28, 2013 letter from Greg Adams approving a six month 
extension of the October 4, 2012 permit, apparently to April 4, 2014 
8) The complete transcript of a hearing between Rocky Mountain Power, Blue 
Mountain Power, Latigo Wind Park, LLC, Division of Public Utilities, Office of Consumer 
Services. Utah Attorney General's Office, Utah Clean Energy, and Ellis-Hall 
Consultants, 
9) A July 16, 2015 letter from s*Power to San Juan County Attorney, Kendall 
Laws with the title of: Latigo Wind Park - Evidence of Substantial Work Under CUP. 
This letter is accompanied by a great deal of evidence of road work and contracts 
entered into which substantiate the "substantial work'' element of the CUP. 
10) A September 23, 2015 letter from Sean McBride detailing mitigation work 
perfomed by s*Power. 
11) A September 30, 2015 letter from Greg Adams to Sean McBride. 
12) Public notice for Planning and Zoning Public Meeting September 9, 2015. 
13) Public notice for Planning and Zoning Meeting September 14, 2015. 
14) A September 14, 2015 letter from s*Power to San Juan County Attorney, 
Kendall Laws with the title of: Latigo Wind Project CUP and Building Permit. 
The condition of "Substantial Work" required to retain a valid building permit was 
extensively addressed by the Planning and Zoning Board and they made the 
determination that substantial work had been done. Substantial Work was not, I believe, 
an element of the November 10, 2015 hearing, and the Hearing Authority has not 
questioned the Planning and Zoning Commissions decision on this matter. 
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The September 23, 2015 letter from Sean McBride detailing mitigation work is 
useful to a limited extent, but there is no evidence that even this letter was considered 
by the Planning and Zoning Commission at their September 9, or 14, 2015 meetings. 
The date on the letter would indicate that they would not have had the letter, but may 
have had similar information. In this letter Mr. McBride says that Latigo altered its 
original plan for turbines in response to the sound and light flicker mitigation 
requirement. He says that the new GE turbines are quieter than the Vestas alternative 
and uses a shorter hub height. Mr. Bingham says that the new turbines are actually 
louder than the original proposed turbines and that s"Power has moved the turbines 
closer to the NMA property. Mr. McBride argues that neither San Juan County nor Utah 
have sound ordinances so they hired consultants to provide them with 
recommendations, which Latigo apparently has met Mr. McBride then includes a 
decisive statement: "Hence, the Project was able to avoid any sound impact at all above 
threshold for existing residences and businesses." He then goes on to explain that 
some parcels exceed the 55 decibel threshold and that the new sound study using the 
GE turbines reduced the sound by 1 decibel resulting in only "two of the inholdings 
parcels now exceeding the threshold of 55 decibels." 
In terms of Flicker light control, Mr. McBride uses the same approach, stating that 
since neither San Juan County nor Utah have shadow flicker ordinances, Latigo 
contracted with the same engineering company to provide industry guidelines. And Mr. 
McBride draws a similar conclusion, stating that four of the nine parcels would have 
flicker impact with the new GE turbine, down from six parcels with the Vestas Turbine. 
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The issues of sound, flicker, light, are technical questions that deserve at least 
some evidence of effort on the part of the planning and zoning commission to assess. 
No such evidence was presented to the Hearing Authority. I am inclined however to give 
the benefit of the doubt to the Planning and Zoning commission as Marcia Hadenfeldt, 
the chairman of the commission, asserted that her board had considered these impacts 
and determined that the terms of the CUP had been met with regard to these specific 
items. 
Where I find adverse evidence is in regard to item IV of Mr. McBride's letter. The 
$1 ,250 payment was an option payment. All evidence suggests that the NMA met the 
conditions placed on them, and that, from Mr. McBrides information, their properties are 
impacted by the Latigo Projet. While Latigo traded hands during that period, the Option 
agreement dated February 28, 2013 was not between Wasatch Wind and the NMA but 
between Latigo Wind Park, LLC and the NMA. It is disingenuous to now suggest that 
s*Power is entitled to the assets of Latigo Wind Park, LLC, but not the attendant 
obligations. 
The original Conditional Use Permit drawn up by the Planning and Zoning 
Department clearly included the following: "PROVIDED THAT the following conditions 
shall be imposed upon the Latigo Wind Park for the protection of adjacent properties 
and the public welfare, which conditions shall be imposed either as operating standards 
for the project or as a mitigation standard to be verified by technical documents, proof of 
payment or offers of payment to be verified at the time of building permit issuance." 
The agreement specifies as one of several mitigation requirements: "These 
mitigation requirements shall be applied and compliance verified at the time of building 
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permit issuance through evidence of payment or qualifying offers of payment. In lieu of 
actual payment or where payment is not yet due, the applicant may provide appropriate 
financial assurances of future payment. such as bonding or an escrow of funds that may 
be disbursed in the future to satisfy the mitigation requirement. " 
Not only does Mr. McBride falsely claim the purchase of an option instrument 
"represented an approximation of the diminution in value of the properties, but the 
actual full value of the properties as has now been affirmed by appraisal," he states: "It 
is important to note that regardless of what NMA representatives might allege, there 
was no obligation contained in the Option Agreement that Wasatch Wind exercise the 
option and purchase the properties." He says: "Ultimately, Wasatch Wind determined 
that it did not need the NMA properties for use in the Project area so it decided not to 
exercise its purchase option." 
This is evidence that Latigo did not mitigate in relation to the NMA Land Owners. 
The statement in section IV C, that "The NMA property owners have been paid full value 
for their properties under the mitigation agreement" is absurd. 
In issuing our initial decision following the November 10, 2015 hearing, the 
Hearing Authority took a passive approach in hopes that the Planning and Zoning 
Commission, a volunteer board with no expertise in the technical aspects of wind 
energy, would re-visit the conditions which it placed on their CUP. 
The decision of the Hearing Authority to re-convene, and the subsequent 
decision to reverse their order to remand the matter to the Planning and Zoning 
Commission is, in both instances, misguided and capricious. 
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In this dissenting opinion I am obligated to point out the prima facie conflict of 
interest that Greg Adams has in relation to this project. Well intentioned as his actions 
may be, it is not appropriate for Mr. Adams to unilaterally sign a letter (exhibit 11 
referenced above) stating: "Although not required by San Juan County as a condition of 
the CUP, Latigo Wind Park indicates that where it could not avoid impacts to its 
neighbors, it provided mitigation through compensation." Adams continues: ''In its 
above-mentioned letter, Latigo Wind Park indicates that it entered into mitigation 
agreements with the Four Corners School and the 'Northern Monticello Alliance.' Since 
these were private agreements, San Juan County has no way of verifying the veracity of 
Latigo Wind Park Claims. However there is nothing to indicate that Latigo Wind Park's 
assertion is not true." 
Conflict of interest aside; how can this be? When the CUP states that proof of 
financial mitigation payments be verified before a building permit is issued. No one is 
asserting that the specifics of the financial transaction between Latigo and NMA are the 
county's business, but what we have here is clear evidence that Latigo Wind Park's 
assertion, that it provided mitigation through compensation to NMA land owners, is 
completely false. 
The statement from Mr. Greg Adams starts with a false premise followed by a 
string of false logic to arrive at a conclusion. Perhaps even more concerning is the 
immediate adoption of Mr. Greg Adams' letter by Latigo in their November 5, 2015 letter 
via legal counsel, Snell & Wilmer stating: "The County reviewed s*Power's submission 
and on September 30, 2015 issued a letter determining that consistent with the 
conditions of Latigo's CUP, the project has completed "as much flicker, light, and sound 
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mitigation as possible." The Snell and Wilmer letter then goes into a lengthy justification 
of the dollar amounts now offered to NMA for additional mitigation which are not within 
the purview of the Appeal Authority. I do not know the role that Rob Adams plays in the 
management of s*Power. Both he and his brother Greg Adams are very likely entirely 
honest and fair, and may have nothing to do with each other in relation to the CUP. the 
Building Permit, the extensions, or the mitigation evaluation. But a sibling relationship is 
one that, on its face, should influence the dealings between the two entities. The County 
is grateful for businesses who desire to locate in San Juan County and, whether one 
likes the wind towers or not, San Juan County ordinances encourage investment and 
development where it is possible. In a shrinking economy and with a shrinking property 
tax base, it is exciting to have the prospects of jobs and development. Which is even 
more reason to make sure that those with prima facie conflicts of interest make 
adequate disclosures and step away from the process so as not to cast even the 
appearance of a cloud over an impartial business transaction. 
I believe that this matter could and should have been remanded to the Planning 
and Zoning Commission. In reviewing the minutes of their October 4, 2012 board 
meeting, several Planning and Zoning board members expressed that they did not have 
the expertise needed to set standards or evaluate mitigating measures. They suggested 
that Mr. Greg Adams bring back some of the industry standards used in California, or 
Massachusetts, or on the Spanish Fork, Utah Project. There is no evidence that any of 
this was done. It would be an easy fix to have the Planning and Zoning Commission re-
evaluate. I would anticipate that their decision would be the same, but it would have the 
support of due diligence. 
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In regard to the Summit Wind!Kimberly Ceruti appeal: The Planning and Zoning 
commission stated in their CUP that a Building Permit would not be issued until leases 
were verified. Mrs. Ceruti claims that she held the lease on a number of parcels which 
were claimed in the initial application for the Latigo Project. If that is the case and the 
project was adjusted to comply with actual ownership that is appropriate, but that 
Planning and Zoning Commission should provide a finding of facts to support the 
issuance of a building permit. 
In either case - the NMA or the Summit Wind appeal - San Juan County has not 
made any motions toward revoking the permits for the Latigo Project. My objective is to 
see the permits perfected so that this massive investment by s*Power can move 
forward without undue friction. Reversing the prior decision of the Appeal Authority will 
not serve any of the parties, least of all San Juan County. 
DATE: 8 December 2015. 
Dissenting 
Commissioner Phil Lyman, 
By: Commiss· er yman 
Authorized Si n ry 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on 8 December 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Amendment to Written Decision to be served upon the following by first class, 
postage prepaid U.S. mail: 
Josh Skogen 
s*Power 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
PaulW. Shakespear 
Snell & Wilmer, LLP 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for s"Power 
Daniel Bingham 
Managing Director 
Northern Monticello Alliance, LLC 
182 E Lewis Park Dr. 
Bountiful Utah 84010 
Kimberly Ceruti 
Member 
Summit Wind Power, LLC 
4733 Hiddenwoods Lane 
Murray, Utah 84107 
San Juan County Chief Administrative Officer 
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